of those that do, it cannot be denied that this was the

end for which Nature designed them'.

To the objection against this notion of moral discipline, "That a course of action proceeding from hope or fear is only a discipline of self-love," it is replied, "That doing God's commands, because He commands is nevertheless obedience, and will form habits of it;— that veracity, justice, and charity;-regard to God's authority, and to our own chief interest,--are not only coincident, but each of them a just principle of action; and from whichsoever a man begins and continues a good life, he must gradually attain more of a character corresponding to the constitution of nature, as moral, and to our relation to God, as our moral governour; and therefore must obtain the happiness connected with such a character."

These remarks as to active obedience, are applicable also to passive submission to God's will, which is likewise a part of a right character, and much in our own power to form. This virtue may be required even in a state of perfect happiness; for we see that prosperity itself, by exciting unbounded desires may pro

1 It is observable that the appearance of such an amazing waste in nature, with respect to these seeds by foreign causes, is as unaccountable, as is that far more awful and terrible ruin of so many moral agents by themselves, through sin.

duce imaginary evils; and though there can be no scope for patience when "sorrow shall be no more," yet there may be need of that temper of mind, which patience forms. Habits of resignation may be necessary for all; and the proper discipline for these is affliction, which religion teaches us to receive patiently, as proceeding from God, and as being what He thinks proper. This dutiful submission, together with an active principle of obedience, makes up a character in us, relatively suited to His sovereignty, not an arbitrary but rightful one, as being Supreme over all.

On the whole then, Nature does not bestow upon us the qualifications necessary for our mature state in this life, but only gives us capacities, and puts us in a condition fitted gradually to acquire them. And this is the Analogy of our condition in this world, as in a state of moral discipline for another.

It is in vain to object, that all this discipline might have been saved, by our being made at once, what we ought to be. Experience shows us that Nature acts not so, nor saves us the trouble of going through danger; but only makes us capable of, and gives opportunities for, doing so ; and that what we were to be, was to be the result of what we would do. Acquirements, experience, and habits, are the natural supply to our deficiencies, and our security against dangers; and the alternative is left for our own choice, either to

improve ourselves and better our condition; or in ierauit of so doing, to remain deficient and wretched.

Cur being placed here in a state of probation, may so be intended as a theatre of action, wherein our respective characters may be exhibited, not indeed to God. because He intuitively knows them, but to His creation: and may be the means He makes use of, in rier to the future disposal of us, suitably to such exhibition of our real character.

It is therefore perfectly credible from the Analogy of Nature, that the same may be our case with respect to the happiness of a future state, and the necessary qualifications for it.

CHAPTER VI.

OF THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, CONSIDERED AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE.

ARGUMENT.—The credibility given to the general doctrine of religion by the analogy of Nature, is not weakened by the opinion of Necessity, or Fate. Fate is but a word, the sign of an abstract idea, and necessarily implies an agent. Now from what we see in the natural government of the world, Fate or Necessity, supposing it to exist, does not exclude deliberation, choice, and acting from certain principles to certain ends; and thus does not at all destroy the proof of an intelligent Author of Nature. Neither, on the same principles, does it destroy the scheme of religion; for, it being matter of positive experience, that under the natural government of the present world, we are prac tically dealt with as if we were free; the analogy of

nature leads to the conclusion, that with regard to a future state, we shall be treated as free: and thus the notion of necessity is evidently not applicable to practical subjects. If, however, Necessity be reconcileable with the natural constitution of things, as we experience them now, it must be equally so with the scheme of religion.

OUR condition under God's government in this world only, has been shewn as greatly analogous to our condition as designed for another. If then, universal necessity be reconcileable with the former, it becomes a question how far it is so with the latter;—not absolutely whether fate be reconcileable with religion, but hypothetically, whether, if it be reconcileable with the constitution of Nature, it be not reconcileable with the system of Religion also, and the proof of it: or, on the contrary, how far a fatalist has any pretence to conclude that there can be no such thing as religion, -which is absurd.

But since it may be objected, that universal Necessity is sufficient to account for the origin and preservation of all things: and whereas it has been taken for granted in our argument hitherto, that there is an intelligent Author of Nature;-the objection requires

an answer.