which presents to it the idea that the door is an image or picture of Christ.

On the other hand, the parable itself of which these words constitute part of the interpretation, affords an example of the allegory in its nearly pure state; John x. 1-5. The picture, which is as concise as it is beautiful, is fully drawn out of a sheepfold and a door to it, which picture is designed to convey to the mind the idea that Christ is the only Saviour. The first representation is here developed in an extended form; it is kept apart from the second, which lies wholly concealed from view, and it forms what may be regarded as a perfect allegory.

The Jews were unable to discover the real sense of this parable or allegory; that is, they were unable to develop for themselves the second idea, which it was designed to picture forth. Christ makes the development for them, and in doing this, in the words "I am the door," he reduces the allegory to a figure. He conducts them from the first to the second representation, and by constructing the bridge of connection between the two, he converts the allegory into a figure.

An allegory accordingly may be defined to be an unapplied and uninterpreted figure; a figure to be an applied and interpreted allegory. Every allegory may be made a figure, and is designed ultimately to become one; every figure may be made an allegory by withholding the second idea.

It follows from the distinction which has been above developed between allegory and figure, that

the etymology of the word allegory, which comes from the Greek aλλnyopevw, to speak otherwise, expresses its meaning with perfect correctness. When a person speaks in allegory, he speaks otherwise than he means, because he presents one first representation to the mind, which is designed indeed to bring out a second and real sense; but this is not apparent until the second representation is developed. This essential part of the sign is kept out of view by the allegory either wholly or in part, for its office is to speak otherwise. The figure, on the other hand, presents this second representation to the mind at once for its contemplation, because its characteristic is to develop all that it means. A figure consequently needs no interpretation; an allegory always requires one.

We thus see that while allegory and figure are both ideographic signs and are convertible into each other, they are very different. An allegory reveals only one of the two ideas which are necessary to the construction of the sign, while the figure reveals both. An allegory is thus a cryptogramic sign, while a figure has all the openness of the signs of literal language. An allegory is the rude or fundamental form of the sign, and that form to which every figure is reduced, when it is analyzed. When we probe a figure to the bottom, we necessarily resolve it into the two ideas of which it consists, and we subject each of these to a distinct examination. We here find the allegory. Thus when we analyze the figure which has been taken for an example, "the ship ploughs

the sea," we separate the two ideas of which it consists, and we find them to be these: a plough moves over the land, a ship moves through the waters. The expression of the first of these two ideas, apart and by itself, is the allegory, which is here short and unextended; the combination of both in the words the ship ploughs the sea is the figure. The allegory is thus the basis of the figure; the figure is the full development of the allegory. The allegory is the elemental form. It is as much the basis of all figurative language as the syllogism is of reasoning.

This is the real distinction which exists between those ideographic signs which, on the one hand, are called allegories, parables, types, and symbols; and on the other, figure, metaphor, and trope. The grand distinction between the two classes lies in this, that the first express a first representation, containing within it a second, which second is either concealed or subordinate. The allegory, distinctively, expresses the first representation in the form of feigned objects, connected together either by a natural relationship or by a certain plot developed which binds them together; the parable expresses the first representation in the form of a feigned narrative; the type in the form of a real historical object or event. The symbol is the subordinate part of the sign when its constitution is complex. Thus in the allegory of Joseph's dream, Gen. xxxvii. 9, the sun, moon, and eleven stars are symbols. These signs, allegory, parable, type, and symbol, are all distinguished by the common characteristic of developing the first of those

two ideas, which compose the ideographic sign, and of making it, if not the exclusive, at least the predominant idea developed, while they withhold either entirely or to a great extent, the second idea.

The figure or metaphor employs either feigned or real objects, or feigned or real actions, to express the second idea, which second is fully developed and brought out, and holds the prominent place in the constitution of the sign. Of necessity the figure must be short, for were it long the first representation would then naturally assume the predominance, and the sign would lose the character of a figure and merge into the allegoric form. A trope is a figure which has passed into a current phrase.

These signs, whether allegoric or figurative, are frequently classed under the general designation of figurative language. This expression is not correct. A better would be ideographic language, which expresses the character of the language as being a language of ideas. This again, as we see, manifests the grand subdivision into allegoric signs on the one hand, the characteristic of which is to fully develop the first idea, and figurative on the other, the characteristic of which is to fully develop the second. Other distinctions are not of equal importance to this. This is of great importance, for it really constitutes these two descriptions of signs two distinct languages, inasmuch as the signs of the one are secret and of the other open. The term ideographic, as we see, thoroughly expresses the nature of this language thus subdivided. It is a language of ideas. These ideas

Here,

are indeed expressed in words, but these words in all cases hold a second idea within them, distinct from the first, which they convey literally, and which second idea is in this case alone the organ of communication. The literal language in which the first representation is conveyed, has no sense apart from the second representation, which it was intended to suggest and develop. This is then a language in which ideas are really the signs. As the ideas of the human mind are infinite, so are the signs. then, is a language in which the mind can express itself in its own element, and which is boundless as itself-boundless as the sea, and it may be added, clear, bright, and sparkling as its waters. It is a language which may be wrought by the aid of comparatively few arbitrary signs. It is the language of savage nations, for the reason that they have few of these; it is the language of polished nations, because they have many ideas. In the figurative form it is clear, bright, and sparkling; in the allegoric, it is secret, dark, and profound.

From the distinction which has been drawn between allegory and figure, the following points of difference naturally follow, and in regard to the former, we observe

1st. That allegories contain as little admixture as possible of language to be taken literally. There is in general no more of this, than so much as is requisite to connect the different parts of the allegory together. The great object held to view is to place a representation before the mind which may be contem