are ordained of God," his complete approval of the Constitution of the Roman Empire, of its laws, and of the mode of appointing Emperors; or his total indifference as to the best or the worst system of civil Government. If all laws were equally good, or if wise laws and unwise were a matter of indifference, or if it did not rest with each Government to make either wise or unwise enactments, what room could there be for political wisdom?

of the above

The mistakes, however, which I have been Instances alluding to, have been not unfrequently made in mistakes. what relates to the powers possessed by Christian Communities, and the mode of exercising these powers. For instance, at the time of the great Reformation, some Bodies of Christians found themselves without any Bishop among their number; and formed what are called Presbyterian Churches. Some members accordingly of these Churches have felt themselves called upon in self-defence to decry Episcopacy, as a form of Government not instituted by the Apostles, and, consequently, as one which all Christians are bound to reject. Erroneous as, I am convinced, their premiss was, they were, on the above principles, still more erroneous in drawing that conclusion from it. Others of them again lamented their want of Episcopacy; considering that form of government as having the apostolical

sanction, and consequently, as obligatory and indispensable to be retained, when possible; but to them, unattainable, from the interruption of episcopal succession. And while some presume to exclude all Presbyterians from the pale of Christ's universal Church-professing at the same time, in words, what they virtually nullify by their interpretations, that " Holy Scripture contains all things necessary to salvation," others again compassionate and sympathize with the supposed unavoidable deficiency in the Presbyterian Churches.

Now that all these parties are mistaken in their views (though a mere mistake, when not accompanied with a want of charity, is not de. serving of severe censure) must be evident to any one who embraces the principles which in the outset I endeavoured to establish. It follows from those principles, that the Bodies of Christians we have been speaking of, had full power to retain, or to restore, or to originate, whatever form of Church-government they, in their deliberate and cautious judgment, might deem best for the time, and country, and persons, they had to deal with; whether exactly similar, or not, to those introduced by the Apostles; provided nothing were done contrary to Gospelprecepts and principles. They were, They were, therefore, perfectly at liberty to appoint Bishops, even if

they had none that had joined in the reformation; or to discontinue the appointment, even if they had whichever they were convinced was the most conducive, under existing circumstances, to the great objects of all Church-government. And though their decision of this point ought to have been very greatly influenced by their belief as to what were the forms adopted by the Apostles (which must have been not only wise, but the very wisest, for those times and persons) they had no reason to hold themselves absolutely bound to adhere, always and everywhere, to those original models. Indeed, to so considerable a degree have all Churches judged themselves at liberty to depart from the exact model of the earliest institutions-especially (as I formerly remarked) in respect of that important change introduced,-whether wisely or unwisely,-by, I believe, all of what are called Episcopal Churches; that of having several bishops in one Church instead of making each Diocese, as appears to have been the apostolical system, an entire and distinct Church;-so considerable, I say, is the liberty in this respect, that has been assumed by all Churches, that those who speak of all Christians being strictly bound to conform in every point to the exact pattern of the primitive institutions, can hardly wonder if they find imputed to them either great want of knowledge,

Erroneous views seductive to

and imagination.

or of reflection, in themselves, or else, a design to take advantage of the ignorance or inattention of others.

§ 38. I have specified the want of "attentive reflection" in applying rightly in practice the the feelings knowledge men do possess, as tending to foster erroneous notions, because it is probably both a more common and a more dangerous defect than mere want of sufficient knowledge. And it may be added, that it arises not so often from original deficiency in the mental powers, as from neglect to exercise them. There are many who inadvertently, and not a few who advisedly and designedly, resign themselves, in all matters pertaining to morals or religion, to the impressions produced on their imagination and feelings; and rather applaud than reproach themselves for not awaiting the decisions of calm judgment, or for allowing their judgment to be biassed. To such persons, there is, it must be acknowledged, something very captivating and seductive in the notions I have been censuring; and not the less, from their being somewhat vague and dimly apprehended, incapable of abiding the test of sober examination, and invested with some of that "mysterious and solemn gloom," which has been put forth expressly by some of their advocates, as a recommendation. There is something.

to many minds awfully and mystically sublime in the idea of the "decisions of the Catholic Church," and of "Catholic Councils, convened in the name of Christ, and whose deliberations are overruled, and their decrees authoritative,”in the idea of the "Sacramental character of Ordination," conferred by persons who have derived a mystical virtue from the successive imposition of hands up to the times of the Apostles ;-and of the " priestly" character, (that of Hiereus) thus imparted, and the " Sacrifices" offered at an "altar ;"-of a "primitive doctrine always to be found somewhere in the Catholic traditions," &c. : especially when these matters are treated of in solemn and imposing language, of that peculiar kind of dazzling mistiness whose effect is to convey, at first, to ordinary readers, a striking impression, with an appearance of being perfectly intelligible at the first glance, but to become more obscure and doubtful at the second glance, and more and more so, the more attentively it is studied by a reader of clear understanding; so as to leave him utterly in doubt, at the last, which of several meanings it is meant to convey, or whether any at all.

The rule of "omne ignotum pro mirifico," applies most emphatically to such doctrines treated of in such language. The very simplicity