cried aloud that the charge of war guilt brought against them was now withdrawn. Of course it was not withdrawn, and the Germans, unabashed, went on with the violent propaganda with which for some years they have covered the allied countries. We have all seen specimens of these documents, which the Germans send broadcast over the world. They are violent, contemptuous, and yet tinged, like all German documents, with the humility of the injured personage. They would have us all know that, while they were doing their best to preserve the peace of the world, the Allies were filled with the lust of war and conquest. And, to make their course easier to run, they have persuaded certain Englishmen, moved some of them by the vanity which would induce them to put their names to any document proffered them, others by the cannibalism which has always made certain superior persons too ready to make a meal of their own land, to give them their support in leaflets. It is just as well that we should know the names of the enemies in midst, though, indeed, it were easy enough to guess them. "A batch of leaflets," we are told by The Times,' recently circulated by the Fichte Association in Hamburg, contains a 'British Appeal to Conscience,' issued last year over the signatures of such prominent Englishmen as the Bishops of Manchester and Birmingham, Pro

fessor Gilbert Murray, Professor A. F. Pollard, Mr Bernard Shaw, and Mr H. G. Wells, and also leaflets entitled 'How France Concocted the War Lies,' The Conspiracy of Silence,' 'The Versailles Conspiracy,' and 'Americans testify against the old Lie.' They are all there, the intellectual gentlemen, who are proud to show that they are superior to the sense of patriotism, or even, where their own country is touched, to the sentiment of justice. Were they absent from such a list, we could not but deplore that they had lost their cannibal appetites. But they are not absent, and England is the stronger and the happier for their well-advertised defection. That such men should prefer their country's enemies to their country itself causes us neither surprise nor regret. We like to see them openly ranged upon the other side.

And then came the British documents to prove to all those who are not so deeply sunk in anti-patriotism that they can neither hear nor read aright, the passion and the patience with which Sir Edward Grey and the Foreign Office upheld the cause of peace. The fact that Germany was resolute for war, because she did not believe that England would in any case support her Allies, is evidence not of Germany's love of peace but of Germany's stupidity. As you read the letters which came into the Foreign Office from all the

capitals or went out from it to Berlin and Vienna and St Petersburg, you are struck chiefly by the slow passage of time. Every day produces a vast courier, and yet so little is done, so little is said effectively. To the most important letters no immediate answers are forthcoming. Never does Sir Edward Grey cease to hope. He wishes to engage the four great powers-England, France, Germany, and Italy, none of them,

he falsely believes, committed to war-in an amiable discussion, which shall presently bring Russia and Austria to accept amiable terms. And he does not realise for a moment that it is Germany's war which is going to break out, that Germany is determined, at all hazards, to send no counsels of prudence to Austria. Sir Edward Grey, indeed, comes no better out of the British Documents' than he does from his apology for his own career. That he meant well is clear enough. That he served the cause of peace, which he had always at heart, in any practical fashion is not clear at all. He lacked the strength and the power of decision. He could neither dominate his Cabinet nor accept its views. He wavered, and was lost. Sensitive to obligations, which then did not matter, such as that he had promised France no more than diplomatic support, he let the hour of action go by. Sir Edward Goschen admits that even Tirpitz, the flaming firebrand of Germany, did not

So the war came-came because Germany willed it-with no better reason than the murder of an Archduke, whom few mourned either at Vienna or Buda-Pest, and whose death was nevertheless made a pretext for the greatest war that ever was known on earth. The effect of the documents, now published, is cumulative, and nobody can read them without coming to a firm conclusion that Germany divides the responsibility with Austria-Hungary alone; that, even more than this, Germany, by sending to Vienna a word of advice, might have checked the war-policy of her parasitic ally at any moment. Nor are the documents themselves the only valuable part of the collection. The minutes made upon the papers by the higher officials of the Foreign Office are of the highest importance. They were," as the editor written upon the spur

says, of the moment with full confidence that they would under no circumstances be published, at any rate until very many years had elapsed. They therefore show better than anything else could, the impression made at the time on those

whose duty it was to advise the Secretary of State."

