I think I could observe in those speeches the triumph of men who had found an advocate in the Prime Minister, whom they expected to meet as an opponent, and who were delighted that, acting with their confederates in the other House of Parliament, they were likely to obtain a signal party advantage.

Is there anybody who has denied in point blank terms, except the right hon. gentleman, that the House of Lords, in the course it has taken, has violated-I will not say the privileges of this House, for privilege is a word not easily definedbut has broken in upon the usages of many centuries old— usages which our predecessors in this House have acknowledged to be of the utmost importance to our own powers and to the liberties of those whom we represent? If there was nothing wrong, then why was there a committee? The right hon. gentleman, the member for Bucks, neglected to answer that question. He made no opposition at the time; but three weeks afterwards he thinks that it would have been better if the committee had not been appointed. I will, however, undertake to affirm that, when the noble Viscount proposed that committee, every member of this House thought the proposition a reasonable one. Why did we ransack the journals unless something had happened which jarred upon every man's sense of the rights and privileges of this House and the usages of the House of Lords? And why, having this committee, and instituting these researches, have we these Resolutions moved, not by a young, inexperienced, and unknown member-if any such there be in the House of Commons-but by one of the oldest members of this House, one of the ablest statesmen of the day, and at this moment the chief Minister of the Crown? Surely everyone will admit that the circumstances were such as to justify the course that was taken in appointing the committee.

Then I have another reason to give to hon. gentlemen opposite, notwithstanding their spasmodic cheering-I do not use the word offensively-why we should have these very Resolutions which you are about to agree to, which the right hon. gentleman, the member for Bucks, as far as I could understand, entirely approves, and which you all feel delighted should be proposed by the noble Viscount, because they relieve you from a considerable difficulty. I say that these Resolutions are a proof that the course which has been taken by the other

House has been unusual, if not wrong; because the Resolutions by implication condemn what the Lords have done, and although they do not revoke the Act, or pledge this House to any particular course, yet, when those Resolutions come to be considered, it will never be denied that the House of Commons does by them express a unanimous opinion that the course which has been taken by the other House is contrary to usage, and is calculated to excite the jealousy and alarm of the members of this House.

I have been a member of that committee, and the right hon. gentleman, the member for the University of Cambridge, knows my opinion of the committee and its labours. I think that committee fell wonderfully below its duties-that the course which it pursued was poor and spiritless; and at a future time when the course it has taken is contrasted with the course taken by the House of Commons on previous occasions, it will be justly said that there has been a real and melancholy declension in the spirit of this House. That which I complain of in the proceedings of the committee, I also complain of in respect to the manner in which some hon. members have discussed this question. Half of the committee appeared to me to go into that committee as much the advocates of the House of Lords as of the House of Commons, and I find that some members of this House are of the same character. Speeches have been delivered here that very few members of the House of Lords would make on this question, and I will undertake to say that not one member of that House, who is known to the public by his political influence, legal knowledge, high character, or extensive learning, would dare to make the speech that has been made to-night by the right hon. gentleman, the member for Stroud. I went into the committee with the utmost frankness in order that I might ascertain, not altogether in what manner the Lords had asserted their privileges, but what our predecessors had done with regard to theirs. We have no right to let go one single particle of the privileges and powers which the House of Commons have gained in past times; and I took it for granted that if I examined for some centuries back the course which the House of Commons had pursued-if I read their Resolutions, if I read the reasons adduced at their conferences, if I observed the Acts which they passed, and the result of the

discussions between the two Houses-we should be justified in concluding that we have rights to maintain for which our predecessors have contended.

Now, several Members, following the example of the committee, have taken the House back for a long period of time. I will not go into those precedents with the view of contending whether they do or do not refer to this particular case; but the House will permit me to mention two or three facts which I brought out of the Journals, and which convinced me that we should not take a sufficiently bold or decided course if we merely agree to the Resolutions of the noble Viscount. I will first refer to that very case which the right hon. gentleman, the member for the University of Cambridge, and myself fixed upon as the starting point of our precedents—the precedents of the year 1407; and I trust every hon. member has read it, either in the translation, or in the old Norman-French. It is worth reading, for it is a very curious case, and there is no other so like the recent action of the House of Lords as that which took place 453 years ago; for the House of Lords then proposed to continue a tax to which the Commons had not assented, and the House of Commons were greatly disturbed at the House of Lords prolonging a tax to which the House of Commons had not given its assent. We then made a great leap, and from the year 1407 came down to the year 1628. We then found the House of Commons insisting upon the initiation of Bills of Supply. They would not permit the name of the Lords to be inserted in the preamble of a Bill of Supply, neither would they agree to the compromise that neither the Lords nor the Commons should be introduced, but that the High Court of Parliament should be mentioned. The House of Commons refused to pass the Bill in that shape, and submitted that the Commons should be named alone in the grant. This was done, and that has been the practice ever since in the preamble of Supply Bills.

