ver. 14, is a kind of apodosis by way of hint). In this manner, and only in this, can I find the real antithesis or comparison to be fully made out, which the apostle designs to make. This method of writing, too, where the protasis is suspended for the sake of explanations thrown in, is altogether consonant with the usual method of the apostle Paul; comp. Rom. ii. 6-16. Eph. ii. 1-5. iii. 1—13. 1 Tim. i. 3, 4. Rom. ix. 10, seq. Rom. ix. 22, seq. Rom. viii. 3. Heb. iv. 6-9. v. 6-10. v. 10.-vii. 1. ix. 7-12.

Tholuck suggests, that os éσTɩ Túños toû μéλλovтos (ver. 14) is, as to sense, a real apodosis of the preceding declarations in ver. 12; ver. 13 and the preceding part of ver. 14 being regarded as a parenthesis. The meaning of the apostle must then be thus represented: 'As by one man sin and death entered the world; ... [so] this one (ős in the sense of kaì ovтos) was a type, i. e. an antithetic type, of Christ who brought righteousness to all men.' But this seems to be, at best, only an imperfect apodosis, as already hinted; and withal it is somewhat embarrassed; for Tholuck supposes the apostle to have forgotten here that he had begun the sentence with an ὥσπερ, and moreover he changes ös into καὶ οὗτος. I much prefer, therefore, the more easy and obvious solution of the difficulty, by supposing the existence of a suspended sentence; suspended for the sake of intermediate explanations and illustrations, and completed after these have been made, viz. completed in vs. 18, 19. Especially do I prefer this, because this method of writing is so frequent in Paul.

Ai évòs ȧvēрáπov, by one man, i. e. by Adam, as appears from ver. 14; comp. 1 Cor. xv. 21, 22. The apostle cannot design that this should be strictly construed; for he himself has told us, that " Adam was not deceived; but the woman, being deceived, was in the transgression" (1 Tim. ii. 14), i. e. Eve first transgressed; which moreover Paul assigns as a reason why she should not usurp authority and have precedence in the church. In the like way, the son of Sirach represents Eve as the first transgressor, xxv. 24. If now it was a principal object with the apostle here, to point out specifically and with exactness the first author of transgression, how could he omit mentioning Eve? Or if his main design was, to point out a corrupt nature propagated by ordinary generation, then why should he neglect to mention Eve along with Adam; for both parents surely were concerned in this? In respect to these questions it may be remarked further, that either the apostle, in making mention of Adam, trusted that his readers would spontaneously call to mind the primitive pair, the woman being comprehended along with the man; or that he designed merely to compare the origin itself and extent of sin and misery, (without particularizing the manner), with the origin and extent of the deliverance from them as wrought by Christ. In respect to the first of these answers, the rule a potiori nomen fit seems to be applicable to the sentiment of it. Adam, as the constituted superior, first formed, and made lord of the inferior creation; Adam, who by consenting to the sin of his wife and participating in it, made himself a full partaker of it; is named here from the fact of his precedence. He only is named,

because it is the particular design of the writer to make a comparison between the second Adam (Christ) and the first. The congruity of the representation and comparison would be marred, by naming more than one author of sin and misery. Nor can any importance be here attached to the fact itself, that two were concerned in the primitive transgression: for "they twain were one flesh;" they were one also in guilt, i. e. they were both partakers of the same criminality. The question is not concerning the exact manner in which the first transgression came to be committed, (for this is not here any object of investigation with Paul); but the question is: What influence had the primitive sin, in which Adam was the most conspicuous, responsible, and important actor, on the race of men, as to introducing and occasioning sin and misery?

It may also be remarked, that had Adam refused to unite with his wife in her transgression, the consequences must inevitably have been altogether different from what they have now been. His act, then, completed the mischief which was begun by Eve; and so the apostle names him here as the occasion of all the evils which followed. This, however, does not prove that he considers Eve as less blameworthy than Adam, or more excusable; for 1 Tim. ii. 14 is directly opposed to such a notion: but it results, I apprehend, merely from a desire of congruity, in respect to the comparison which he is to make, i. e. the congruity of comparing one person with one, one man (i. e. the first Adam) with one man (i. e. the second Adam). How would it strike readers, if Eve had been here substituted for Adam? And this suggestion leads, at once, to a perception of what congruity demands in the case before us.

