and go to theirs. And there is the more need to consider this, because this is the great popular argument wherewith the emissaries and agents of that church are wont to assault our people. Your church, say they, grants that a papist may be saved; ours denies that a protestant can be saved; therefore it is safest to be of our church, in which salvation, by the acknowledgment of both sides, is possible.

For answer to this I shall endeavour to shew, that this is so far from being a good argument, that it is so intolerably weak and sophistical, that any considerate man ought to be ashamed to be catched by it. For either it is good of itself, and sufficient to persuade a man to relinquish our church, and to pass over to theirs, without entering into the merits of the cause on either side, and without comparing the doctrines and practices of both the churches together, or it is not. If it be not sufficient of itself to persuade a man to leave our church, without comparing the doctrines on both sides, then it is to no purpose, and there is nothing got by it. For if upon examination and comparing of doctrines the one appear to be true and the other false, this alone is a sufficient inducement to any man to cleave to that church where the true doctrine is found; and then there is no need of this argument.

If it be said that this argument is good in itself, without the examination of the doctrines of both churches, this seems a very strange thing for any man to affirm, that it is reason enough to a man to be of any church, whatever her doctrines and practices be, if she do but damn those that differ from her, and if the church that differs from her do but allow a possibility of salvation in her communion.

But they who use this argument pretend that it is sufficient of itself; and therefore I shall apply myself to shew, as briefly and plainly as I can, the miserable weakness and insufficiency of it to satisfy any man's conscience or prudence to change his religion. And to this end I shall,

1. Shew the weakness of the principle upon which this argument relies.

2. Give some parallel instances, by which it will clearly appear that it concludes false.

3. I shall take notice of some gross absurdities that follow from it.

4. Shew how unfit it is to work upon those to whom it is propounded. And,

5. How improper it is to be urged by those that make use of it.

I. I shall shew the weakness of the principle upon which this argument relies; and that is this, that whatever different parties in religion agree in, is safest to be chosen. The true consequence of which principle, if it be driven to the head, is to persuade men to forsake Christianity, and to make them take up in the principles of natural religion, for in these all religions do agree. For if this principle be true, and signify any thing, it is dangerous to embrace any thing wherein the several parties in religion differ; because that only is safe and prudent to be chosen wherein all agree. So that this argument, if the foundation of it be good, will persuade further than those who make use of it desire it should do; for it will not only make men forsake the protestant religion, but popery too; and, which is much more considerable, Christianity itself.

II. I will give some parallel instances, by which it will clearly be seen that this argument concludes false. The Donatists denied the baptism of the catholics to be good, but the catholics acknowledged the baptism of the Donatists to be valid. So that both sides are agreed that the baptism of the Donatists was good; therefore the safest way for St. Austin and other catholics, (according to this argument,) was to be baptized again by the Donatists, because by the acknowledgment of both sides, baptism among them was valid.

But to come nearer to the church of Rome. Several in that church hold the personal infallibility of the pope, and the lawfulness of deposing and killing kings for heresy, to be de fide, that is, necessary articles of faith; and consequently, that whoever does not believe them, cannot be saved. But a great many papists, though they believe these things to be no matters of faith, yet they think those that hold them may be saved, and they are generally very favourable towards them. But now, according to this argument, they ought all to be of their opinion in these points, because both sides are agreed that they that hold them may be saved; but one side positively says, that men cannot be saved if they do not hold them.

But

my text furnishes me with as good an instance to this

purpose as can be desired. St. Paul here in the text acknowledgeth the possibility of the salvation of those who built hay and stubble upon the foundation of Christianity, that they might be saved, though with great difficulty, and, as it were, out of the fire. But now among those builders with hay and stubble, there were those who denied the possibility of St. Paul's salvation, and of those who were of his mind. We are told of some who built the Jewish ceremonies and observances upon the foundation of Christianity, and said, that unless men were circumcised, and kept the law of Moses, they could not be saved. So that by this argument St. Paul and his followers ought to have gone over to those Judaizing Christians, because it was acknowledged on both sides that they might be saved. But these Judaizing Christians were as uncharitable to St. Paul and other Christians, as the church of Rome is now to us, for they said positively that they could not be saved. But can any man think that St. Paul would have been moved by this argument to leave a safe and certain way of salvation for that which was only possible, and that with great difficulty and hazard? The argument you see is the very same, and yet it concludes the wrong way; which plainly shews that it is a contingent argument, and concludes uncertainly and by chance, and therefore no man ought to be moved by it.

