of profit, or of fame, to do an act which he knows to be unjustifiable and wrong; and Cicero says, his habitual decision, on the one side or on the other, determines him to belong to the class of good or bad, of honest or dishonest, of upright or wicked

men.

In applying this standard to practice, we must not satisfy ourselves with looking at the immediate and particular consequences of our actions only; to give it any considerable practical value, we must also look to the remote and distant consequences of our conduct. To satisfy this test, an action must be useful in the long run, as well as near by; "in all its effects collateral and remote, as well as in those which are immediate and direct;" since, in computing consequences, it makes no difference in what way, or at what distance, they arrive.

It has before been observed, that Dr. Paley made the usefulness or expediency of an action the standard of its rectitude. He says, "It is the utility of any moral rule alone, which constitutes the obligation of it." And, however mistaken he may have been, in making "expediency" the corner-stone of his system, still, the very circumstance of his doing this, led him to state, illustrate, and qualify it with peculiar care. I should do wrong, therefore, if I were not to avail myself freely of his illustrations.

The bad consequences of actions, he says, are twofold, particular and general. The particular bad consequence of an action is the mischief, which that single action directly and immediately occasions. The general bad consequence is the violation of some necessary or useful general rule. In many cases, the particular consequences are comparatively insignificant, while the general consequences are so injurious as to call for the greatest severity of punishment.

The particular consequence of counterfeiting the current coin of a country, is the loss of a dollar, or of a few dollars, to the person, or persons, who may receive it; the general consequence, that is, the consequence which would ensue if the same practice were generally permitted, would be to abolish the use

*Moral and Political Philosophy, p. 42.

of money. The particular consequence of forgery may be a damage of fifty, or a hundred dollars, to the man who accepts the forged bill; the general consequence would be the destruction of paper currency. The particular consequence of horsestealing is a loss to the owner of the value of the horse stolen ; the general consequence would be, that no man's horses would be safe. The particular consequence of breaking into a house without inhabitants may be the loss of some clothing, or of a few spoons; the general consequence would be, that no one could safely leave his house unoccupied. The particular consequence of smuggling may be a diminution of the national income, almost too minute for estimation; the general consequence would be, the destruction of one entire branch of the public revenue, a proportionate increase of the burthen upon other branches, and the ruin of all fair and open trade in the kind of merchandise smuggled. The particular consequence of an officer's breaking his parole may be the loss of a prisoner, who may, perhaps, not have been worth detaining; the general consequence would be, that this mitigation of captivity must be refused to all other prisoners. The particular consequence of assassination, or suicide, may be the death of an individual, whose life may be of little or no importance to himself, or to any one else; the general consequence would be, that, in the one case, every man would be under constant apprehensions for his life, and that, in both cases, no man's life, however valuable, would be safe. In all cases, the particular consequence is of so small importance, compared with the general consequence, that, in the enactment and administration of criminal laws, the particular consequence is entirely disregarded and left out of sight. The crime and the fate of the forger is the same, whether he has forged to the value of five or fifty dollars. The crime is regarded the same, as the general consequences are the same. *

It has before been said, that the rule of expediency, by which to estimate and guide our moral conduct, however valuable, is still imperfect. 1. It is imperfect, because sometimes men with

* Moral and Political Philosophy, Book II. chap. 8.

the best intentions, and after using the greatest care and diligence to inform themselves, moreover after the most mature reflection, are unable to foresee and calculate the consequences of their actions. Unforeseen contingencies sometimes occur in human affairs, which baffle human sagacity and foresight. However anxiously we look into consequences, they often elude our penetration. Hard, indeed, would be our condition, if, without regarding our intention and the accompanying circumstances, our actions were to be ultimately and finally estimated by their consequences.

2. Again, by directing our attention too exclusively to a moral estimate of our external actions, we are in danger of losing sight too much, of that restraint, which it is indispensable to impose on the thoughts and inclinations; in other terms, of neglecting the moral culture of the heart, out of which are the issues of life, and which is to be kept with all diligence. * The rule of expediency is a rule of calculation; valuable as it is, it refers chiefly to our external conduct, and ought never to be permitted to withdraw our attention from the suggestions of an enlightened and unsophisticated conscience. It may be useful in aiding the conscience, but must not be allowed to supersede its high functions.

