r son; but as a public one, he must expect nothing from me. "Go, therefore, and tell him, in my name, that the best coun"sel I can give him is to lay down his arms, and not reject 66 any articles of peace which may be proposed to him. This is "the best advice I could give him as a good and faithful friend."

Antiochus thought that the Romans could not have prescrib ed harder conditions had they conquered him; and such a peace appeared to him as fatal as the most unfortunate war. He therefore prepared for a battle, as the Romans did also on

their side.

The king was encamped at Thyatira, where hearing that Scipio lay ill at Elea, he sent his son to him. This was a reme. dy that operated both on the body and mind, and restored both joy and health to a sick and afflicted father. After embracing him a long time in his arms, "go," says he to the envoys, "and thank the king from me, and tell him, that at present "the only testimony I can give him of my gratitude is to ad"vise him not to fight, till he hears of my being arrived in the "camp." Perhaps Scipio thought that a delay of some days would give the king an opportunity of reflecting more seriously than he had hitherto done, and incline him to conclude a solid peace.

Although the superiority of Antiochus's forces, which were much more numerous than those of the Romans, might natural ly induce him to venture a battle immediately, nevertheless the wisdom and authority of Scipio, whom he considered as his last refuge in case any calamitous accident should befal him, prevailed over the former consideration. He passed the river Phrygius (it is thought to be the Hermus,) and posted himself near Magnesia, at the foot of mount Sipylus, where he fortified his camp so strongly as not to fear being attacked in it.

The consul followed soon after. The armies continued seve`ral days in sight, during which Antiochus did not once move out of his camp. His army consisted of 70,000 foot, 12,000 horse, and 54 elephants: that of the Romans was composed, in the whole of but 30,000 men, and 16 elephants. The consul, finding that the king lay still, summoned his council to debate on what was to be done, in case he should persist in refusing to venture a battle. He represented, that as the winter was at hand, it would be necessary, notwithstanding the severity of the season, for the soldiers to keep the field; or if they should go into winter-quarters, to discontinue the war till the year following. The Romans never shewed so much contempt for an enemy as on this occasion: they all cried aloud that it would be proper

to march immediately against the enemy; to take the advantage of the ardour of the troops, who were ready to force the palisades, and pass the intrenchments, to attack the enemy in their camp, in case they would not quit it. There is some probability that the consul was desirous of anticipating the arrival of his brother, since his presence only would have diminished the glory of his success.

The next day the consul, after viewing the situation of the. camp, advanced with his army towards it in order of battlee The king, fearing that a longer delay would lessen the courage of his own soldiers and animate the enemy, at last marched out with his troops, and both sides prepared for a decisive battle. Every thing was uniform enough in the consul's army, with regard to the men as well as arms. It consisted of two Roman legions, of 5400 men each, and two such bodies of Latin infantry. The Romans were posted in the centre, and the Latins in the two wings, the left of which extended towards the river. The first line of the centre was composed of * pikemen, or hastati, the second of principes, and the third of triarii: these, properly speaking, composed the main body. On the side of the right wing, to cover and sustain it, the consul had posted on the same line 3000 Achæan infantry, and auxiliary forces of Eumenes; and, in a column, 3000 horse, 800 of which belonged to Eumenes, and the rest to the Romans. He posted at the extremity of this wing the light-armed Trallians and Cretans. It was not thought necessary to strengthen the left wing in this manner, because the rivers and banks, which were very steep, seemed a sufficient rampart. Nevertheless, four squadrons of horse were posted there. To guard the camp, they left 2000 Macedonians and Thracians, who followed the army as volunteers. The 16 elephants were posted behind the Triarii, by way of corps de-reserve, and as a rear-guard. It was not thought proper to oppose them to those of the enemy, not only because the latter were greatly superior in number, but because the African elephants, all those in the Roman camp being of that country, were very much inferior both in size and strength to those of India, and therefore were not able to oppose them. The king's army was more varied, on account of the different nations which composed it, and the disparity of their arms: 16,000 foot, armed after the Macedonian fashion, and who composed the phalanx, formed also the main body. This phalanx

These are the names of the three different bodies of troops of which the inany of the Roman legions consisted.

was divided into ten bodies, each of 50 men in front by 32 deep; and two elephants were posted in each of the intervals which separated them. It was this formed the principal strength of the army. The sight only of the elephants inspired terror. Their size which in itself was very remarkable, was increased by the ornament of their heads, and their plumes of feathers, which were embellished with gold, silver, purple, and ivory; vain ornaments, which invite an enemy by the hopes of spoils, and are no defence to an army. The elephants carried towers on their backs in which were four fighting men, besides the leader or guide. To the right of this phalanx was drawn up in a column, part of the cavalry, 1500 Asiatic Gauls, 3000 cuirassiers armed cap-a-pee, and 1000 horse, the flower of the Medes and other neighbouring nations. A body of 16 elephants were posted next in files. A little beyond was the king's regi ment, composed of the Argyraspides, so called from their arms being of silver. After them 1200 Daliæ, all bowmen; to whom 2500 Mysians were joined. Then 3000 light-armed Cretans and Trallians. The right wing was closed by 4000 slingers and archers, half Cyrtæans and half Elymeans. The left wing wa drawn up much after the same manner, except that before part of the cavalry the chariots armed with scythes were posted, with the camels, mounted by Arabian bowmen, whose thin swords, in order that the riders might reach down from the back of these beasts, were six feet long. The king commanded the right; Seleucus his son, and Antipater his ne phew, the left and three lieutenant-generals the main body. A thick fog rising in the morning, the sky grew so dark that it was not possible for the king's soldiers to distinguish one another, and act in concert, on account of their great extent; and the damp occasioned by this fog softened very much the bowstrings, the slings, and thongs or straps*, which were used for throwing javelins. The Romans did not suffer near so much, because they scarce used any but heavy arms, swords, and javelins: and as the front of their army was of less extent, they could the easier see one another.

