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the light of the further conception into which it rises, it appears before us as something which may, in the highest sense, assert itself, not certainly irrespective of happiness, yet apart from its immediate bestowal-yea, even in the bestowal of partial and temporary unhappiness. For, as the good is at the same time ever the right, as love only sustains itself in holiness, so it becomes conceivable that, where the right has been invaded, and the holy desecrated, goodness may express itself more distinctively in suffering or punishment,” pp. 316,-318.
In a still subsequent chapter, while considering the phenomena of sin, our author asserts : “ In the law of conscience we found that good interprets itself as the right. The moral good which commands us in conscience is righteousness. The one idea only sustains itself in the other, and finds its complement in it. The attribute of Divine goodness becomes, accordingly, in relation to moral life, also Divine righteousness. The two conceptions are essentially inseparable. If we regard sin, then, in this higher theistic light, we will at once see that suffering is its necessary mark of punishment. Asserting itself in opposition to the law of conscience, it thereby directly opposes itself to the righteous will of God, of which that law is the expression, and so provokes His punishment. Existing only as a rebellious infraction of Divine will, it necessarily calls forth the Divine wrath. In its very character, wherever it occurs in the universe of God, sin accordingly is, and must be, marked by His displeasure. It must bear the brand of suffering. It must have its doom written on it. And in this point of view, so far is suffering from constituting a valid objection to the Divine goodness, that it is truly a manifestation of that goodness. Rightly viewed, the Divine punishment of sin is merely another side of the Divine goodness. For inasmuch as goodness only completes itself in righteousness, were sin or unrighteousness not visited with punitive suffering, the Divine goodness could not be the reality which conscience demands. It might remain a vague and beautiful dream of the imagination ; but a goodness which in any respect came short of righteousness would, in the very nature of the case, prove a vanishing shadow—a mere fiction, on which the heart could never rest. Let the one idea be lost sight of, and the other will altogether fail to legitimatize itself, or keep its ground. A goodness which does not rest on justice, and embrace it, would, in the highest meaning of the attribute, be no goodness—our own moral conscience being judge—and would leave, therefore, no real foundation for that happiness in whose behalf it is sometimes emptied of this essential element. In all this view, therefore, the Divine goodness is seen not only to be consistent with, but to be expressly called forth in, human suffering as the punishment of sin,” pp. 383, 384. The reader will notice the partial coincidence between these views of Dr. Tulloch, and the course of thought pursued in the Bibliotheca Sacra, vol. x. pp. 705–738.
No Treatise on Natural Theology can be complete, which does not grapple with the problem of the existence of sin. Dr. Tulloch expressly rejects the dogma, that sin is necessary on the part of the sinner. “For sin being necessary, it is no longer morally blamable. If it spring out of the essential limitations of our being, it is no longer a fault, but only a misfortune,” p. 393. Dr. Tulloch also teaches, that “in the very fact of trial, there lies the possibility of failure of a sinking below the good, as well as a rising to higher measures of it. In the simple fact of moral action, there lies the contingency of wrong action, and of all that moral imperfection that actually exists in the world,” p. 369. “ In the mere fact of moral development, evil is contingent, and consistently with the nature of that development, could not have been absolutely excluded,” p. 376. The position that Omnipotence cannot prevent sin, we regard as untenable, and unnecessary for the proof of the doctrines which our author wishes to establish. He adds: “ The worst of the social evils from which man has suffered in the past, or still suffers, are not in any sense to be regarded as a part of the Divine constitution of the world, but really infringements thereof, taking their rise in the invasion of that constitution by man's impious selfishness. The misrule, and the servile and unhappy bondage of mind and body, of which so many are the victims, are felt to arise, not from the Divine appointment, but from the direct violation and contempt of it,” pp. 373, 374.
In agreement with these assertions, several of which, we think, ought to have been modified, Dr. Tulloch regards the existence of sin as an inexplicable mystery. “Such,” he says, “ being the true character of sin, it must be obvious in its very definition, that we cannot bring it into induc- ' tive relation with the course of our evidence; or, in other words, that we cannot find any argumentative solution of it. For how can we intelligibly relate that to God, whose very essence consists in opposition to Him? How can we explain that which in itself, in its very conception, presents the uttermost contradiction? In order that anything may be capable of explanation, it must exhibit some ground of reason; but here is all unreason. That any creature should revolt against its Creator, can only present itself as the most awful and unfathomable folly. Sin, therefore, baffles all explanation. Every attempt that has been made to throw any light upon it, or to resolve it inductively, has ended, in the very nature of the case, in denying it. All that we can say or know is, that the possibility of sin lies in the fact of human freedom. Man being made free to choose good or evil, the choice of the latter was possible—but further all is darkness; and if we insist for a moment in carrying our logical explanations up into this region, we only plunge into deeper and more hopeless darkness.