'H ȧpapria, sin. The sin would mean, in English, something different from what the Greek here means, although the article is prefixed to the word. Whenever any thing is named which is generic in its nature, but unique or single in its kind, the Greeks usually prefix the article to it; e. g. ò pióropos, ἡ αρετή, ἡ ἀλήθεια, τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἡ δικαιοσύνη, &c. In such cases ή δικαιοσύνη (for example) as an entire genus, is unique, i. e. it differs from all other qualities of moral beings; and so it has the article prefixed in order to denote this. But still, dikaιoσúvŋ may at another time be considered as a genus comprehending several subordinate species, such as commutative justice, penal justice, integrity, &c.; in which case the article would naturally be omitted. Agreeably to these principles áμapría here appears with the article, because it appears in its simple generic nature, i. e. as single or monadic. That it is generic here, i. e. that it comprehends both sinful actions and affections, seems to be clear from the nature of the case, and from what follows. If Adam was created so as to be upright, and was purely holy until his fall, then sin commenced with his fall; sin of every kind, or rather of any kind; sin either in affection or action. That such a generic meaning must here be given to ǹ åμapría, is evident, moreover, from the sequel; viz. ἐφ ̓ ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον, ver. 12; ἁμαρτία ἦν ἐν κόσμῳ, ver. 13; Comp. Rom. vii. 7, seq., where sin is represented as comprising concupiscence, i. e. internal affection; Rom. vii. 15-19, where the fruits of this concupiscence, i. e. external actions, are called evil, i. e. sin.

Bretschneider remarks (Dogmatik, II. 48, edit. 3), that the article is used before ȧpapría in the verse before us, because it designates vitiositas, but not

peccata actualia. But surely he will not contend, that the article is not used before nouns employed in a generic sense, like ὁ φιλόσοφος, ὁ στρατιώτης, ὁ ayabós, &c.; which is even a law of the Greek language. Nor does the sequel here justify his remark; for the ȧpapría of Adam is called (ver. 14) his Taρáßaσis in vs. 15, 17, and 18, his wарáñτшμа in ver. 19, his πapakoń all of which implies peccatum actuale, viz. the eating of the forbidden fruit. It must be evident, also, that if actual sin is the fruit and consequence of vitiositas, and if this last entered the world by the act of Adam, then sin in its generic sense must have entered the world di' évòs åvěpánov, i. e. by Adam's offence.

Eiç ròv κóoμov, into the world, i. e. among men, into the world of human beings; comp. Matt. xxvi. 13. 2 Pet. ii. 5. iii. 6. Matt. xiii. 38. John i. 10. iii. 16, 17. xvi. 33. 2 Cor. i. 12. Comp. also ἔρχεσθαι εἰς TOV KOOμov, John vi. 14. ix. 39. xi. 27. xii. 46. Heb. x. 5. That the right explanation of koopoç is given above, is confirmed by ver. 18, where siç návraç ȧvlρúñovç is a substitute for it, and one of equivalent import.

Elonλ0ε, entered into, invaded. So the Latin invadere terram vel provinciam, &c.; and so ɛioέoxoμau in Mark iii. 27. Acts xx. 29. The representation is full of vivacity; for sin is here personified, and represented as invading the human race, in the first transgression of Adam. Compare also the expressions in Wisd. ii. 24, 40óvų dè diaβόλου θάνατος εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὸν κόσμον xiv. 14, κενοδοξία γὰρ ἀνθρώπων [εἰδωλολατρεία] εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὸν κόσμον.

Kai dia τñs àμaprías, and by sin, i. e. through the instrumentality of sin; or rather, by reason of sin, in consequence of sin, on account of sin; did being usually employed in this sense, when put before the Genitive.

Dávaros, death. But what death? That of the body, or of the soul, or of both? In other words: Is temporal evil here meant, or eternal, or both?

The answer must be sought for, first of all, in the usus loquendi of the author himself. In the context we have his own explanation of θάνατος. In ver. 15, death (àñélavov) stands opposed to xáρiç тov dɛov καὶ ἡ δωρεὰ ἐν χάριτι. In ver. 17, it stands opposed to τὴν περισσείαν τῆς χάριτος καὶ τῆς δωρεᾶς τῆς δικαιοσύνης. In ver. 21, it stands opposed το ζωὴν αἰώνιον. In chap. vi. 23, θάνατος is directly contrasted with Son aluvios. That Oávaros, then, by the usus loquendi of Paul, does sometimes mean a death which is the opposite of eternal life or happiness, is here made certain.

In the like sense, i. e. as used to designate the penalty of sin, the reader may find Oávaros, in Rom. i. 32. vi. 21. vi. 16. vii. 5. vii. 10.

vii. 13. vii. 24. viii. 2. viii. 6. 2 Cor. ii. 16. vii. 10. 2 Tim. i. 10. Heb. ii. 14.

This usage agrees with that of other sacred writers in the New Testament; e. g John viii. 51. v. 24. James i. 15. 1 John iii. 14. Rev. ii. 11. xx. 6. xx. 14.

In like manner we find it used in the Old Testament; e. g. Deut. xxx. 15. Jer. xxi. 8 (comp. Sirach xv. 7). Prov. v. 5. viii. 36. xi. 19. xii. 28. Ezek. xxxiii. 11.

