neither. Mr. B. beyond doubt, means, all along, to deny every thing spiritually good, being either in whole or in part, the duty of carnal men. I have attempted, on the other hand, to maintain, that such obedience is not merely in part, but fully incumbent upon them. And, one should think, it either is incumbent upon them, or it is not; but the above position implies that it is neither.

Farther: I question if both these kinds of inability can possibly obtain in the same instance. Where there is, and always was, an entire natural inability, there appears to be no room for an inability of a moral nature. It would sound uncouth, to affirm of any of the brutal creation, that they are morally, as well as naturally, unable to credit the gospel. It would be equally uncouth, to affirm of a man in his grave, that he is unwilling, as well as unable, to rise up and walk.

That men are capable of hating spiritual things, nobody will dispute. But it is impossible that there should subsist any aversion from what there is an entire natural inability to understand. We cannot hate that of which we have no idea, any more than love it. A brute, be his savage disposition ever so great, is incapable of aversion from every thing superior to his nature to understand. The same may be said of any be ing, intelligent or unintelligent.

I may be told, perhaps, that a poor man may be of such a temper of mind, that, if he had a natural ability to relieve the distressed, he would still be under a moral inability. Be it so it is not proper to say, he is morally, as well as naturally, unable to relieve the indigent. It might with truth be said, that he is morally unable to do such kind actions as are within his reach; and we may conclude he would be equally so to relieve the indigent, if his wealth were to increase. But this does not prove that moral inability can exist without natural ability. Besides, the inability of the poor man to relieve the distressed, is not, in every respect, total; and so is not of equal extent with that pleaded for in carnal men, as to the discernment of spiritual things. No man, however poor, is destitute of those faculties and powers of mind by which generous actions are performed. It is impossible, perhaps, to find a man naturally unable, in every respect, to do good, in some way or other, to his fellow-creatures: or, if a man of that description

could be found, he must be utterly void of reason; and, in that case, he cannot be said to he morally, as well as naturally, unable to do good.

Those who possess great natural ability are capable of being the subjects of greater moral inability and guilt, than others whose capacities are less. It is not in some men's power to be so wicked as others. And where there is, and always was, an entire natural incapacity, there is no place for an incapacity of a moral nature, in any degree. Mr. B. denies that men either have, or ever had, any natural ability for the embracing of spiritual things. We reply, If so, they would be equally incapable of rejecting, as of embracing, them. The aversion of the human mind from things of that nature, I conceive to be a strong additional argument in our favour; for which argument my thanks are due to Mr. Button. The above observations may be considered as a farther reply to the quotation from Mr. Brine. (p. 57.)

Can Mr. B. seriously pretend to maintain, that his sentiments represent human depravity in an equal light with ours? It seems he wishes to have it thought so; but with what colour of evidence, it is difficult to conceive. We suppose men's aversion is so great, as to amount to a total moral inability; and so to render divine influence absolutely necessary. But Mr. B. expresses his surprise, that we should call this inability total, (pp. 56. 93.) It seems, then, he does not think that the chain of men's native aversion from God and spiritual things is strong enough to keep them from coming to Christ, without having something else in conjunction with it.

But, if this cannot be maintained, he seems certain of the advantage, however, in one respect. "We certainly," says Mr. B. "lay man much lower than he does:" and this, he thinks, has a tendency to abase his pride, while our sentiments tend to gratify and promote it. (p. 96.) It is true, Mr. B. does lay man lower than we do: but it is observable, that, so far as that is the case, it is not in the character of a sinner, but of a creature of God; not on account of what he has made himself, but on account of what God has made him: and if this is the way in which we are to 2 G

VOL. I.

be humbled, it might be done still more effectually, if we were reduced to the condition of a stock or a stone.

In reply to what is said on the doctrine of grace, and the work of the Spirit, (pp. 1. 93. 97.) little more need be said in addition to the above. Though Mr. B. sometimes speaks of men's inability as being partly innocent, and partly criminal; yet, as was said before, it was manifestly his design, all along, to prove men wholly excusable in their omission of every thing spiritually good. But, suppose it were otherwise; suppose they were only in part excusable; if it be a more glorious instance of grace, and a greater exertion of divine influence, to save one who is partly innocent, than one who is entirely to blame; it must be upon this principle, that, in proportion as criminality is lessened, the glory of divine grace in salvation is increased; and, if so, then the most glorious display of grace that could be manifested in our salvation, must be upon the supposition of our being altogether innocent!