The chariots armed with scythes, which Antiochus had flattered himself would terrify the enemy, and throw them into confusion, first occasioned the defeat of his own forces. King Eumenes, who knew both where their strength and weakness lay, opposed to them the Cretan archers, the slingers, and horse who discharge javelins, commanding them to charge them not

in a body, but in small platoons, and to pour on them from every quarter, darts, stones, and-javelins, shouting as loud as possible all the while. The horses, frightened at these shouts, run away with the chariots, scour the field on all sides, and turn against their own troops, as well as the camels empty terror thus removed, they fight hand to hand.

That

But this soon proved the destruction of the king's army; for the troops which were posted near these chariots, having been broke and put to flight by their disorder, left every part naked and defenceless, even to the very cuirassiers. The Roman cavalry vigorously charging the latter, it was not possible for them to stand the attack, so that they were broke immediately, many of them being killed on the spot, because the weight of their arms would not permit them to fly. The whole left wing was routed, which spread an alarm to the main body, formed by the phalanx, and threw it into disorder. And now the Roman legions charged it advantageously; the soldiers who composed the phalanx not having an opportunity to use their long pikes, because those who fled had taken refuge amongst them, and prevented their fighting, whilst the Romans poured their javelins upon them from all sides. The elephants drawn up in the intervals of the phalanx were of no service to it. The Roman soldiers, who had been used to fight in the wars of Africa against those animals, had learned how to avoid their impetuosity, either by piercing their sides with their javelins, or by ham-stringing them with their swords. The first ranks of the phalanx were therefore put into disorder; and the Romans were upon the point of surrounding the rear ranks, when advice was brought that their left wing was in great danger.

Antiochus, who had observed that the flanks of this left wing were quite uncovered, and that only four squadrons of horse had been posted near it, as supposing it to be sufficiently defended by the river, had charged it with his auxiliary forces and his heavy armed horse, not only in front but in flank; because that the four squadrons being unable to withstand the charge of all the enemy's cavalry, had retired towards the main body, and left open their ground near the river. The Roman cavalry having been put into disorder, the infantry soon followed it, and were driven as far as the camp. Marcus Æmilius, a military tribune, had staid to guard the camp. Seeing the Romans flying towards it, he marched out at the head of all his troops to meet them, and reproached them with their cowardice and ignominious flight. But this was not all; for he commanded his soldiers to sheath their swords in all they met, who refused

to face about against the enemy. This order being given so seasonably, and immediately put in execution, had the desired effect. The stronger fear prevailed over the less. Those who were flying, first halt, and afterwards return to the battle; and now Æmilius, with his body of troops, which consisted of 2000 brave well disciplined men, opposes the king, who was pursu ing vigorously those who fled. Attalus, the brother of Eumenes, having quitted the right wing, on his receiving advice that the left was defeated, flew to it very seasonably with 200 horse. Antiochus, being now charged on every side, turned his horse, and retired. Thus the Romans, having defeated the two wings, advance forward over the heaps of slain, as far as the king's camp, and plunder it.

It was observed, that the manner in which the king drew. up his phalanx, was one of the causes of his losing the battle. In this body the chief strength of his army consisted, and it had hitherto been thought invincible. It was composed entirely of veteran, stout, and well disciplined soldiers. To enable his phalanx to do him greater service, he ought to have given it less depth, and a greater front; whereas, in drawing them up 32 deep, half of them were of no use; and the rest of the front was filled up with new-raised troops, without courage or experience, who consequently could not be depended on. However, this was the order in which Philip and Alexander used to draw up their phalanx.

There fell this day, as well in the battle as in the pursuit and the plunder of the camp, 50,000 foot, and 4000 horse: 1400 were taken prisoners, with 15 elephants, with their guides. The Romans lost but 300 foot, and 24 horse; 25 of Eumenes's troops were killed. By this victory the Romans acquired all the cities of Asia Minor, which now submitted voluntarily to them.

Antiochus withdrew to Sardis, with as many of his forces who had escaped the slaughter as he could assemble. From that city he marched to Celænæ in Phrygia, whither he heard that his son Seleucus had fled. He found him there, and both passed mount Taurus with the utmost diligence, in order to reach Syria.

Neither Hannibal nor Scipio Africanus were in the battle. The former was blocked up by the Rhodians in Pamphylia, with the Syrian fleet; and the latter lay ill in Elea.

*The instant Antiochus was arrived at Antioch, he sent An

*Liv. 1. xxvii. n. 45-49. Polyb. in Excerpt. Legat. p. 24. Appian. in Syr. p. 110-113..