country, in a great measure, uncertain, confused, and problematical.

3. Again, truth is violated by the practice of repeating stories, narratives, and statements improbable in themselves, without much or any inquiry into their credibility, and without much regarding whether they are true or false. To originate such narratives and statements, without any ground on which to rest them, is, except that the intention of deceiving may be wanting, absolute and unqualified falsehood. And no man, who attaches much value or importance to truth, will be willing to assert any thing without knowing it to be true, or without a belief and assurance of its truth, resting on grounds reasonably entitled to confidence. Actual knowledge, then, or reasonable grounds of assurance, can alone justify us in asserting any thing for truth. And he does not show much respect for truth, who positively asserts any thing, of which he is not assured, and of which he might be assured by inquiry.

Nor will a man, scrupulously regardful of truth, indulge himself in the habit of amplifying, exaggerating, and supplying circumstances, with a view to embellish the narrations or anecdotes which he may have occasion to relate, and thus to season his conversation, render it more attractive, and spice it to the taste of a circle of gay companions. Such a habit is dangerous; it may gradually undermine and impair, or perhaps, even destroy, a man's regard for truth, before he is sensible of the effect. Truth is too sacred a subject to be trifled with ; and such a habit, if it is not positively and unequivocally criminal, is assuredly overstepping the line of safety. Our safety, in such a case, consists in avoiding even too near an approach to the division line between right and wrong. Habits grow insensibly upon the individuals who practise them, until their remote results are widely different from any thing, which, in the outset, could have been anticipated.

There are some instances on record, equally fitted to surprise and to instruct us in regard to the importance of an habitually strict observance of truth. The habit of amplifying on every occasion, of exaggerating and supplying circumstances whenever there is a temptation to do so, and, still more, of making positive affirmations upon inadequate grounds of assurance, has sometimes

led men eventually to mistake the suggestions of their passions and the promptings of their imaginations for truth, and to impose them on themselves and on others as such.* By a confirmed habit of disregarding truth, men have come at length firmly to believe their own falsehoods. It can scarcely be necessary to observe, that any thing said under this division, does not apply to tales, parables, or other fictitious writings, designed for amusement or instruction.

4. Certain forms of expression, usual in polite circles of society, seem to be inconsistent with the sincerity of character in which much of truth consists, and with that simplicity and directness of intercourse recommended by our Saviour, when he says, "Let your communication be, Yea, yea; Nay, nay; for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil."†

When a stranger enters the house of a Spanish gentleman, properly introduced, he never fails to assure him, that both it and himself are perfectly and always at his disposal. He says to his guest, "Sir, here you have a house, this house is yours; if I can serve you in any way, command me, I am always at your disposal." And Miss Edgeworth must be good authority for saying, that, in England, a general invitation to visit, means nothing but "Good morning to you."§ Any one, in the slightest degree acquainted with the modes of intercourse which prevail in fashionable life, cannot fail to know, that similar usual, but insincere forms of expression, are very common elsewhere than in Spain and England. Every person with whom we are accustomed to hold intercourse, is entitled to a polite, decorous, and respectful style of address. A just indulgence, too, may be allowed in favor of hyperbolical, ironical, and other playful forms of expression, by which cheerfulness, good humor, and good feeling may be very much promoted. But, as on other subjects, just limits are to be observed, to transgress which is an offence against good taste, propriety, and decorum, if not against good morals.

It is sometimes said, that it is well to give good words to

*See Report to the U. S House of Representatives, of April 30th, 1832, on the Bank of the United States, written by John Quincy Adams, p. 389. Wines' Two Years and a Half in the Navy, Vol. I. p. 171.

t Matt. v. 37.

§ Helen, Vol. I. p. 12.

persons, when it is in your power to give them nothing else. This is very true, but a kind and polite address, and terms perfectly courteous, are always consistent with the strictest observance of truth; as, also, bluntness of address and rudeness of language are quite consistent with an habitual disregard of truth. In fact, these observations pertain to good manners quite as much as to good morals; or rather, in this instance, these two departments meet and mingle with each other. Whatever is incon sistent with truth, reason, propriety, decorum, a just taste, selfrespect, and mutual respect, is equally at variance with both.

Dr. Paley, among several instances of falsehoods which he says are not criminal, includes the case of a servant denying his master; that is, saying to visiters that his master is not at home, when he knows him to be in the house, probably in the next room. As this is one of the most exceptionable of the usages of fashionable society to which I have referred, and as it has been frequently justified by persons whose general tone of moral feeling and conduct is sound and healthy, (and Dr. Paley is one of these,) I may be excused for giving it a moment's consideration.

