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can need proof; it is found abundantly in the numerous predictions of this event, contained in the Old Testament. CHRIST is said to have been slain, that is, in the purpose of God, from the foundation of the world. The calling, sanctification, conversion, and salvation, of the Christian Church, are said to be according to the eternal purpose of God. A vast multitude of declarations, importing the same things generally, might be added to these, were it necessary. But I shall only observe further, under this head, that the works of Creation and Providence are exhibited in the Scriptures as parts of one great plan, universally devised, and conducted, according to the good pleasure of God; extending to the clothing of grass and the falling of sparrows, the government of this world and the regulation of the heavens.

2dly. I shall now consider some of the Difficulties, which result from a denial of this doctrine.

That God made all beings, will not here be questioned. When he made them, he either made them with, or without, a design. If he acted without design, he acted without wisdom; and was therefore originally unwise, or unpossessed of wisdom: for nothing is more absolute folly, or indicates more an entire destitution of wisdom, than to act without design; or without an end; and especially to do such great and wonderful things, for so long a period, without any end in view.

If God acted with design in the Creation of all things; he either provided for the certain accomplishment of the end, which he had in view; or he did not. If he did not, it was because he was either unable, or unwilling, to do it. If he was unable, it was either because he knew not the means of doing it, or because he had not power to bring them to pass. In the former case, we deny his Omniscience; in the latter, his Omnipotence. When we behold the wonderful contrivance of the endless multitude of things in Creation and Providence, we cannot, in the exercise of Reason, doubt his Omniscience. When we call to mind, that they were brought into existence by his power, we cannot doubt his Omnipotence. He, who contrived the Universe, plainly knows all things: He, who made it, can plainly do all things, which in their nature are possible.

If God was unwilling to provide for the accomplishment of the end, which he proposed in the Creation of all things; it was either because that end was not sufficiently dear to him, or because the accomplishment of it required more labour and self-denial than its importance would justify. The end could not but be sufficiently dear to him. God certainly could propose to himself an end of infinite value; viz. the promotion of infinite good. If he did not propose this end; it was not because he was unable to propose it, but because he was unwilling. If he was unwilling to propose this end, when it was in full view before him; he was not only destitute of infinite benevolence; but, I apprehend, wholly destitute of

all benevolence; since, in this case, he preferred a good, which was comparatively nothing, (as being finite) to that which was in finite. If he is infinitely benevolent, and did actually propose, as the end of creating and governing the universe, an infinite good; then to him this end was infinitely dear.

He was not prevented from providing for the accomplishment of this end because of the labour, or self-denial, which it would require. To infinite benevolence, no effort of choice can be laborious, or self-denying; to Omniscience, no effort of contrivance; and to Omnipotence, no effort of execution. The Infinite Mind acts, of course, with perfect ease. The Creator of the ends of the earth, fainteth not, neither is weary.

If God did provide for the accomplishment of the end, which he had in view; then it will either be accomplished, or it will not. If it will be accomplished, the means, provided for this purpose, are all of the proper nature, and will operate in the proper manner, for its accomplishment. In other words, they will sustain precisely that nature, and operate in that manner, which was intended by the Infinite Mind, when the end was proposed, and the means were selected for bringing it to pass. Of course, both the end, and the means, were from the beginning known, proposed, chosen, and determined, by God.

He, therefore, who denies this doctrine, will, I think, find the denial followed by the immoveable difficulty of being obliged, at the same time, to deny the absolute perfection, and infinity, of the divine power, knowledge, or goodness.

Further; if the actions of voluntary beings are not, upon the whole, such as God originally chose they should be; it must be either because he did not know what they would be; or, knowing this, did not choose to prevent their existence. If he did not originally know what they would be; then his creatures communicate to him continually new ideas; and those, in endless multitudes. Of course, his views change daily; and, instead of being Omniscient originally, and eternally, he is not now, nor will he ever be Omniscient; but will, throughout Eternity, receive continual and vast accessions of knowledge, communicated to him by his voluntary creatures; who, in this case, devise what before he did not know, and act what before he never conceived. In this case also, his knowledge must, like ours, be successive, and mutable. Nay, as his mind is the greatest of all minds, and must, according to this supposition, continually imbibe knowledge; so, from its extent and comprehension, it must imbibe knowledge incalculably faster, and be more rapidly mutable, than that of any other being whatever.

Further; as the views of God continually enlarge, and change; so it is plain, that, together with his views, his disposition must change with respect to particular things, and ultimately with respect to his whole system; and that his administrations, and his measures, must in the same manner also change. New objects

sustain new characters, and new relations; and infer new proprieties of conduct, and of consequence new measures. The conduct, which it would be proper for God to adopt towards a being, whose character and actions are unknown to him, must be also unknown. Every creature, whose character and actions are new, and different from any thing before known, or conceived, must, if he be properly treated, receive a treatment differing from any, before exhibited, or contrived. As voluntary beings are, in a sense, endlessly numerous, and exist throughout eternity; so their actions, being, according to the supposition, unknown to God before they exist, must, in a multitude of instances, literally endless, demand a new treatment, or new measures, repeated in a manner, also literally endless. Of course, not only in his views, but also in his disposition and conduct, God must, according to this supposition, be the most unceasingly, and absolutely, changeable of all beings.

