affixing not only a definite, but a demonstrative signi- · fication to the sign.

But what is that which is called figurative or metaphoric language? The difference between this and the above lies in that which holds between allegory and figure. This is a very obvious conclusion, since the former language is the medium of an allegory, and the latter is the medium of a figure. It is only necessary, then, in order to distinguish between these two media of communication, which we have denominated by the name of languages for the want of a better term, to observe the difference between allegory and figure. What is the difference? We have already ascertained it. It has been seen that the former is a close or shut ideographic sign reserving, hiding, and concealing the second sense. The latter is an open ideographic sign, developing the second as well as the first sense, explaining itself, concealing nothing, and, in this respect, not differing at all from any of the signs of literal language, since there is, in every case, a reduction to the literal sense. It is in virtue of this quality of secrecy which it possesses, that the symbolic is another language which requires a translation into the literal idiom; it is in virtue of this quality of openness, that the figurative is not another language, and it requires no translation. In the former an inversion is made of ordinary words and phrases, so as to form out of these a new and secret language-secret because the inverted words express but the one-half of their true meaning; in the latter an inversion is also made-the first half of

the sign is developed, which makes the inversion; but a re-inversion is also made-the second half of the sign is developed, which undoes the inversion. The inversion is thus practically disannulled, and the result is that no new language is formed differing from the literal. If the re-inversion, that is, the explanation, is not fully made, the figurative language is bad.

The symbolic or hieroglyphic, then, is an occult language demanding interpretation; figurative is already interpreted, is clear and at once intelligible. The one is a language within itself, as different from literal language as Hebrew is from Greek. It contains in it words bearing an ideographic sense, which is different from the literal, and this real sense is not developed in it; at least, it is neither the principle nor is it the practice of the language to afford this development. Figurative language consists of words bearing also an ideographic sense distinct from the literal, but the figurative words are, in all cases, translated from their literal to their real sense by the context. They are to be regarded as quotations from another language, the translation of which is appended. The one, then, is an open language, the other is a shut. The two languages, then, are, in this respect, wide as the poles asunder, for it is the purpose of the one to express the true meaning, and it is the design of the other to conceal it. If a hieroglyph is not dark, that is, if it tells all its meaning, it is no hieroglyph; if a figure is not clear, that is, if it does not tell all its meaning, it is unfaithful to its own nature

and constitution.

From this distinction there results

a wide difference between the constitution of hieroglyphs and figures, viewed as signs.

Figures or metaphors cannot, like hieroglyphs, be regarded as of the nature of fixed signs at all; they are created for a particular occasion, and they evanish with it; their significations are necessarily shifting and various and dependent on the context. Hieroglyphic signs form an independent language, and in virtue of their doing this, they necessarily bear fixed significations. They are also amenable to those laws founded in the character of the mind itself, to which every human language, that stands on an independent basis, must be subjected. They accordingly have their code of laws by which they are governed; figures are not amenable to any laws, not even to the fundamental one of unity of idea, which the figure may violate without, at least, any peril to its existence, although the violation will always mar its beauty. There is only one condition which this sign must fulfil; it must be at once intelligible; but this is the very condition which the hieroglyph must avoid.

It is perfectly obvious from what has been said, that the signification of a figure or metaphor, (for these words are synonymous,) cannot be taken in any safe or reliable sense as the exponent of a hieroglyph or a symbol, which may also be used synonymously. It is very true that the significations of both do frequently accord-an accordance which is sufficiently natural, inasmuch as they are both ideographic signs, the basis of which is the natural resemblances

of things. On the ground of this general agreement, a probable conclusion may be drawn from the known sense of a figure to the unknown sense of a hieroglyph.

On the other hand, the sense is not unfrequently at variance, while in all cases the signification of the figure is, as above said, indefinite, and subject to the context. There is always an important latitude attachable to its sense. It is not a sign bearing a fixed and stereotyped signification; it is simply a picture drawn for the purpose of illustrating the subject in hand, and, as a sign, has no real validity beyond this.

But when the sense of a prophetic hieroglyph or symbol is known through an express interpretation rendered in Scripture, there is a positive certainty that the same sense will attach to it wherever it appears; at least, there is as great a certainty to this effect, as that the sense of a word, in common language, will remain unchanged. The symbolic is, as it has been seen, a language distinct within itself, constructed by the inversion of the words of ordinary speech; being a distinct and independent language, its signs are necessarily unchangeable, and that law, which is fundamental to every language, prevails in it, that the same sign bears the same signification. The figurative is not, in any sense, such a language ; there is not the slightest necessity, accordingly, that its signs should bear unchangeable significations.

The distinction above drawn is a highly important one, for it sweeps away, at once, the whole of figurative language as a basis of interpretation for the symbolic. The two are essentially different, and, accord

ingly, the one can be no proper exponent of the other.

It is perfectly obvious, then, from what has been said, that the interpretations rendered in Scripture, and the known senses attached to the hieroglyphics by the prophets who employ them, as signs of that distinct and independent language which they constitute, can alone form the groundwork of a valid interpretation of the Revelation. This book is written in hieroglyphic, and not in figurative language, as the structure and materials of the whole composition show, and as the interpretation in ch. xvii. conclusively proves. If written in figurative language, it cannot be considered as any thing else than an incomprehensible rhapsody and a farrago of imagery, very ill-assorted. It is impossible to regard it in any other light but this. Such it has long been held by infidels to be. Alas! that Christians should have labored with untiring efforts, to prove that it was nothing better, and to bring its interpretation into the merited contempt of all men of sound understanding. But could any other result follow from the course which has been pursued? This course develops the very same absurdity as would be incurred in the attempt, could the attempt be conceived to be made, to interpret a Greek book by the aid of a Hebrew lexicon. The Revelation is written in hieroglyphic language, and its interpretation is striven to be accomplished by figurative and even literal language. The result is only that which might naturally have been expected the interpretations are legion in number, and