In the same way the verb to die is employed; e. g. by Paul, Rom. viii. 13; by John, vi. 50. xi. 26. viii. 21. So in the Old Testament; e. g. Ezek. xviii. 4. xviii. 20. xviii. 17. xviii. 21. xviii. 24. xviii. 28. xviii. 32. Prov. xv. 10. Ezek. xxxiii. 8. xxxiii. 11. xxxiii. 14. xxxiii. 15. Prov. xxiii. 13. Must not this be the sense, also, in Gen. ii. 17. iii. 3, 4?

If any one now will carefully investigate all these examples, he will find that in many cases it is quite impossible to limit the word death, so as to make it signify no more than the dissolution of the body or temporal death. E. g. John viii. 51, 'If any man shall keep my saying, he shall never see death.' John v. 24, 'He that heareth my words.... is passed from death unto life.' John xi. 26, 'Whosoever.... believeth in me, shall never die.' Ezek. xviii. 28, 'He .... that turneth away from his transgressions.... shall surely live, he shall not die;' and to the same effect in many of the other passages quoted; to which it would be easy to add many more.

That the usus loquendi, then, permits Bávaros to be construed as designating the whole penalty of sin, there can be no good ground of doubt. The only question now is: Whether Oávaros is employed in this sense, in the passage before us?

The antithesis in vs. 15, 17, 21, and vi. 23, as produced above, would seem to go far toward a final settlement of this question. Indeed, I see no philological escape from the conclusion, that death, in the sense of penalty for sin in its full measure, must be regarded as the meaning of the writer here.

But is there any thing in the nature of the case, which goes to shew that death should here have a limited meaning given to it; in other words, that it should be construed as meaning only the death of the body?

What then is the nature of the case? It is this, viz. that, as condemnation [Karáκpiμa] came upon all men by the offence of one man (Adam), so by the obedience of one (Christ) all men have access to δικαίωσις εἰς ζωήν, ver. 18. Now as ζωή is here plainly the antithesis of θάνατος [κατάκριμα], we have only to inquire what must be the meaning of (wn, in order to obtain that

of Cávaros. But in respect to this there can surely be no doubt. Zwý means the blessings procured by a Saviour's death, viz. all the holiness and happiness which this introduces. But certainly these blessings are not limited to the resurrection of the body. I do not deny that such a resurrection is a blessing to the righteous; for so the apostle plainly considers it in 1 Cor. xv.; or rather, I would say, it is a thing preparatory to the bestowment of blessings. But it must be remembered, that the wicked will be raised from the dead as truly as the righteous; yet no one will count this a blessing to them. It is only a preparation for augmented misery.

It cannot be then, that a resurrection from the dead, in itself considered, is dikalwois (wns and therefore a state of temporal death is not the antithesis, i. e. is not the evil from which it is the main object of Christ to deliver us. A resurrection from this is a good or an evil, just as the case may be in regard to the moral character of him who is the subject of it.

Does Christ then deliver from the suffering itself of temporal death? A formal answer to this is unnecessary, since all men without distinction are mortal and die.

One thing, however, should be said in reference to this; which is, that the sting of death' is taken away through the hopes inspired by a Saviour's blood; and that in this way the evil is greatly mitigated to those who have true hope in Christ.

I remark, once more, that the penalty of all sin, is evil both of body and soul. "The soul that sinneth shall die." Now if Adam's first sin was a real sin, and a fortiori if it was one of the greatest of all sins (as we surely have much reason to conclude when we consider its consequences), then death in its most extensive sense must have been the penalty attached to it. What reason can be given why other less sins are punishable with death in the enlarged sense of this word, and yet that the sin of Adam was not punishable in the like way? Was he not the more culpable, who fell from a state of entire holiness?

Finally, the apostle, when he comes to point out the dissimilitude between Adam's offence and its consequences, and the obedience of Christ and its consequences, (as he does in vs. 15-17), opposes the κpíμa occasioned by Adam to the dikaiwua effected by Christ, ver. 16; and the Oávaros introduced by the former to the Baσiλevei év (wn accomplished by the latter, ver. 17. Now as dikalwμa is not, in its more important sense, a deliverance from temporal death, nor the reigning in life merely a deliverance from mortality; so temporal death cannot, with any good appearance of reason, be understood here as the essential meaning of θάνατος. That θάνατος includes this among other evils, I would not by any means be understood to deny; for 1 Cor. xv. 22 shews, that Paul clearly held the death of the body to have been introduced by Adam. But that this was the prominent evil in his mind, so much so as to be here named as the principal thing which constituted the penalty threatened to our first parents, has, I trust, been rendered sufficiently improbable, by the considerations above stated. See Excursus III.

Kai ovrwe, and thus, or and in like manner. An important inquiry may be here raised, viz. Does the apostle mean to say: 'In consequence