V. 1. CHAPTER VII. -This "About which you have written to me";I. seems to be a general introduction to all the remaining topics of the Epistle, and which appear to have been taken from some communication which the Apostle had received from the Corinthians. They are these: 1. marriage; 2. The eating of idol-offerings; 3. The observance of the positive institutions; 4. The exercise of supernatural spiritual power; 5. The charitable collections. II. "That you your conclude from view of the Christian religion that it is good for a man to abstain altogether from marriage.” It is customary to consider the remark " it is good for a man", &c. as coming from St. Paul himself, and that he says it in reference to the impending persecutions of which he speaks in v. 26. But this assuredly is a forced construction, as there does not appear to be any natural connexion between the verses; and besides, it is unlikely that if he had been arguing wholly with a view to that event, he would have omitted to mention it in the dissuasive from marriage given in v. 8. Moreover, it would not be consistent with the Apostle's usual consideration to speak with such unqualified praise of celibacy, when he admits, as he does immediately after in v. 7, B., that continency is a gift from God, because those who do not possess the gift would naturally be embarrassed by such a declaration from him. I think it will appear, on a careful perusal of the whole chapter, that St. Paul nowhere dissuades from marriage, except under the particular circumstances mentioned in v. 8. and 26; but even in those cases he admits that marriage may be good. But it is said that we may interpret the phrase "it is good” (xaλov) as signifying not an absolute recommendation of celibacy, but merely such an approval of it as to uphold it as a condition of life equally estimable with that of marriage. This indeed the Apostle might have been called upon to do, if the Corinthians had in their letter unreasonably magnified the value of the married state. And it is certain that though among the heathens there were differing opinions on the subject, yet by the Jews it was universally held to be the duty of every one to marry, whose age and circumstances al lowed of it. It is not impossible therefore that the Corinthians might have expressed too favourable an opinion on the subject, which St. Paul might think it right to correct. And in the above limited interpretation of the phrase there would indeed be nothing in the sentiment, as coming from St. Paul, inconsistent with what he says afterwards. But yet I think there would be too much of abruptness in this manner of introducing the subject. For as the Apostle professes to be entering on a matter proposed to him for his opinion by the Corinthians themselves, clearness of method would make it most proper that it should be stated, and not merely implied, which it must be, if we suppose this observation to be the beginning of St. Paul's answer. On the whole, therefore, I am inclined to consider the observation as coming from the Corinthians themselves: in which case, it will be like that of the disciples of our Lord on the somewhat similar occasion recorded in Matt. ch. xix. 10; the right understanding of which will throw light on the passage before us. When our Lord, as they understood his meaning (see ch. vI. 16. n. 111.), restricted the right of divorce to the case in which the wife had been guilty of adultery, the restriction seemed to them so hard, on account of the many inconveniences to which married life is subject from disagreements in temper and opinions, and other circumstances, that they exclaimed "If the case of the man be so with his wife, it is not good to marry." To this observation it is remarkable that our Lord gives an indirect answer, implying an approbation of it; "But he said unto them, All men cannot receive this saying, save they to whom it is given." The reason of our Lord's approval of the remark could not have been the same as that which influenced the disciples in making it, for it is plain that they alluded only to the abridgement of their personal liberty which would be produced by such a limitation of the law of divorce. Neither could it have been on account of any difficulty which the condition of married life, abstractedly considered, may present to us in the performance of our duty; for since every condition has its trials, and these affect different men variously, these trials alone could be no sufficient reason for men in general to decline that condition. If celibacy serves to improve the character in some respects, it is injurious to it in others; or if it is altogether serviceable to the characters of some men, it is in an equal degree injurious to those of others. At the same time, it is certain that there are often particular circumstances in a man's situation in life which may make it an act of religious prudence in him to abstain either from marriage altogether, or from a particular connexion. These it is the duty of every man to reflect upon before he enters into that condition, and to make his decision accordingly. And we may presume that it was in reference to this, that our Lord approved the remark. It is true that on that supposition, the sentiment, as it existed in our Lord's mind, differed materially from that of the disciples. But this circumstance (as was stated in the note just