A being, whose conduct is, and must be, regulated by the actions of others, is plainly dependent on others, with respect to this prime part of his character. He cannot act, as he would originally, and absolutely, choose to act; but must act as their conduct requires him to act. God, therefore, being intimately, and inseparably, connected with all voluntary beings, is in this respect more dependent, according to this supposition, than any other being what

ever.

But, if God did know, originally, all the actions of voluntary beings, and did not choose to prevent their existence in any case; then they were, upon the whole, agreeable to his pleasure; or he chose, that they should exist, when, upon the whole, they were contrary to his pleasure. That he could have prevented the existence of any actions whatever, if he pleased, we certainly know; because he could have prevented the existence of the beings, whose actions they If they were upon the whole contrary to his pleasure, and he yet chose that they should exist; then he chose, that actions should exist, whose existence was upon the whole contrary to his choice; which is no other than a self-contradiction.

were.

Again; if God proposed infinite good as the end of all his conduct; and this end was infinitely dear to him, and is yet not certainly and completely accomplished; it must be because he is not able to accomplish it. This will not be pretended. But, if God does not foreknow the actions of voluntary beings, he cannot be certain of the accomplishment of this end. To the accomplishment of perfect and infinite good, it is plainly necessary, that every thing, pertaining to the system, should be in time, place, nature, and operations, exactly that, and only that, which contributes directly, as well as ultimately, its own proper efficacy to the promotion of this end. A perfect system plainly demands, that every part of it be necessary, and entirely fitted for the place, and operations, assigned to it, and that there be nothing contrary to, or aside from, the general purpose; nothing out of place, or time; nothing superVOL. I.

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fluous, and nothing defective; in a word, that there be just such means, and so many of them, as will perfectly accomplish the end, and that there be nothing more. But, in the case supposed, the actions of voluntary beings, unless accordant with the pleasure of God, can in no wise sustain the character of proper parts of a perfect system. Just so far, as they vary from this pleasure, they vary from the character specified. It will not be denied, that God is both able, and disposed, to plan a perfect system of good. It follows, therefore, that he certainly has planned such a system. Whatever accords not with his pleasure, upon the whole, accords not with this system; this being the thing, which is agreeable to his pleasure; but must be defective, or superfluous; out of place, or out of time; aside from, or contrary to, the perfection of the system. Consequently, if the actions of voluntary beings be not, upon the whole, accordant with the pleasure of God; he was not only unassured of the accomplishment of the end, which he proposed in creating and governing the universe; but he entered upon this great work without knowing, that it would be accomplished; and was originally certain, that the perfect good, which he proposed, would never exist.

Those, who deny this doctrine, are therefore, unless I am deceived, forced by their denial to acknowledge, that God is a limited, mutable, and dependent being; and that he orignally was, and ever must be, uncertain of the accomplishment of the great end, proposed in his works; or rather that he ever was, and will be certain, that it can never be accomplished. The magnitude of these difficulties I need not explain.

THE DECREES OF GOD.

JOB Xxiii. 13.—But he is in one mind; and who can turn him? and what his soul desireth, even that he doeth.

IN my last discourse I asserted, from these words, the following Doctrine:

That all things, both beings and events, exist in exact accordance with the purpose, pleasure, or, what is commonly called the Decrees, of God.

In discussing this doctrine, I mentioned, that I should attempt, I. To Explain it ;

II. To Prove it; and

III. To answer the objections, commonly made against it.

Under the first head, after having mentioned several erroneous opinions, and forms of phraseology, frequently adopted concern. ing this subject, I expressed my own views of it in this manner: What is commonly intended by the Decrees of God, is that choice, or pleasure, of the Divine Mind, eternally and unchangeably inherent in it, by which all things are brought into being.

Under the second head, I alleged several direct arguments in support of the doctrine; and then suggested several difficulties, which result from denying it. These, by proving the converse of the doctrine to be false, indirectly proved the doctrine to be true: according to the general axiom, that every proposition, or its converse, is true.

I shall now, as I proposed, attempt,

III. To answer the Objections, commonly made against this doc

trine.

These, I think, may be reduced to the following:

1st. That it is equivalent to the Stoical doctrine of Fate, or Destiny:

2dly. That it exhibits God as the Author of sin:

3dly. That it destroys the Free Agency of rational creatures: and,

4thly. That it discourages all the Efforts of mankind towards Reformation.

I will not say, that no other objections are brought against this doctrine; but I think of no others, which appear to be regarded, as material, by those who allege them; or which, if these be fairly obviated, would be supposed sensibly to affect the question in de-. bate. These, therefore, I shall now proceed to consider in the order proposed.

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