“But in this very confession of the utter unintelligibility of sin, is not our argument relieved from its difficulty ? We cannot give any theistic explanation of it. But why? Because in its very essence, it is anti-theistic. It is in God's creation, but it is there as a blot upon it—in direct violation of the Divine order which otherwise prevails. In its nature it wholly separates itself from God, and is, therefore, whatever we may make of it, not entitled to reflect injuriously on the Divine character,” pp. 386, 387. “ All that we can know is, that the possibility of sin lies in the fact of personality; in other words, in the fact of human freedom," p. 395.
These views with regard to the existence of sin, prepare us to expect a
very different theory with regard to the nature of human responsibility from that which prevails among many theologians of Scotland and of America. “It is no doubt true,” he says, “ that it is only through special Divine agency
that the Gospel everywhere makes progress, and that it is possible for us to conceive such a forth-putting of this agency as might speedily bring the whole world under its sway; yet it is no less, and in the very nature of the case, true, that this agency everywhere only works in coöperation with the free agency of man. It is a persuasive power, eliciting and strengthening man's spirit, but in no case forcibly overbearing it even for its most holy purposes. The whole course of history, as well as the express teaching of revelation, prove that God has ever dealt with man, not by the strength of an irresistible power crushing all that is contrary to it, but by the moral strength of those Divine influences by which He seeks to draw every inferior will into true harmony with His own perfect will. And no doubt this is so, because, consistently with the blessed perfection of God, it could not be otherwise; because He is most glorified in being served by a world of created beings, who are indued with the mysterious power of willing good or evil, and who, through His grace and goodness, have been each one brought into true harmony with Him.' It is not difficult to see, indeed, that the idea of a forcible and compulsory advance of the Gospel is not for a moment tenable even as a supposition. For in the very statement of this idea there is already implied the annihilation of the moral quality in man,
which alone constitutes the Gospel so great a blessing to him, or even makes him possibly a subject of it. Unless man were truly possessed of a will, the Gospel would lose all meaning, as man would lose all distinction from the objects of nature around him. In such a case, it has been well said, “There could be really no true living being in the world except God. For to have a will is in truth to live. What are all things without this but mere machines, which must do the order of the one Will which acts through them? What are they but mere shadowy figures of being cast forth from the one Being? If we do not believe that there are separate wills, with this awful power of resisting the one Will, we must either make the perfectly good God the direct cause of evil, or we must admit a second first cause from whom that evil springs.'
Here, therefore, we come back to the final mystery of creation, the fact of human freedom. In this fact is contained at once man's glory and the possibility of his fearful revolt and shame. It is this alone which at once makes him a subject of Divine grace, and enables him to oppose that grace. Forcibly to destroy the capability of opposition, would be to destroy the very character of his being, and to leave him incapable of good any more than of evil. It is the awful peril of freedom, that while man may rise into union with God, and become a partaker of the Divine nature, he less harden himself against God, and fall away from Him into an ever deeper revolt and abandonment of selfishness,” pp 418-421. Again he says: Most necessitarians “ mean not only to assert that man's rational activity displays itself under the same law of cause and effect as the course of na
ture does, but that there is really nothing more in it than this display. Volition goes forth under motive; motive, again, is dependent on organization, or at least on some external cause; and this is all. The whole question plainly lies in this higher region. What constitutes motive? What is the spring of the order which is universally admitted to obtain among the facts of man's spiritual being, no less than among all other facts? Is that spring in nature, and bound to its immutable sequences ? or is it deep in the central being of the man himself, and essentially separated from nature? The materialistic necessitarian holds as his cardinal principle the former of these views. He knows nothing beyond the mere series of phenomena which collectively he may call Mind. Any spiritual unit or soul beneath the multiplicity, and therein expressing itself, while yet essentially distinguished from it, has no place in his system; and quite consistently so. The theological necessitarian of course shrinks from this conclusion, but his language has not unfrequently been such as to bear it out. Carrying up with an iron band the phenomenal law of cause and effect into the region of spiritual life, he may have seemed to gain a temporary triumph over an adversary; but he has done so too often at the risk of total peril to his faith, and to the very ground and condition of all religion,” pp. 296, 297.
