advantages, or detract from the respect due to illustrious birth; for though the philosopher may say with the poet :

'Et genus et proavos, et quae non fecimus ipsi,
Vix ea nostra voco ";

yet the claim derived from that advantage, though fortuitous, is so generally and so justly conceded, that every endeavour to subvert the principle would merit contempt and abhorrence. But though illustrious birth forms one undisputed title to preeminence and superior consideration, yet surely it ought not to be the only one. The origin of high titles was derived from the will of the sovereign to reward signal services, or conspicuous merit, by a recompense which, surviving to posterity, should display the virtues of the receiver, and the gratitude of the donor. Is merit then so rarely discernible, or is gratitude so small a virtue in our days, that the one must be supposed to be its own reward and the other limited to a barren display of impotent goodwill? Had this bill originated with some noble peer of distinguished ancestry, it would have excited less surprise; a desire to exclude from a participation of honours is no novelty in persons of that class: Quod ex aliorum meritis sibi arrogant, id mihi ex meis ascribi nolunt.

But it is a matter of just surprise, that a bill of this nature should either have been projected, or at least promoted, by a gentleman who was, not long ago, seated among us, and who, having got into the house of Peers, is now desirous to shut the door after him.

When great alterations in the constitution are to be made, the experiment should be tried for a short time before the proposed change is finally carried into execution, lest it should produce evil instead of good; but in this case, when the bill is once sanctioned by Parliament, there can be no future hopes of redress, because the Upper House will always oppose the repeal of an act which has so considerably increased their power. The great unanimity with which this bill has passed the Lords, ought to inspire some jealousy in the Commons; for it must be obvious, that whatever the Lords gain must be acquired at the loss of the Commons, and the diminution of the royal prerogative; and that in all disputes between the Lords and Commons, when the House of Lords is immutable, the Commons must, sooner or later, be obliged to recede.

The view of the ministry in framing this bill is plainly

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nothing but to secure their power in the House of Lords. The principal argument on which the necessity of it is founded is drawn from the mischief occasioned by the creation of twelve new peers during the reign of Queen Anne, for the purpose of carrying an infamous peace through the House of Lords; that was only a temporary measure, whereas the mischief to be occasioned by this bill will be perpetual. It creates thirtyone peers by authority of Parliament; so extraordinary a step cannot be supposed to be taken without some sinister design in future. The ministry want no additional strength in the House of Lords for conducting the common affairs of government, as it is sufficiently proved by the unanimity with which they have carried through this bill. If, therefore, they think it necessary to acquire additional strength, it must be done with views and intentions more extravagant and hostile to the constitution, than any which have yet been attempted. The bill itself is of a most artful and insidious nature. The immediate creation of nine Scotch peers, and the reservation of six English peers for a necessary occasion, is of double use; to be ready for the House of Lords if wanted, and to engage three times the number in the House of Commons by hopes and promises.

To sanction this attempt, the King is induced to affect to wave some part of his prerogative; but this is merely an ostensible renunciation unfounded in fact or reason. I am desirous to treat of all points relating to the private affairs of his Majesty with the utmost tenderness and caution, but I should wish to ask the House, and I think I can anticipate the answer: Has any such question been upon the tapis, as no man would forgive the authors, that should put them under the necessity of voting against either side? Are there any misfortunes, which every honest man secretly laments and bewails, and would think the last of mischiefs, should they ever become the subject of public and parliamentary conversations? Cannot numbers that hear me testify, from the solicitations and whispers they have met with, that there are men ready and determined to attempt these things if they had a prospect of success? If they have thought, but I hope they are mistaken in their opinion of this House, that the chief obstacle would arise in the House of Lords, where they have always been tender upon personal points, especially to any of their own

body, does not this project enable them to carry any question through the House of Lords? Must not the twenty-five Scotch peers accept upon any terms, or be for ever excluded? Or will not twenty-five be found in all Scotland that will? How great will the temptation be likewise to fix English, to fill the present vacancies? And shall we then, with our eyes open, take this step, which I cannot but look upon as the beginning of woe and confusion; and shall we, under these apprehensions, break through the union, and shut up the door of honour? It certainly will have that effect; nay, the very argument advanced in its support, that it will add weight to the Commons by keeping the rich men there, admits that it will be an exclusion.

