NOTE B.

"Every good gift, and every perfect boon.”—Page 75.

Πᾶσα δόσις ἀγαθὴ καὶ πᾶν δώρημα τέλειον.—ΙΑΚΩΒ, 1. 17.

It is probable that there is some difference of meaning between dos and dúgna, (see Heisenius in Schleusner on the former word,) as well as between the epithets connected with them and the variation adds a poetic grace to this metrical passage. But, whether dúgnua, taken separately, mean (as that writer thinks) a greater kind of gift, or not, its epithet shows that the best of all gifts is here intended; and δώρημα, from its relation to δωρεαν, seems peculiarly adapted to intimate, that this best of gifts, divine influence on the soul, is purely free, or gratuitous. Thus understood, the passage most emphatically, though indirectly, reproves every mode and aspect of that pride, so natural to man, so apt to vegetate even in the "good ground," which can 'glory" in the gifts of God, whether spiritual or moral, intellectual, or relating to external things, "as though they had not been received."

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The comment of Estius on this passage, viewed in its reference to the origin of spiritual good, is excellent. Having made the supposition, that does and dugnua are to be distinguished, he says: "Ut illa ad naturam referatur, hoc ad gratiam; nam denua est quod gratis datur. Quo pertinet et epithetum perfecti: nam gratia perficit naturam. Docet

ergo Deum esse auctorem omnis boni in nobis, sive naturalis, sive supernaturalis, sive in habitu consistat, sive in actu; præsertim cùm de peccatis ante fuerit locutus, quibus ex adverso bonæ actiones respondent. Egregiè hoc refellit Pelagium," &c.-Estius in Pol. Synops. in loc.

NOTE C.

an infinite moral perfection.-Page 82.

a part of his wisdom and power.—Page 83.

To some accurate thinkers, this, and similar language, may appear incorrect, or questionable. Locke has said, "Finite and Infinite, seem to me to be looked upon by the mind, as the modes of quantity, and to be attributed, primarily, only to those things which have parts:-and such are the ideas of space, duration, and number. When we apply to the first and Supreme Being, our idea of infinite, in our weak and narrow thoughts, we do it primarily in respect of his duration and ubiquity; and I think more figuratively to his power, wisdom, and goodness, and other attributes which are properly inexhaustible and incomprehensible, &c. For, when we call them infinite, we have no other idea of this infinity, but what carries with it some reflection on, and intimation of that number, or extent of the acts or objects of God's power, wisdom and goodness, which can never be supposed so great, or so many, which these attributes will not always surmount and exceed;" &c. See the whole

passage (which is here abridged) in Essay on the Human Understanding, Book II. chapter xvii. § 1. But this great philosopher does not here object (at least not explicitly) to such a “figurative" application of the term infinite. Nor, indeed, does it seem to me possible, for us, wholly to abstract from the idea of quantity when we speak of moral and intellectual attributes, although the idea, thus applied, may be purely analogical. Locke himself, when he remarks in the above passage, that the divine power, wisdom, &c., are properly inexhaustible and incomprehensible, uses terms which as plainly take their rise from the idea of quantity, or measure, as does the term infinite. And the consideration, that this mode of conception and expression is so natural, will, I think, at least suffice to justify the popular use of the terms to which this note refers, and of others which resemble them: even although, taken metaphysically, they should be liable to objection. When we speak of any perfection of Deity as infinite, we mean, not that it is a quantity, possessing infinite extension and divisibility, but that its exercise is boundless and endless. When we speak of a part of the stability of divine power or truth, or a portion of the unsearchable strength of divine love, (pp. 85, 86,) we mean a portion of the exercise, or of the acts, and manifestations of either attribute.

But indeed it would be in vain (as well as unwise, for other reasons,) to attempt an exclusion of all phrases which are metaphysically improper or inadequate. The language of figure, or analogy, is made for man. It seems to be, in many cases, the only class of signs which he can use, and even when he would abstract the most carefully from what is material, he cannot wholly dispense with it. The terms which we must retain in speaking of the divine attributes, which

the inspired writers continually use in relation to the Deity, lie open to the very same kind of comment. It may indeed be thought, that Archbishop King, and his learned modern commentators, 'Dr. Copleston and Archbishop Whately, have gone a degree too far in their views of the analogical nature of all those terms and ideas by which we describe the moral attributes of God; (on which point see the Quarterly Review, No. LI. pp. 88, 89): yet I apprehend thus much none can doubt, that they " are all imperfect expressions when applied to God, helping us only to form some notions, but those faint and inadequate, of his divine perfection." (Archbishop King, as quoted by Dr. Copleston, in his 'Inquiry on Necessity,' &c., page 118.) And this remark, of course, extends to what are called the natural, as well as the moral attributes. Dr. Watts, in his 'Philosophical Essays,' where a devout reverence for revealed truth and scriptural language appears in every page, states "the true notion of omnipresence," in terms which, if correct, strikingly show the analogical nature of our language in describing that attribute.-"This infinite consciousness and activity of God, which are his very self, have no measurable or unmeasurable relation either to body or space, as the parts of extension or quantity have to each other; and, therefore, we say he is in no place, in strict and philosophical language; though, in common speech, and in the language of Scripture, which is suited to the bulk of mankind, God is said to fill all things, and to exist every where, because of his immediate consciousness," &c.-Essay VI. § 5.

The language, therefore, of all religious writings, and, I should suppose, even of philosophical theology, must be exposed, in some degree, to this imputation of inaccuracy. As it respects" omnipresence," for example, the second

paper of this volume would in some sense be so by its very title; much more by several parts of its contents.

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It may be further remarked, by the way, that, if the above notion of omnipresence be just, (in which Hartley fully concurs, when he writes, We cannot discover any relation which space or place bears to the divine existence," - Observations on Man,' Part II. chapter i. Propos. 7: see also Doddridge's Lectures, Propos. 34, Scholium 2,) then it would appear that the term infinite is applied as improperly or figuratively" to the "duration and ubiquity" (i. e. eternity and omnipresence) of God, as to other attributes, notwithstanding Mr. Locke's distinction—if it involve (as he supposes) the idea of quantity,* to which, according to those authors, the divine existence has no relation. Yet this term is not wholly discarded by the most recent and accurate theologians: it is useful and expressive; and, to say that it is but analogical, is only to say what may equally be said respecting a great portion of the other language of Christian divines, and of the Scriptures.

But, that these thoughts may not be unapplied to a practical use, which, it is conceived, directly arises from them, (and which, if well founded, may of itself excuse their having been pursued at some length,) I conclude by suggesting, that the great proportion of figure, and especially analogical figure, which enters necessarily into the very formation of human thought and language, very much weakens the objection made against the truth of the Old Testament, on account of what may be termed its rude and popular, and inaccurate way of representing great pheno

*But see note D, page 303.