We are interested in some of the verbal discriminations which Dr. Tulloch makes throughout the present volume. Thus he says: “The continuation of alarm, not merely the first movement or flutter of the soul, but the prolonged emphasis of the emotion, becomes fear, apprehension, inciting to escape from danger.” “Terror, which sometimes stands for the generic emotion, seems certainly more correctly regarded as its highest excess, betokening the comparative feebleness of the subject of it. The danger is so imminent and threatening that the mere guardian impulse loses itself in that species of convulsive agitation which we specially denominate terror. Panic, again, is contagious alarm. The simple emotion has a tendency to propagate itself from heart to heart, and as it propagates, it kindles into intenser forms, till it becomes that general and helpless movement of fear which we call panic,” p. 263.
Is Dr. Tulloch correct, however, when he says, on page 266, that “ Resentment is the deepened and prolonged form of anger.” Is not the reverse more exactly the truth? Can " indignation, as an individual emotion,” be defined to be “ anger restraining itself from a sense of the unworthiness of the object exciting it,” “ a kind of magnanimous anger,” p. 266. Or is it rather a modification of resentment ? See Bishop Butler's Sermons, particularly the eighth and ninth.
We cannot say that we coincide with Dr. Tulloch in his views of Pride, Vanity, Humility, and Modesty. He says: “Of this class of emotions, pride is one of the most distinguishing. In its most general form, it seems to be simply self taking the measure of its own claims alongside those of others. It always implies this element of comparison. When the comparison is made with fairness, we recognize the propriety of the feeling, as in the
common expression, a proper pride. Where, again, the comparison is grossly mistaken and over-estimated by self in its own favor, the feeling assumes that excessive form, in which it becomes so odious to others, and often such a source of misery to its subject. Vanity seems again to be the simple pampering of self-complacency, self dwelling on its own image till it can scarcely find interest or beauty in any
other. “ Directly converse to such emotions are those of humility and modesty. The former may be defined to be the simple opposite of pride, the retirement of self from the assertion even of rightful claims which it might prefer before others. It, too, seems always to involve an element of comparison; and, in a similar manner to pride, it may so greatly and obviously mistake the comparison as to become disagreeably excessive. The only case in which it can never do so, is in reference to the Supreme Being, before whom the most extreme retirement of self is not only appropriate, but demanded. And hence we recognize the primary importance of this emotion in religion. Modesty is also, may we not say, a species of self-denial, self-shrinking from the acknowledgment of claims of which it is yet dimly conscious. It is self-repressive, peculiarly; and yet self does not, as in humility, retire out of sight. It is this curious balance of emotion, in which self is negatived, and yet, with a vaguely conscious justice, stands forward (the internal conflict betraying itself in the suffusion of the face with blushes), which gives to modesty that special charm which all recognize in it,” pp. 272, 273. We think that there is no justifiable pride, for pride is always an indulged excess of self-esteem; that a man may be “ too proud to be vain,” for vanity always implies an undue choice to secure the good opinion of others; that the virtue of humility is never at variance with a rightful esteem of our constitution or character, but is always consistent with all truth; and that modesty never conflicts with the acknowledgment of all the gifts with which God has endued us. Our constitution is really so insignificant, and our character is really so base, that the utmost humility and modesty are exercised in feeling toward ourselves precisely as we ought to feel. It is of the highest importance to remember, that all true humility, and all true modesty, are in accordance with justice. We deserve to be humble; we must be grossly unfaithful to ourselves, if we are not modest.
II. BRODIE's PsychoLOGICAL INQUIRIES." “ There runs a chain throughout the whole system of beings,” says Bishop Berkley. “In this chain, one link drags another; the meanest things are connected with the highest. The calamity, therefore, is neither strange nor much to be complained of, if a low, sensual reader shall, from
Psychological Inquiries: In a Series of Essays intended to illustrate the Mutual Relations of the Physical Organization and the Mental Faculties. By Benjamin Brodie, Bart. D. C. L., V. P. R. S., Corresponding Member of the Institute of France, etc. Second edition. London: Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans. 1855. pp. 275. 18mo.