Then we come to 1640, when the House of Lords were much more modest than they ought to have been, according to the right hon. gentleman, who maintains that they ought to check, alter, amend, improve, and if necessary overthrow, all the financial arrangements of the year that this House may agree to. The Declaration of 1640 sets forth that the Lords stated at the Conference that:

"My Lords would not meddle with matters of subsidy, which belong naturally and properly to you-no, not to give you advice therein, but have utterly declined it."

Then the House of Lords, in 1640, we are asked to suppose, knew nothing of their constitutional rights, and the House of Commons of that day were less able than they are at present to judge of what is necessary for the performance of their proper functions in the State, and for the liberties of those whom they represent. Mr. Pym told their Lordships that they had not only meddled with matters of Supply, but that they had

"Both concluded the matter and order of proceeding, which the House of Commons takes to be a breach of their privilege, for which I was commanded to desire reparation from your Lordships."

The Lords made reparation by declaring that they did not know they were breaking a right of the Commons in merely suggesting that Supply should have precedence over the consideration of grievances. I am not sure that even now, notwithstanding what has been said, the House of Lords have ever admitted by any resolution that they have not the power to originate Supplies. They have not the power, of course, to carry such a Bill, because if it came to this House it would fall down dead, unless that unhappy time should come when the theories of the right hon. gentleman, the member for Stroud, are carried out.

Then comes the question of Amendments. The Lords endeavoured to amend a Bill of Supply. I do not wonder that they did so, because the theories of the right hon. gentleman must have been palatable to a good many of them. In 1671 it was proposed not to continue a tax, but to reduce a taxthe duty on white sugar. The Lords proposed to reduce the duty from one penny per pound to five-eighths of a penny, and the House of Commons came to a Resolution that "in all aids given to the King by the Commons the rate or tax ought not to be altered by the Lords." A conference was held with the House of Lords, and the House of Commons then declared that the right which they claimed "was a fundamental right, both as to the matter, the measure, and the time.' Then, what followed in the House of Lords? They replied by the very same Resolution, which had been passed in a contrary sense by this House. They said, with reason, " for

if they cannot amend, or abate, or revise a Bill in Parliament -they said this, mind, in answer to the Commons, who declared that they could not amend, but might negative the whole they said, "if we cannot amend, or abate, or alter in part, by what consequence of reason can we enjoy the liberty to reject the whole ?"

The right hon. gentleman, the member for the University of Dublin, last night showed himself a most unhappy critic. He called our attention to the condition of things in the United States. In fact, he proved himself-only he did not exactly understand what he was saying-he showed himself to be strongly in favour of Americanizing our institutions in one respect. He said the Senate of the United States has the power not only of rejecting, but of amending—which is quite true. When the founders of the American Republic were binding together the thirteen sovereign States in one greatand to be still greater-combination, they looked back naturally to the practice of the country from which they were separating, to determine, or at least to learn, something from our Parliamentary practice. They found that in England the Lords could not begin Money Bills, could not alter or amend them ; but that theoretically-because the matter had never been decided-theoretically they had power to reject. But, then, what was the conclusion which they came to? They said the very same thing that the House of Lords had said in the year 1671-" It is perfectly childish to say that the House of Lords cannot alter, abate, or increase, but yet shall be able to reject." They knew well, that, although there was that theoretical right in England, yet, practically, it had never been enforced, and they came to the conclusion that if they should give to their own Senate power to reject, it would be necessary also to give them the power to amend; and at this very moment the Senate of the United States might, not with that sort of responsibility of which the right hon. gentleman is so fond, but with a real responsibility, every two members being the representatives of a particular Sovereign State-that elected Senate does amend, and does reject, and does deal with finance in a manner which has never been permitted, nor even proposed in this country, except in the extraordinary speech to which we have just listened.

Seven years after the last date to which I have referred