I subjoin two practical applications of this principle, by way of illustration. 1. Every one is morally responsible for the consequences of his actions, so far as he foresaw them, or might have foreseen them by diligence and care.

2. We are prepared to understand and to explain several current maxims, which are in the mouths of many persons, but not always with a just understanding of their import. "We must not do evil that good may come," that is, we must not violate a general principle, for the sake of any particular and immediate good consequence, which may result from such violation. The converse of this maxim, couched in very different terms, is often cited thus, "The end sanctifies the means; "" a dangerous maxim, and the more so, because men of worth and of the best intentions, having good objects to accomplish, have

* Prov. iv. 23; Mat. xv. 18-20.

sometimes acted upon it. They seem to have made this mistake by looking so intently at their good object, that they did not scrutinize the means, by which they proposed to attain it. In truth, there is always an inclination to view the means in the favorable light which the end reflects upon them. We know how apt persons are to consider the cause good which they wish to see advanced; and, on the strength of this maxim, they are tempted to be unscrupulous in using any means which they deem likely to promote it. A good object should be accomplished by good means only. A bad cause may be consistently advanced by bad means. Moreover, we sometimes hear this maxim; "We must do our duty without shrinking, and leave the consequences to God." But we have seen, that one test, by which we are to judge of our duty, is the consequences which may probably result from our conduct. If we foresee, that the consequences of a particular line of conduct will probably be evil, or that the evil will probably preponderate over the good, we ought to abstain from such line of conduct. This maxim is often used by the inexperienced, the rash, the passionate, the enthusiastic, and the fanatical, to justify their conduct.

III. The preceding sources by which conscience is enlightened and guided, to wit, the law of the land, and a regard to the consequences of our conduct, are subordinate; and the supreme authority, which supplies their deficiencies, is the sacred Scriptures. These contain a system of moral truth, comprised in facts, customs, precepts, and principles, adapted to all ages, nations, climates, and circumstances of life.

This position is an important one, and, moreover, is not so obvious as not to require a careful illustration. The Scriptures, in reference to the periods of time which they embrace, are usually considered by divines under three dispensations; the Patriarchal, the Mosaic, and the Christian. It will be convenient to review the various writings of which the Scriptures consist, under these same divisions; by which we shall see, that this moral system was gradually unfolded, according as these dispensations succeeded each other in the order of time, and according to the degree of knowledge mankind possessed, the

kind of life they led, and various other circumstances which affected their condition.

1. The book of Genesis comprises nearly all the Patriarchal writings. It is more valuable for the moral facts (that is, facts having a moral bearing and influence,) and institutions which it makes known, than for the principles of a moral kind which it contains, though it is not destitute of the latter. It makes known the creation of the earth, the heavens, and all things else, from nothing, in opposition to the ancient philosophers, some of whom maintained that the universe had existed for ever, while others ascribed its origin to blind chance. It also makes known, that the universe was created by one God, in opposition to Polytheism; and these two facts united, along with the duty of worshipping one God, lay a foundation for a belief in the moral doctrine of a Divine Providence.

The creation of man in the divine image, by which the dignity and excellence of his nature are recognised, and by this recognition, the duty of acting up to the dignity of his nature, the origin of all the branches of the human family, however diversified by complexion, features, habits, and degrees of improvement, from a single pair, thus creating between them all, the ties and obligations of kindred, and the interest and sympathy in each other's welfare which spring from a common original, — the institution of the Sabbath, and of marriage between one man and one woman, -all have a silent, but most effectual moral bearing and influence.

These facts and institutions prepare the way for the high estimate set on human life by the Almighty, and for the command, under the most severe penalties, against taking it away.* The introduction, wide-spread increase, and overwhelming punishment of sin by a universal deluge, viewed in connexion with the accompanying circumstances, imply a coextensive standard of morals, not indeed reduced to writing, but that law of God written in the hearts of men, which has in all ages and among all nations, as we have seen,† caused substantially the same acts and habits to be recognised as virtues or vices, merits or crimes. During

*Gen. iv. 5-14; ix. 5, 6.

+ See above, PP.

6-10.