The ground taken by those who justify the practice, is, that it is a polite and inoffensive way of refusing to see a visiter, whom the person visited does not wish to see; that it is conventional and well understood by those who use it. This is the best ground on which to rest it; and, if the visiter and the person visited were the only parties concerned, it might be too much the part of a precisian to make objection against it. But a man's language and actions seldom terminate with himself, — the message to the visiter at the door is heard by the children of the family, they cannot understand how it is consistent with truth, and, assuredly, their respect for the claims of truth is impaired. But this is not all. The message is carried by a servant; he does not understand its consistency with truth, he has not much education, and is unaccustomed to refined distinctions; the example of his master is apt to be, in all respects, a standard high enough for him; his regard for truth is diminished, and his opinion of its obligation is unsettled. Now children and servants comprise a very large part of mankind, and those who are now children will

be the men and women of the next generation. Query. Does a gentleman when he has directed his servant to "deny him" to a visiter, feel, during the next hour, quite as much respect for himself as he did during the hour previous? Is he perfectly satisfied, that he has set up a standard of truth safe for his children and servants?

CHAPTER IV.

OATHS.

THE observance of truth is the highest of the personal virtues, its violation is always a gross personal degradation, — not only so, falsehood is a heinous offence against manners, morals, and religion. Its tendency too, as seen in its effects, is always injurious; or, if its effects are not always actually so, still the liar is entitled to no credit by reason of this, his conduct is not palliated, much less justified, by this circumstance. Its tendency may be counteracted, but this does not change its nature. This is undeniably and unchangeably evil.

This is true of the affairs of ordinary life; but in certain special cases, the chief of which are trials in our courts of justice, the general and frequent violation of truth would be attended with universal and overwhelming calamities, inasmuch as the life, character, and estate of every man would be no longer secure. There are, moreover, certain situations, and especially public offices, usually called, by reason of their excellence, "offices of honor, trust, and profit," which require, for the performance of their duties, special uprightness and integrity of character, inasmuch as their suitable discharge presupposes all the moral qualities which constitute trust-worthiness; and the persons invested with these offices must, from the nature of the case, be in a great measure the judges of their own duties. The virtue of the best of men is imperfect, hence, for the security of the public, all possible means have been devised for attaining truth in our tribunals of justice, and for strengthening and con

firming the integrity of those who are invested with situations and offices of trust.

One of the chief means, which have been relied on to secure the observance of truth in witnesses, and integrity in those who hold situations of public trust, is, the administration of oaths, by which, earthly virtue, imperfect as it is, may be confirmed by the great ultimate sanction of morals, the consideration of a future state of rewards and punishments. Men continue, as in the days of St. Paul, to "swear by the greater, and an oath for confirmation is "still" to them an end of all strife."* I shall consider oaths under the several divisions, 1. Of their lawfulness. 2. Their forms. 3. Their signification. 4. Their efficacy as securities for truth and integrity. 5. Their abuse. 6. In what cases they are not binding.

1. The use of oaths on solemn occasions, especially to give the highest binding force to solemn and important transactions, is coeval with the first dawn of history. The distinction between judicial and profane swearing seems to be recognised in the ten commandments (compare the third and ninth); and an examination and comparison of the passages in the New Testament, which pertain to oaths, † has had the effect of convincing all Christians, except the Quakers and Moravians, of their lawfulness in a moral point of view. The distinction, indeed, between judicial and profane oaths is a very plain one; and, while the former are clearly sanctioned by the sacred writers, the latter are condemned and forbidden by them. From respect to the plea of a tender conscience, urged by the Quakers and Moravians, the forms inserted in our political constitutions, and used in our courts of justice and wherever else judicial oaths are accustomed to be administered, generally, if not always, admit of an affirmation instead of an oath. In the view of every good man, however, this is a difference in form rather than in substance. I

2. The forms of oaths and the ceremonies accompanying their

*Heb. vi. 16.

Matt. v. 33-6; xxvi. 63; Rom. i. 9; 2 Cor. i. 23; Heb. vi. 16; James v. 12. The lawfulness of oaths is well vindicated by Dr. Paley, in his Moral and Political Philosophy, pp. 112-114,- and strenuously opposed by Dymond, Essays on Morality, pp. 147 - 152.