But we are told that his Majesty has voluntarily consented to this limitation of his prerogative. It may be true; but may not the King have been deceived? Which if it is ever to be supposed, must be admitted in this case. It is incontrovertible that kings have been over-ruled by the importunity of their ministers to remove, or to take into administration, persons who are disagreeable to them. The character of the King furnishes us also a strong proof that he has been deceived, for although it is a fact, that in Hanover, where he possesses absolute power, he never tyrannised over his subjects, or despotically exercised his authority, yet, can one instance be produced when he ever gave up a prerogative?

If the constitution is to be amended in the House of Lords, the greatest abuses ought to be first corrected. But what is the abuse against which this bill so vehemently inveighs, and which it is intended to correct? The abuse of the prerogative in creating an occasional number of peers, is a prejudice only to the Lords, it can rarely be a prejudice to the Commons, but must generally be exercised in their favour; and should it be argued, that in a case of a difference between the two Houses the King may exercise that branch of his prerogative, with a view to force the Commons to recede, we may reply, that upon a difference with the Commons, the King possesses his negative, and the exercise of that negative would be less culpable than making peers to screen himself.

But the strongest argument against the bill is, that it will not only be a discouragement to virtue and merit, but would endanger our excellent constitution; for as there is a

due balance between the three branches of the legislature, it will destroy that balance, and consequently subvert the whole constitution, by causing one of the three powers, which are now dependent on each other, to preponderate in the scale. The Crown is dependent upon the Commons by the power of granting money; the Commons are dependent on the Crown by the power of dissolution. The Lords will now be made independent of both.

The sixteen elective Scotch peers already admit themselves to be a dead court weight, yet the same sixteen are now to be made hereditary, and nine added to their number. These twentyfive, under the influence of corrupt ministers, may find their account in betraying their trust; the majority of the Lords may also find their account in supporting such ministers; but the Commons, and the Commons only, must suffer all, and be deprived of every advantage. If the proposed measure destroys two negatives in the Crown, it gives a negative to these twenty-five united, and confers a power, superior to that of the King himself, on the head of a clan, who will have the power of recommending many. The Scotch commoners can have no other view in supporting this measure but the expected aggrandizement of their own chiefs. It will dissolve the allegiance of the Scotch peers who are not amongst the twenty-five, and who can never hope for the benefit of an election to be peers of Parliament, and almost enact obedience from the Sovereign to the betrayers of the constitution.

The present view of the bill is dangerous; the view to posterity, personal and unpardonable; it will make the Lords masters of the King, according to their own confession, when they admit that a change of administration renders a new creation of peers necessary; for by precluding the King from making peers in future it at the same time precludes him from changing the present administration, who will naturally fill the vacancies with their own creatures; and the new peers will adhere to the first minister with the same zeal and unanimity as those created by Oxford adhered to him.

If, when the Parliament was made septennial, the power of dissolving it before the end of seven years had been wrested from the Crown, would not such an alteration have added immense authority to the Commons? and yet, the prerogative of the Crown in dissolving Parliaments may be,

and has been, oftener abused than the power of creating peers.

But it may be observed that the King, for his own sake, will rarely make a great number of peers, for they, being usually created by the influence of the first minister, soon become, on a change of administration, a weight against the Crown; and had Queen Anne lived, the truth of this observation would have been verified in the case of most of the twelve peers made by Oxford. Let me ask, however, is the abuse of any prerogative a sufficient reason for totally annihilating that prerogative? Under that consideration, the power of dissolving Parliaments ought to be taken away, because that power has been more exercised, and more abused than any of the other prerogatives; yet in 1641, when the King had assented to a law that disabled him from proroguing or dissolving Parliament, without the consent of both Houses, he was from that time under subjection to the Parliament, and from then followed all the subsequent mischiefs, and his own destruction. It may also be asked, whether the prerogative of making peace and war has never been abused? I might here call to your recollection the peace of Utrecht, and the present war with Spain. Yet who will presume to advise that the power of making peace and war should be taken from the Crown?

How can the Lords expect the Commons to give their concurrence to a bill by which they and their posterity are to be for ever excluded from the peerage? how would they themselves receive a bill which should prevent a baron from being made a viscount, a viscount an earl, an earl a marquis, and a marquis a duke? Would they consent to limit the number of any rank of peerage? Certainly none; unless, perhaps, the dukes. If the pretence for this measure is that it will tend to secure the freedom of Parliament, I say that there are many other steps more important and less equivocal, such as the discontinuance of bribes and pensions.

That this bill will secure the liberty of Parliament I totally deny; it will secure a great preponderance to the peers; it will form them into a compact impenetrable phalanx, by giving them the power to exclude in all cases of extinction and creation all such persons from their body, who may be obnoxious to them. In the instances we have seen of their judgment