Defining Personhood: Toward the Ethics of Quality in Clinical CareMany debates in biomedical ethics today involve inconsistencies in defining the key term, person. Both sides of the abortion debate, for instance, beg the question about what constitutes personhood. This book explores the arguments concerning definitions of personhood in the history of modern philosophy, and then constructs a superior model, defined in terms of distinctive features (a theoretical concept borrowed from linguistics). This model is shown to have distinct advantages over the necessary and sufficient condition models of personhood launched by essentialists. Philosophers historically have been correct about what some of the pivotal distinctive features of personhood are, e.q., rationality, communications and self-consciousness, but they have been wrong about the methods of recognizing and asserting personhood, and about the relative importance of feelings. In clinical care, complaints often surface that care is not personal. This book aims to improve care through providing a method of attending to patients as people. Charts in the Appendices show that where physicians attended to personal features important to their patients, sometimes the patients rated the care even higher than the physician did. The book will be useful to health-care providers whose goals include improving quality of care, listening to patients, and preventing malpractice. |
Contents
5 | |
Distinctive Features of Person and Quality of Clinical Care | 67 |
Subject Response | 73 |
Significance | 79 |
The Features | 97 |
Features Not Included | 106 |
A Theoretical Framework for Interpreting the Data | 113 |
FOUR Implications for Clinical Practice and Public Policy | 143 |
Notes | 173 |
183 | |
Interview Scripts and Questionnaires | 191 |
Quality Assessment Charts | 203 |
About the Author | 213 |
220 | |
Other editions - View all
Defining Personhood: Toward the Ethics of Quality in Clinical Care Sarah Bishop Merrill Limited preview - 2021 |
Common terms and phrases
abortion abortion debate abstract analysis attention autonomy bioethics C. S. Peirce claims concept of personhood concerning conditions for personhood consensus contexts criteria Cuomo debate decisional capacity decisions defining personhood Dennett discussion distinctive features distinctive-features theory DNR order doctors essentially contested essentially contested concepts exists features of personhood fetus Gallie health professionals human Ibid important individual informed consent interviewed Joel Feinberg Kant Kant's language linguistic Locke Locke's Ludwig Wittgenstein Macklin Mary Anne Warren Max Black metaphysical Mode necessary and sufficient nonperson notion of personhood Overall Quality Paired Patients Paired Physicians Peirce personal features Philosophy physical appearance physician political practice Pretest Means Nurses principle problem Question Quality Component questionnaire ratings rationality recognized responses resuscitation Sarah Bishop sense set of features Sissela Bok social sufficient conditions surrogate term person Test Means Physicians treatment undergraduate vague Variance W. B. Gallie Wittgenstein York
Popular passages
Page 14 - Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person; this nobody has any right to but himself.
Page 13 - This personality extends itself beyond present existence to what is past, only by consciousness, whereby it becomes concerned and accountable, owns and imputes to itself past actions, just upon the same ground, and for the same reason, that it does the present.
Page 14 - To conclude, the power that every individual gave the society when he entered into it can never revert to the individuals again as long as the society lasts, but will always remain in the community, because without this there can be no community, no commonwealth, which is contrary to the original agreement...
Page 12 - In this personal identity is founded all the right and justice of reward and punishment; happiness and misery being that for which every one is concerned for himself, not mattering what becomes of any substance not joined to or affected with that consciousness.
Page 13 - Person, as I take it, is the name for this self Wherever a man finds, what he calls himself, there I think another may say is the same person. It is a forensic term appropriating actions and their merit; and so belongs only to intelligent agents capable of a law, and happiness and misery.
References to this book
What are We to Understand Gracia to Mean?: Realist Challenges to ... Robert A. Delfino No preview available - 2006 |