III. I shall take notice of some gross absurdities that follow from it. I shall mention but these two.

1. According to this principle, it is always safest to be on the uncharitable side. And yet uncharitableness is as bad an evidence, either of a true Christian, or a true church, as a man would wish. Charity is one of the most essential marks of Christianity, and what the apostle saith of particular Christians, is as true of whole churches, that though they have all faith, yet if they have not charity, they are nothing.

I grant that no charity teacheth men to see others damned, and not to tell them the danger of their condition. But it is to be considered, that the damning of men is a very hard thing, and therefore whenever we do it, the case must be wonderfully plain. And is it so in this matter? They of the church of Rome cannot deny but that we embrace all the doctrines of our Saviour contained in the Apostles' Creed, and determined by the four first general councils, and yet they will

not allow this and a good life to put us within a possibility of salvation, because we will not submit to all the innovations they would impose upon us. And yet I think there is scarce any doctrine or practice in difference between them and us, which some or other of their most learned writers have not acknowledged either not to be sufficiently contained in scripture, or not to have been held and practised by the primitive church; so that nothing can excuse their uncharitableness towards us. And they pay dear for the little advantage they get by this argument, for they do what in them lies to make themselves no Christians, that they may prove themselves the truer and more Christian church. A medium which we do not desire to make use of.

2. If this argument were good, then by this trick a man may bring over all the world to agree with him in an error which another does not account damnable, whatever it be, provided he do but damn all those that do not hold it; and there wants nothing but confidence and uncharitableness to do this. But is there any sense, that another man's boldness and want of charity should be an argument to move me to be of his opinion? I cannot illustrate this better, than by the difference between a skilful physician and a mountebank. A learned and skilful physician is modest, and speaks justly of things: he says, that such a method of cure which he hath directed is safe; and withal, that that which the mountebank prescribes may possibly do the work, but there is great hazard and danger in it; but the mountebank, who never talks of any thing less than infallible cures, (and always the more mountebank, the stronger pretence to infallibility,) he is positive that that method which the physician prescribes will destroy the patient, but his receipt is infallible, and never fails. Is there any reason in this case, that this man shall carry it merely by his confidence? And yet if this argument be good, the safest way is to reject the physician's advice, and to stick to the mountebank's. For both sides are agreed that there is a possibility of cure in the mountebank's method, but not in the physician's; and so the whole force of the argument lies in the confidence of an ignorant man.

IV. This argument is very unfit to work upon those to whom it is propounded; for either they believe we say true in

this, or not. If they think we do not, they have no reason to be moved by what we say. If they think we do, why do they not take in all that we say in this matter? Namely, that though it be possible for some in the communion of the Roman church to be saved, yet it is very hazardous; and that they are in a safe condition already in our church. And why then should a bare possibility, accompanied with infinite and apparent hazard, be an argument to any man to run into that danger?

Lastly, This argument is very improper to be urged by those who make use of it. Half of the strength of it lies in this, that we protestants acknowledge that it is possible a papist may be saved. But why should they lay any stress upon this? What matter is it what we heretics say, who are so damnably mistaken in all other things? Methinks if there were no other reason, yet because we say it, it should seem to them to be unlikely to be true. But I perceive, when it serves for their purpose, we have some little credit and authority among them.

By this time I hope every one is in some measure satisfied of the weakness of this argument, which is so transparent, that no wise man can honestly use it, and he must have a very odd understanding that can be cheated by it. The truth is, it is a casual and contingent argument, and sometimes it concludes right, and oftener wrong; and therefore no prudent man can be moved by it, except only in one case, when all things are so equal on both sides, that there is nothing else in the whole world to determine him; which surely can never happen in matters of religion necessary to be believed. No man is so weak as not to consider, in the change of his religion, the merits of the cause itself; as not to examine the doctrines and practices of the churches on both sides; as not to take notice of the confidence and charity of both parties, together with all other things which ought to move a conscientious and a prudent man and if upon inquiry there appear to be a clear advantage on either side, then this argument is needless, and comes too late, because the work is already done without it.

Besides, that the great hazard of salvation in the Roman church (which we declare upon account of the doctrines and practices which I have mentioned) ought to deter any man much more from that religion, than the acknowledged possibi