quoted) is no valid objection. For as the sentiment was in one sense just, it was suitable to the divine wisdom and the manner of our Lord's teaching, to express his approval of it generally, and to leave it to his hearers to unravel his meaning by duly reflecting on his words; from which, if rightly considered, it is easily deduced. The case seems to be this: particular circumstances may render it desirable for a man for reasons of religion to keep himself in a state of celibacy; but as, on the other hand, it is a condition which from our natural constitution is fraught with temptation, it must be left to every one to adopt it or not, according to the exigency of the case, and as he finds himself capable of attempting this higher course of virtue. Under these circumstances, it would not have been right to have met the observation with a direct negative; neither would it have been advisable to encourage men inconsiderately to undertake so hazardous a condition. Our Lord has pursued the middle course. He begins by dissuading from an inconsiderate attempt at celibacy, "all men cannot receive this saying"; and then intimates that the single state may be rendered subservient to the purposes of religion, " and there be eunuchs which have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven's sake. He that is able to receive it, let him receive it." Now the point which St. Paul had to decide with his Corinthian converts, appears to have been very similar to this one between our Lord and his disciples. In truth, I am inclined to think that it arose much in the same way; for I think that both this remark and the enquiry about idol-offerings in ch. VIII. grew out of the apostolical decree mentioned Acts, ch. xv., which enjoins the keeping clear from both fornication and idol offerings. The former restriction, it may be concluded from their toleration of the case of incest, mentioned in the last chapter, was as unpalatable to the Gentile converts, as the limitation of the law of divorce was to the Jewish disciples of our Lord. Hence, probably, in their letter to St. Paul they expressed a hasty opinion, that since the gospel required such moderation in this respect, it would be a good thing to abstain altogether. "It is good for a man not to touch a woman." This remark is much of the same kind as that of the disciples to our Lord, "If the case of the man be so with his wife, it is not good to marry." And the Apostle treats it in the same way, for he meets it indirectly by intimating the natural necessity which makes marriage desirable; and his answer in the second 66 verse, nevertheless to avoid fornication, let every man have his own wife, and let every woman have her own husband," is equivalent to that of our Lord to his disciples, " all men cannot receive this saying, save they to whom it is given." But, also, like our Lord, he at the same time points out the religious purpose to which this abstinence may be made subservient; for in his subsequent reasoning he adds, in v. 32—34., “He that is unmarried careth for the things that belong to the Lord, how he may please the Lord. But he that is married careth for the things that are of the world, how he may please his wife," &c. (See the paraphrase of these verses.) And in v. 8. 26. he points out two cases in which it may be desirable to abstain for reasons of religion. See the notes on those verses. V. 2. “Indiscriminate concubinage" mogvalas, which seems to be put in the plural to include both fornication and adultery. V. 4. The I. "Has not exclusive power" ovx εgovσlake. substantive εouria being used to signify not only power, but a power of doing as one pleases (see ch. VIII. 9.); the verb εžovσiaw, which is derived from it, has the same meaning. II. "But the husband has a joint power over it with her,” aλx' ó -The sentence aλx' i avng is elliptical, and its proper ανηρ. meaning must be made out, not by supplying ovσialeɛl, which, whatever sense we take it in, will not give a consistent meaning, but by inferring from the context what is manifestly implied by the disjunctive, viz. something on the husband's part operating as a check to exclusive power in the wife; and this, according to the terms of the marriage-contract, is an equality of power in the respect mentioned, for the mutual benefit of the parties. V. 5. 1. “ Live together again as before” παλιν επί το αυτο συνερχεσθε. The phrase ET TO AUTO signifies, literally, to the same, and may refer either to time, place, society, purpose or other circumstance, and the meaning must, in each case, be determined by the connexion. Hence, παλιν επι το αυτο συνερχεσθε, means here, come together again for the purpose to which you have engaged yourselves by your mutual vows. 11. "The bent of your natural inclinations,” i angaσiav.. This word does not necessarily express an irregularity of desire, but may denote merely that state of constitution which makes marriage requisite. It seems to be here opposed in meaning to eyxgarela. V.6. 1. "But yet, so far agreeing in your remark.". This verse is connected with v. 1., the intermediate ones being a parenthetical notice of the fundamental particulars necessary to be attended to in laying down any rules on this subject. These verses shew that the Apostle could not altogether agree in the remark of the Corinthians, but here he in some measure acquiesces in it. As the duty of exer |