of human intellect," and of the presumptuous expectation of having every thing that we are to believe made perfectly level to our understanding, and satisfactorily explained.

No one, it may be said, would believe in God, if he were to insist on first obtaining a clear and full comprehension of the nature and attributes of such a Being; an explanation, such as no man of sense would think of giving, or of seeking,-of the divine attributes, brought down to the capacity of such a Being as Man. Nor would any one believe in the Christian Revelation, if he were to require, previously, to have a clear and full comprehension of the mysteries of the Incarnation, of the Redemption, of the Trinity, and of every thing else appertaining to the Gospelscheme. We must content ourselves, therefore, we are told, with faint, indistinct, and imperfect notions on religious subjects, unless we would incur deserved censure for want of faith.

How often and how successfully the fallacy here sketched out has been employed, is really wonderful, considering how totally different and entirely unconnected are the two things which are thus confounded together; the clear or indistinct notion of the subject-matter itself,-of the fact or proposition-that is before us; and, the clear or indistinct notion of the evidence of it,—of the reasons for believing it. A moment's

reflection is sufficient for any one to perceive the difference between the two; and yet, in the loose language of careless or sophistical argument, they are continually confused together, and spoken of indiscriminately, as if they were the same thing.

faint appre

the evi

of the sub

to be con

Every one, whether possessing Christian faith Clear or or not, believes firmly, and must believe,—and hension of that, on the clearest evidence,-in the existence dence, and of many things concerning which he has but a ject of it, not very imperfect knowledge, and can form but founded. indistinct and confused ideas of their nature; while to believe in whatever is proposed to us without any clear proof that it is true, with an imperfect and indistinct apprehension of any reason for believing it,—is usually regarded as a mark of credulous weakness. And on the other hand, some description, narrative, or statement, may be, in itself, perfectly clear and intelligible, and yet may be very doubtful as to its truth, or may be wholly undeserving of credit.

For instance, there is, I suppose, no one who seriously doubts the existence of something which we call Soul-or Mind-be it Substance or Attri· bute, material or immaterial—and of the mutual connexion between it and the Body. Yet how very faint and imperfect a notion it is that we can form of it, and of many of its phenomena that are of daily occurrence! The partial sus

pension of mental and bodily functions during Sleep, the effects of opium and other drugs, on both body and mind;-the influence again exercised by volition, and by various mental emotions, on the muscles, and on other parts of the bodily frame, and many other of these phenomena, have exercised for ages the ingenuity of the ablest men to find even any approximation towards but an imperfect explanation of them. Yet the evidence on which we believe in the reality of these and of many other things no less dimly and partially understood, is perfect.

On the other hand, the characters, transactions, &c. represented by dramatic writers, or described by historians, are often as clearly intelligible as it is possible for any thing to be; yet from the total want of evidence, or from the want of clear and decisive evidence, as to their reality, we regard them as either entire fictions, or mixtures of fable and truth, or as more or less likely to have actually existed. The character and conduct of Lear, for instance, or Othello, of Hamlet, and Macbeth, are perfectly intelligible; though it is very doubtful how far the tales which suggested to Shakspeare the idea of most of his dramas had any foundation in fact, or were originally fictitious. Many again of the Orations

* See Rhetoric, part i. c. 2, § 2. "On the plausible and the historically probable."

recorded by the ancient Greek and Roman historians are as easily and plainly to be understood as any that are reported in our own times; but in what degree each of these is a faithful record of what was actually spoken, is a point on which we have, in some cases, a slight and imperfect evidence; and in others, none that deserves the

name.

resorted to

41. In all subjects where religion is not Fallacies concerned, no one of ordinary good sense ever on religious subjects. confounds together two things so dissimilar and unconnected as those I have been speaking of. But in what pertains to religion, the fallacy is, as I have said, often introduced. Yet Religion does not, in this respect, really differ from other subjects.

Our Saviour's character and his teaching were matter of wondering perplexity to all around Him; even in a far greater degree than after the establishment of his Kingdom, on his personal ministry being completed; both because the Jews were full of the expectation of a totally different kind of Deliverer, and because great part of his discourses were not even designed to be fully intelligible, at the time, to his own disciples; but to be explained afterwards by the occurrence of the events He alluded to. Some of his followers, accordingly, "went back and walked no more

with Him," on the occasion of one of these discourses. But the Apostles, who adhered to Him, did so, neither from having any clearer notions concerning his revelations, (for we often find it recorded that "they understood not this saying," &c.) nor again, from being satisfied to believe without any clear proof of his high pretensions; but because they "believed, and were sure that He was the Christ, the Son of the living God," on such evidence as He had Himself appealed to: "the works that I do in my Father's name, they bear witness of me." Dim, and indistinct, and imperfect as were still their notions (as, to a great degree, ours must be also) concerning "the Son of God," it was no indistinct or imperfect evidence on which they believed that He

was so.

A converse case is that of the several false Christs who afterwards arose. "I am come," says our Lord, " in my Father's name," (with such manifestations of divine power as testified his coming from God) "and ye receive me not; if another shall come in his own name," (viz. requiring acceptance on his own bare word, without any miraculous credentials) "him ye will receive."h Their teaching, their pretensions, and promises, were as clearly intelligible to the

h See Sermon on the "Name Emmanuel :" and also Cruden's Concordance on the word "Name."