Of those who wrote minutes upon the correspondence, none comments upon events with greater knowledge and a finer judgment than Sir Eyre Crowe. From the very first he seems to have understood what must surely happen. He was deflected from his settled opinion neither by prejudice nor ignorance. He knew the problem which England was asked to solve, and his acquaintance with the Chanceries of Europe was so wide and so deep that he could interpret the letters which were sent by our Ambassadors abroad in a flash, and read clearly and openly what they merely hinted at. His knowledge of Germany and her character seems never to have been at fault. And we can only say that fortunate was the Foreign Office which had Sir Eyre Crowe for its brain. Immeasurably inferior to his permanent secretary, Sir Edward Grey vacillates and is in doubt. He was in perpetual dread of his Cabinet and the House of Commons. He could not walk far along the path of rectitude, nor with firm steps, because the ghost of democracy raised a warning finger warning finger to check his advance. And if only we could learn the real lessons which suffering teaches us, we should henceforth dissociate the Foreign Office, and all the swift decisions which it should make, from the lumbering, blundering machine that is called democracy.

In all respects Sir Eyre Crowe has the best of it over his chief. Not only had he the prescience which sees the impending disaster: he knew as by instinct how to meet it. And nothing is more keenly characteristic of the two men than the chilling chilling comment which Sir Edward adds to the wise minutes of Sir Eyre Crowe. When the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs told Sir George Buchanan that it would be advisable for three Governments to counsel moderation at Vienna, Sir Eyre Crowe added, with an intuition of the part which Germany was playing, "I very much doubt the wisdom of our making any representations at Vienna. It is for the German Government to do this." And Sir Edward Grey's unilluminating comment was, "I am going to see Count Mensdorff tomorrow." From the first, Sir Eyre Crowe knew precisely what the German Ambassador's sayings were worth. "Prince Lichnovsky's vague hints and apprehensions do not quite correspond to the actual situation which his Government is helping to execute." Poor man! How could they, when he was kept resolutely in the dark? On 24th July Sir Eyre Crowe summed up the whole situation with an understanding which erred not at all. "The point that matters," he wrote, "is whether Germany is or is not absolutely determined to have this war now. There is still a chance that she can be

Edward Grey shut his lips tight and let M. Cambon suffer. The very day on which Sir Edward Grey exulted in our freedom from alliances, Sir Eyre Crowe addressed to Sir Edward Grey "some simple thoughts which the grave situation had suggested to his mind." These are so clear an expression of political wisdom that we make no apology for quoting them in this place. "The theory that England cannot engage in a big war"-thus he wrote

...

means her abdication as an independent State. She can be brought to her knees and made to obey the behests of a Power or group of Powers who can go to war, of whom there are several. The fact that British influence has on several momentous occasions turned the scale is evidence that foreign States do not share the belief that England cannot go to war. At the opening of any war in all countries there is a commercial panic. The systematic disturbance of an enemy's financial organisation and the creation of panic is part of a welllaid preparation for war. Commercial opinion is generally timid, and apt to follow pusillanimous counsels. The panic in the city has been largely influenced by the deliberate acts of German financial houses, who are in at least as close touch with the German as with the British Government, and who are notoriously in daily communication with the German Embassy. It has been

the unremitting effort of Germany to induce England to declare herself neutral in case Germany were at war with France and Russia. The object has been so transparent that His Majesty's Government have persistently declined to follow this policy as incompatible with their duty to France and Russia, and also to England herself. The proposal was again pressed upon us in a concrete form yesterday. It was rejected in words which gave the impression that in the eye of His Majesty's Government the German proposal amounted to asking England to do a dishonourable act. If it now be held that we are entirely justified in remaining neutral and standing aside whilst Germany falls upon France, it was wrong yesterday to think that we were asked to enter into a dishonourable bargain, and it is a pity that we did not close with it. For at least terms were offered, which were of some value for France and Belgium. We are apparently now willing to do what we scornfully declined to do yesterday, with the consequence that we lose the compensating advantages accompanying yesterday's offer. The argument that there is no written bond binding us to France is strictly true. There is no contractual obligation. But the Entente has been made, strengthened, put to the test, and celebrated in a manner justifying the belief that a moral bond was being forged. The whole policy of the Entente,