thor of all, to be without Knowledge and Understanding. And if there be Intelligence at all in the felf-existent Being, it must be infinite Intelligence. And the Proofs of this are as plainly deducible from the Works which he hath made, as those of his almighty Power. For not only do we every where in this vast univerfal Frame, meet with manifeft Evidences of an Understanding that filleth us with Admiration and Astonishment, but many of the Beings which he hath created are themselves endued with Knowledge and Understanding. And whence could intelligent Beings proceed but from an intelligent Caufe? If the first Cause and Author of all had not Intelligence, it is not poffible to conceive how there could ever be fuch a Thing as Intelligence in any derivative dependent Being. The Reasoning of the Pfalmift is obvious, and invincibly strong and cogent. He that teacheth Man Knowledge, shall not be know? Pfal. xciv. 10. We are confcious to ourselves that we are knowing Beings. We are as fure of this as we are of our Exiftence. The fame we conclude concerning all other Men, in whom we fee plain Marks of Knowledge and Understanding. Many of the human Race have attained to high Degrees of Science. And it cannot be de

nied, that the human Mind is capable of taking in a much larger Compass of Knowledge than any one Man here on Earth was ever poffeffed of. And all the Knowledge that ever was or can be found in any Man is but a Ray from the Father of Lights, the fupreme Intelligence. And must not he who is the Author and Fountain of Reason and Understanding to all other Beings, who made us and all the Orders of intelligent Creatures throughout this vast Universe, many of them of amazing Capacities for Knowledge, and probably much fuperior to the most knowing among Men, have an inexhausted Fund of Knowledge in himself? and that free from all the Imperfections which attend it in us, or in any created Beings? His Knowledge is not acquired by a laborious Search and Deduction, inferring one Thing from another, but is intuitive and immediate, certain and infallible, incapable of Error or Mistake, and univerfal in its Extent. His Knowledge therefore must be Omniscience. He knoweth himself his own infinite Effence and Perfections, the whole Extent of his Power, and all the Councils and Purpofes of his Will. And he knoweth the whole Compafs of the Creation, this vaft Univerfe, and all the Beings it containeth, of every Order and Degree, all their Effen

ces

ces, Properties, Capacities, and Powers, all of which were made and contrived by him, with all the various Ways in which thofe Faculties and Powers will operate in any Circumftance of Things, and all the Relations and Refpects they bear to one another and to the whole. And confequently he muft needs know all Things; all Things poffible, all Things actual, all Things future; yea even those Futurities that appear to be most contingent, and to depend on the free Determination of moral voluntary Agents. For to fubftract from the divine Fore-knowledge the free Actions of the numberless moral Agents throughout the Univerfe, and confequently the Events which depend upon them, and the many Things that come to pass in the natural World through the Intervention of the voluntary Actions of free Agents, to fuppofe that these are not foreknown by him at all, or not with Certainty, would be to bring his Knowledge under great Limitations and Reftraints. He might in that Case be mis taken in the Designs and Schemes he had formed, and be furprised with Events which he did not foresee, and might literally be fubject to repent, which is unworthy of God, and scarce consistent with his infinite Perfection. Nor is our not

being able to account how God doth foreknow these Things, a juft or sufficient Objection against it, fince it is unreafonable to expect that we fhould be able to explain or to conceive all the Ways which an infinite Understanding hath of knowing Things. Even Men may in many Cafes forefee how other Men, who are free Agents, will determine themselves. And if any wife Man had a perfect Knowledge of another Man's Temper, Humour, prevailing Appetites and Inclinations, of all his Interefts and Connections, and of all attending Circumftances in any given Case, he might form a very probable Judgment, which would feldom fail, how that Man would act in fuch an Inftance. And it is but reasonable to conclude, that God, to whom every particular Person,and all Things relating to him, are perfectly foreknown, is able to foresee, not only by probable Conjecture, but with abfolute Certainty, how every particular Perfon will act and determine himself. And accordingly, God's Fore-knowledge of the free Actions of Men, and of the Events belonging to them, hath been generally believed and acknowledged in all Ages. It were easy to produce remarkable Teftimonies to this Purpose from heathen Writers, and even from fome of the moft celebrated ancient [VOL. I.] Philo

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to come.

Philofophers. And it feems to be clearly afferted in the holy Scriptures. It is there reprefented as the proper Character of the Deity. Hence that Challenge to the heathen Idols, Let them fhew the former Things, (i. e. before they come to pass) that we may confider them, and know the latter End of them, or declare us Things for Shew the Things that are to come hereafter, that we may know that ye are Gods. Ifa. xli. 22, 23. By the Things that are to come are plainly to be understood, not merely Things that depend upon neceffary Causes, but upon the Will and Determination of free Agents, and the Revolutions of human Affairs. And it is plainly intimated, that it is the Prerogative of God to know fuch future Events, and of him only. And therefore he expressly attributeth this Knowledge to himfelf, after denying it to all others. I am God, and there is none like me, declaring the End from the Beginning, and from ancient Times the Things that are not yet done, faying, My Counsel shall ftand, and I will do all my Pleasure. Ifa. xlvi. 9, 10. And accordingly there are many clear and express Predictions recorded in Scripture concerning Events that appear to have depended as much as any Events whatsoever upon the free Actions of Men, and even their evil Actions,