When ye shall have done all those things which are commanded you, says Christ to his disciples, say, We are unprofitable servants: we have done that which was our duty to do. Luke xvii. 10. From this passage two things are observable: First, That obedience to God cannot merit any thing at his hands. Secondly, the reason why there is no such thing as merit in our obedience is, that all the good we have done, or may do, is commanded, is our duty. From hence it follows, 1. That the very idea of duty excludes merit, and cuts off boasting. 2. That the more attached we are to our duty, as such, the more distant we are from all pretence to merit, or boasting. The very way to extirpate the notion of human merit is, to consider all which we do as being our duty. 3. That, if it were possible to perform any thing which does not come under the idea of duty, then would there be some ground for merit. If the foregoing observations be just, it scarcely needs asking, Which sentiment it is, that cuts off boasting; that of faith being considered as a duty, or the opposite P

Perhaps it may be said, in answer to this, that, when a man is enlightened by the Spirit of God, it is then his duty to believe. But I think, if it be not incumbent before, it will be

difficult to prove it so at all. In this case, the work of the Spirit upon the heart must constitute the ground of duty; and then it is necessary that the person should know that he is the subject of this work, before he can see it his duty to believe. But by what evidences can he obtain this knowledge? Surely not by his impenitency and unbelief; and yet, till he has repented and believed, he can have nothing better.

If it be as Mr. B. represents, the work of the Spirit must consist in giving us new natural powers. If we have no natural power to embrace spiritual things till we are regene rated, then regeneration must be the creation of natural power. And what this is different from creating a new soul, is difficult to determine. Be that as it may, the creating of natural power cannot be a spiritual exertion, any more than the creation of a leg or an arm; and so cannot be reckoned amongst the special spiritual operations of the Holy Spirit. Whatever grace there may be in it, it is no part of the grace of the gospel; it is no part of salvation. It is not any thing that became necessary through sin; for it is supposed that man was as destitute of it in his created, as in his fallen state. One should think, therefore, it can be nothing which is given us in behalf of Christ, as mediator; or for which we shall have to praise him in that character to eternity.

Among a catalogue of other bad consequences imputed to my sentiments, they are said to be "distressing to saints." (p. 105.) This, for aught I know, may be just. They certainly have a tendency to convince both saint and sinner of abundance of sin, which the sentiments here opposed make to be no sin. It is no wonder, therefore, that true saints, by discerning their great obligations, both before and after conversion, to love the Lord Jesus Christ, should now be greatly distressed in a way of godly sorrow. Looking upon him whom they pierced, they mourn, as one that is in bitterness for his first born. But this, so far from being brought as an objection, ought to be considered as a corroboration. That which tends to sooth and quiet the minds of men, by giving diminutive representations of the causes of reflection and grief, is not the gospel. The gospel gives peace which passeth all understanding; and this is consistent with the exercise of the most pungent grief: but that quietness of mind which

rises from a diminution of blame-worthiness, rather deserves the name of ease, than of peace, and is much more to be dreaded than desired.

It was acknowledged, in the former treatise, "that many who have dealt in addresses to unconverted sinners, have dabbled in Arminianism." Mr. B. from hence repeatedly represents me as acknowledging that they tend that way. (p. i. Pref. and p. 100.) This I must beg leave absolutely to deny. There is no such acknowledgment, nor any thing like it; but the very reverse. Mr. B. cannot be ignorant, that many who have maintained the doctrines of grace, have more than dabbled in Antinomianism; and yet that is no proof that the doctrines of grace are really of that tendency.

As to the use that is made of my concession concerning the manner of addressing sinners; such as "Come to Christ now, this moment," &c. (p. 99.) I might refer the reader for answer to the passage itself; yea, to that part of it which Mr. B. has quoted. Surely he had no reason to conclude, that I thought a believing in Christ was a matter that might safely be deferred. He professes to maintain, that men ought to be perfectly holy, in some sense or other; but does he ever say to his auditory, Be perfectly holy now, this moment?'

One remark more on this subject requires a reply. I had attempted to remove the supposed absurdity of addresses to dead sinners, by observing that we supposed spiritual death to be altogether a criminal affair. Mr. B. answers, from Mr. Wayman, "It was man's sin to destroy a moral life, but it is not man's sin that he hath not a spiritual one. It is God's eternal grace that gives life." (p. 102.) To this it is replied, this position requires a higher authority to support it than Mr. Wayman.* If we admitted this sentiment as true, then, it is granted, our manner of address to unconverted sinners would be inconsistent; but we deny it. In order to prove our conduct absurd, it should be proved to be inconsistent

• It is not man's sin that he hath not a spiritual one :"—If spiritual life be what we never had, then we cannot be said to be spiritually dead; for death is not a mere negative, but a privative idea. "It is God's eternal grace that gives life."-True; and is it not God's eternal grace that gives to a fallen creature a conformity to his holy law? and yet it does not follow from thence that it is not man's duty to have it.