mena and sublime truths, and particularly on account of those descriptions of the Deity and the divine acts, where the analogy is taken from the human body.

A polished taste is very susceptible, (and perhaps may, even critically speaking, be over-sensitive,) as to the difference between figures which are thought appropriate and refined, and such as are felt to be quite the reverse. But if we grant that all analogical expressions are imperfect; and extremely so, in reference to what is divine; then the most splendid and the most undignified which Scripture offers, are not to be contrasted, but only compared; as being utensils of the same kind, taken from different parts of that same narrow range of types or signs for indicating truth to man, of which alone his present knowledge admits the use.

Mankind must be taught the greatest truths through the exhibition of some kind of images; they may fancy, at a certain stage of refinement, that these images, if they were really set forth by the Divine Teacher, would needs all have been (as it were) of pure crystal, or even of lambent flame; and in no instance of homely wood, or earth, or miry clay forgetting that there would be still an inconceivable difference, not only between the meanest, but the most brilliant images that could be offered to the human faculties, and the reality of the divine things denoted by them.

An ancient geometer, demonstrating profound and beautiful theorems, may have chosen sometimes to trace his diagrams on the mud of the Nile, or in the sweepings of his lecture-room; we can suppose a young student, who looked on them, to say,-If these theorems had been from a master's hand, and true and important in themselves, they would not have been drawn thus meanly;-we can also suppose the philosopher to ask him, with scorn,-How much

more mathematical truth or beauty would there have been, had they been traced on papyrus, or in gold dust?

The topic, indeed, admits of several other arguments; but this one, I think, is not inconsiderable: it might, if the present note had not exceeded its designed limits, be more fully developed; and perhaps, also, more variously applied, in defence of scriptural representations.

NOTE D.

"works which are, in some sense, notwithstanding their magnificence, finite."-page 89.

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even though the multitude of intelligent or sentient beings should be not infinite, which, understanding that word in the sense of ever-growing, or increasing without end, we can be no way certain that it will not be."-page 114.

MATTER, as to its extension, must be finite, unless we would exclude a vacuum; it is also contradictory to speak of an actually existing infinite number. But in admitting the infinite divisibility of matter, which is as demonstrable as a vacuum, we admit an endless series of parts in the smallest known body; which, I apprehend, sufficiently shows, that the notion of a never-ending multiplication of bodies is not contradictory. The reflection, trite as it is, should not here be omitted, how ill it becomes us rashly to deny what is above reason, while infinitude meets and confounds us in

all things, "from the least to the greatest;" as much in contemplating an atom as the universe; and, while mysteries, not less inscrutable, attach to the existence of body, than to that of spirit. The words of Locke are remarkable:—“I would fain have instanced* any thing in our notion of spirit, more perplexed, or nearer a contradiction, than the very notion of body includes in it: the divisibility in infinitum of any finite extension, involving us, whether we grant or deny it, in consequences impossible to be explicated or made consistent." (Essay, Book II. chapter xxiii. § 31. See also the last of Howe's Letters on the Trinity; in Works, vol. ii. p. 605, folio edition.)

But to return to the direct subject of this note;—the opinion that the material worlds, or that organized beings, are infinite in multitude, although it has been controverted, is supported by some eminent writers. Dr. Edmund Halley (to whose care Newton committed the publication of his 'Principia') adduces astronomical arguments in favour of the supposition, that "the number of stars is infinite, and the system without bounds." (Quoted in Bonnycastle's Introduction, p. 308.) 'The conclusiveness of these arguments is much doubted; indeed the terms of the supposition, except infinite was meant to be used in the sense of endlessly increasing, appear contradictory.

Dr. Hartley, however, in more general terms, and on metaphysical grounds, seems to suppose more than this— "Though no finite being can comprehend more than the finite effects of power and knowledge; nay, though to suppose infinite effects, i.e. an infinite universe, is thought by some to involve a contradiction, to be the same thing as

*(i.e. by the objector).

supposing an actually infinite number; yet it appears to me, that the other branch of the dilemma repels us with the greatest force. To suppose a finite universe, is to suppose a stop where the mind cannot rest; we shall always ask for a cause of this finiteness, and, not finding any, reject the supposition. -As to the foregoing objection to the infinity of the universe, we may observe, that it arises merely from the finiteness of our comprehensions. We can have no conception of any thing infinite, nor of the possibility that any other being, conceived by us, can conceive this, &c. But all this vanishes when we come to consider, that there actually is, that there necessarily must be, an Infinite Being. This Being may conceive his own infinite works, and he alone can do it. His own infinite nature, which we cannot but admit, is as much above conception as the infinity of his works." ("Observations on Man,' vol. ii. chap. i. Propos. 3.)

It is not to be inferred, from my having connected with this supposition of an infinity (i. e. endless multiplication) of sentient beings, the fact of the vast extension of the material universe, as corroborating its probability, (at pp. 116, 117,) that I imagine extension necessary to the supposition. Even did we know that a created spirit never can or must act, except in connexion with matter, it would be no whit the less conceivable, that the power who unites animation and all vital functions with microscopic portions of matter, may unite the highest faculties of a spirit with an organization equally minute, or indefinitely more so. Why may it not be one among the countless triumphs of omnipotent skill, to give to some of the noblest and happiest intelligences, bodies whose structure is the more exquisite in proportion as their exility is more wonderful? Nothing, I think, but our analogical thoughts and expressions, such as greatness,

sublimity, &c., so habitually applied to mind, would make this idea appear extravagant. Wherefore should not subtilty be as admirably stupendous as magnitude, and the Divine Artificer be more glorified, and the creature more perfect and refined, when the mass of organised matter were in the inverse ratio (and consequently the wonderfulness of its fabric in a direct ratio) to the excellence and dignity of the actuating Spirit ?-But, moreover, it is argued by some metaphysicians, that spirits have no measurable relation to place," and "do not require any space to possess; and if there be any sort of separate spirits which are not united to matter, they are, most properly, no where, in strict philosophy." (Dr. Isaac Watts, on the Place and Motion of Spirits; Philosophical Essay, VI., § 4. See, also, Doddridge's Lectures, Prop. 84.)

This, which however incomprehensible by us, cannot, I apprehend, be disproved, would at once exclude all imagined necessary dependence of created existence on extension.— Nor can these be justly deemed trifling or over-curious speculations, if they any way conduce to show how unsearchably infinite are the resources of Divine power and goodness. He who disbelieves a plurality of worlds, or he who even denies the existence of matter, has not advanced one step towards demonstrating, that God will not create an infinity of happy spirits.

Will it be said, in reference to these last remarks,-Why, therefore, speak of "the incalculable magnitude of creation" as "auxiliary to faith," and of there being "ample room for a preponderance of happiness?" &c., pp. 116, 117. I answer -Because the fact and the contemplation of such magnitude greatly promote our belief that there is an utterly inconceivable multitude of sentient beings: nay, further, ren