science by sophistical reasoning, and excusing himself for his continuance in guilt. I have beheld this same sinner stretched on the bed of sickness, pale, feeble, languishing, in the midst of the tears and the sighs of his relatives, expecting each moment that death would arrive to tear his unwilling soul from his body, and bear it to the tribunal of his Judge. Ah! his faltering tongue no longer dared to extenuate his crimes; his trembling lips abstained from their unholy charges against God: but shuddering and affrighted by considering the misery which awaited him, he exclaimed, Fool that I was, to have rejected an offered salvation; to have closed my ears against a wooing Redeemer; to have slighted the importunities of a compassionate God! I perish, and I perish under the agonizing reflection, that none but myself is to blame.'

And could we follow sinners beyond the grave; could we behold them in their torments, and hear the sad accents which burst from their lips, with what emphasis, what energy, would they confirm the truth that we are establishing. Oh! were it in their power, they would give millions of worlds to be freed from the dreadful reflection that their own folly brought them to that state of wo. This torturing remembrance, we have destroyed ourselves," preys like a serpent upon their souls, and stings them to madness.

Unite all the reflections which have been made. and you will, we trust, be convinced that the accursed must lay all the blame of their perdition, not on God, but on themselves.

Nevertheless, sinners object to this truth; and they found the principal of their objections on the

decrees of God, and on the inability of man. examine these objections in the

Ild. Division of our discourse.

We are to

The first objection which the sinner makes against the doctrine that we have been establishing is this: Since God has decreed whatsoever comes to pass, and since his decrees are irreversible, it will follow that if I am destroyed, it will be through the compulsive power of the divine decree, and not through my own fault. On this very common objection we make the following remarks:

1. The proofs of our doctrine have been drawn from plain and simple sources: the principles on which we built our reasoning were clear; the deductions from them were intelligible, and level to the weakest capacity. But on the contrary, the objection is drawn from a subject of which we have very inadequate conceptions, in which we soon get beyond our depth, and feel ourselves involved in difficulties and darkness. Is it not then most clear, that an objection of this nature, even though it were insurmountable to us, ought nevertheless to have but little weight against such a body of clear and perspicuous evidence?

2. The principle on which this objection is founded is not a just one. What is this principle? That when two doctrines are affirmed in the scripture, which to our limited capacity appear irreconcilable, we are authorized to embrace the one and reject the other. Why is this principle unjust? Because another person, on precisely the same ground, may reject the doctrine which we embrace, and embrace the doctrine which we reject. Let me illustrate my meaning from the case before us. Here are two doctrines which we suppose to be taught by the scriptures that the sinner is the author of his own

perdition, and that God has decreed whatsoever comes to pass. The sinner says, I cannot reconcile these doctrines, and therefore I will reject the former.' And the Arminian, on precisely the same principle, may say, I cannot reconcile these doctrines, and therefore I will reject the latter.' Now then, that cannot be a just principle, which is so vague and uncertain in its application, as to lead two different persons to conclusions and sentiments diametrically opposite.

3. Permit me again to present to you the interesting reasonings of an excellent divine on this subject.* When the sinner asserts that these two propositions, God has irreversibly decreed whatever comes to pass, and the accursed can blame none but themselves for their perdition-when the sinner asserts that these two propositions are irreconcilable, there are only two ways in which we can answer him: the first is, accurately and minutely to compare the decrees of God with the cor duct and dispositions of sinners; and to make it evident from this comparison, that sinners notwithstanding these decrees, have a perfect freedom of will, and are not compelled to embrace perdition: the second is, to refer this question to the decision of a Being of unsuspected knowledge and veracity, whose testimony is unexceptionable, and whose decisions are infallible. Now the first of these methods is impracticable: since we do not know the arrangement, the extent, the combinations of the decrees of God, we cannot possibly accurately compare them with human conduct. The second way is possible: there is a Being capable of deciding this point; a Being who has decided it: this Being

VOL. IV.

*This whole paragraph from Saurin.
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is God, from whose decisions there can be no appeal. I will suppose you to put up this petition to God: Doth the eternal destination which thou hast made of my soul before I had a being; do what they call in the schools predestination and reprobation, destroy this proposition: that if I perish, my destruction proceeds alone from myself? My God, remove this difficulty, and lay open to me this important truth.' Suppose, my brethren, that having presented this question, God should answer in the following manner: The frailty of your minds renders this matter incomprehensible to you; it is impossible for men, finite as you are, to comprehend the whole extent of my decrees, and to see in a clear and distinct manner the influence they have on the destinies of men: but I who formed them perfectly understand them; I am truth itself, as I am wisdom; I do declare to you then, that none of my decrees offer violence to my creatures, and that your destruction can proceed from none but yourselves. You shall one day perfectly understand what you now understand only in part; and then you shall see with your own eyes, what you now see only with mine. Cease to anticipate a period which my wisdom defers; and laying aside this speculation, attend to practice; fully persuaded that you are placed between reward and punishment, and may have a part in which you please.' Is it not true, my brethren, that if God had answered in this manner, it would be carrying, I do not say rashness, but insolence, to the highest degree, to object against this testimony, or to desire more light into this subject at present? But God has given this answer, and in a manner infinitely more clear than we have stated .it: he has given it in all those passages of his word

which attest his willingness to save man; and therefore, notwithstanding this objection, it still appears true that the sinner has destroyed himself.

But a second objection is urged. It is founded on the inability of man. 'God,' says the sinner, ' does not deal fairly with us; he is a "hard master, gathering where he has not strawed;" he requires of me certain duties which I cannot perform; and then, because I do not perform them, sentences me to wo.' This is the objection in its full force. We make but a single observation in reply to it. This inability, instead of extenuating your crime, is the very essence of your guilt.

Inability is of two kinds, natural and moral, Natural inability consists in a defect of rational faculties, bodily powers, or external advantages; this excuses from sin. Moral inability consists only in the want of a proper disposition of heart to use our natural ability aright; this is the essence of sin. We shall illustrate this point by a familiar example. A beggar applies for relief to two different persons: the first says to him, I perceive your misery; I know that you ought to be relieved, but I do not possess any property, and therefore I am totally unable to relieve you.' Here is an instance of natural inability, and it perfectly exempts the person from the sin of uncharitableness. The second says to him, I perceive your misery; I know that you ought to be relieved; I have a sufficiency of money; but I have such a dreadful hardness of heart that I cannot pity your distresses, and that I am totally unable to relieve you.' Here is an instance of moral inability; instead of excusing from sin, it is that which constitutes the very essence of the sin, and which renders the man uncharitable.