King, it is extremely difficult to determine their number. I will take the liberty to suggest a few reflections on the subject. The number of voices. in the National Assembly is about twelve hundred, of which six hundred belong to the Clergy and Nobility, and six hundred to the Commonalty. Now, if the six hundred votes of the two first Orders were equal in weight to the six hundred of the Commons, as they are in number, there would be an exact equilibrium between them, and nothing more would be necessary to the Sovereign but his own single voice to make the balance incline which he pleased: What do I say? The voice of the King which disposes of all employments, possesses of it's own Nature such a preponderancy, that it alone would bear down all the rest, as happens in despotic States, unless it too had a counterbalance.

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It is useless therefore to multiply the voice of the King in the National Assembly, in order to give him weight; it is sufficient that it be reserved to him: but it is highly necessary to reform the national balance itself, to render it susceptible of equilibrium. Though it's arm may be equal in length, it's scales are by no means so in respect of weight. It may be affirmed that the scale of the Clergy and Nobility is of gold, whereas that of the People is of straw. The former is so filled with mitres, ribbands, dignities, governments, magistracies, survivances already given away, though they originally belong to the Royal authority or even to the People, that the balance has always leaned to that side, in defiance of the efforts made

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by some of our Kings to re-adjust it. This scale accordingly preponderates not only by it's proper weight, but by that of the royal power, which it has attracted to itself; so that in order to restore the scale of the People to an equilibrium, it would be necessary that the King should either render it heavier by transferring to it a certain proportion of dignities and employments, or by increasing the length of it's arm, in multiplying the voices of the Representatives of the People in the National Assemblies. The plebeian lever thus becoming the longer of the two, it will require very little effort on the part of the Prince to give it inclination, and the moderating power will act in the Monarchy in the same manner as the moveable weight along the greater lever of the Roman balance. It was only by the number of their own voices that the People of Rome balanced the weight of the senatorial voices. In the British Parliament, the number of the members of the Upper House does not exceed two hundred and forty-five, whereas that of the members of the House of Commons amounts to five hundred and fifty-eight, that is to more than double. Without an equivalent proportion, the plebeian scale will never be able to acquire it's equilibrium, till the six hundred voices which compose it shall be supported by the voices of the twenty-four millions of men whom they represent: in that case, though it's scale may be light, it's arm becoming infinitely long, it's re-action will be rendered infinitely powerful. This moment of revolution will be the proper one for the King to resume his moderating power, in order to the re-establishment of the monarchical balance.

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The royal influence will then resemble that of the Sun, who balances in the Heavens the Globes which revolve around him..

I have oftener than once expressed a desire that the King would make a progress once every year over the estates of his kingdom from one extremity to the other, as the Sun visits by turns every year the two poles of the world. My wishes seem to be on the point of accomplishment. The move. ment will indeed be different, but the effect will be the same. It will not be the motion of the King toward the People; but that of the People toward their King. This political system is sim plified like the astronomical, in which it is sup posed, with a high degree of probability, that it is not the Sun which revolves round the Earth, but the Earth which revolves on her axis and in her orbit round the Sun, presenting to him by turns her icy poles.

This order seems to me still better adapted to the functions of a King, who after all is only a man, and who ought not only to diffuse his light over his People, but who in his turn stands in need of receiving illumination from them. The King will accordingly derive information from the National Assembly, of what is passing in the provincial as semblies, of what is transacting in the Assemblies of the cities; and from those of the cities, of what is going on in the villages.

The men like the affairs of the State will circulate under his eyes; for the meanest peasant may be elis gible as deputy from the assembly of his village to that of the city in whose district it is situated, from

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the assembly of such city to that of the province, and from that of the province to the National Assembly. Thus by this mode of rotation, the De puties of the National Assembly may exhibit to the Sovereign all his subjects in succession, just as the Earth présents to the Sun all the parts of her circumference.

I here proceed on the supposition that the assemblies of the villages, of the cities and of the provinces, shall take place all over the kingdom, that they shall be at once permanent and periodi cal, in other words, that they shall be every year renovated in a third part of their members, and that the same rule shall be applied to the National Assembly, which ought to be the centre of all those, assemblies: for there should exist complete harmony in all the parts of the State. To grant permanency to the assemblies of villages, of cities and provinces, and to withhold it from the Na tional Assembly, would be the same thing as in a watch whose minute, middling and great wheels are all in motion, to withdraw the main spring.

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From this permanency of the National Assembly the result will be, that no one aristocratical body will have it in it's power henceforward to interpose itself between the King and the Nation; and that from the periodical rotation of it's members, it wilb not be possible for itself to degenerate into an aris tocratic juntó. As the King possesses of right the executive power, no law could pass in it but what had received the sanction of his authority; and as he has likewise the moderating power, this Assem bly being composed of two powers which have op Mot. IV. clq 574 S posite 2117

posite interests, he will always possess the power of maintaining the equilibrium of it. Neither therefore by it's operations, nor by it's duration, would it be able to make any encroachment whatever on the Royal authority.

It may be further alleged, that it alone can facilitate the operations of a good Government; and, by it alone the interests of the King and of the People, which are one and the same, can be found in perfect union. The King, in committing to the Deputies of the Commons the power of defending the interests of the People, commits to them at the same time that of defending the interests of royalty, which differ in nothing from the prosperity of the People themselves, and should there happen, as in times past, any disorder in Administration, the People could not accuse the King of it, who has given them the perpetual power of watching it's motions,and of proposing to him the proper remedies.

May this order so simple, so natural and so just, be admitted into all the Governments in the World, for the happiness of the Nations and of their Princes! The tastes, the manners, the fashions, the discords and the wars of one kingdom communicate themselves to another. Wherefore might there not be a mutual intercommunication of concord and good Laws? May Louis XVI. then receive for ever the applause which he shall merit for it from his own People! May he obtain it from the gratitude of all Nations, and fulfil the glorious device transmitted to him from his ancestors, but which he alone shall have deserved to wear; al Sun illuminating various Worlds, with this inscription: Sufficient for many," Nec pluribus impar.