of doing those things God hath made absolutely requisite to free them from his future wrath, since otherwise they must be born under an absolute necessity of being ever miserable.

V. Thirdly. I add that it cannot be consistent with divine equity and goodness to make that a condition of any man's happiness which he cannot know to be his duty, or, knowing, cannot do; since this must certainly subject him to an impossibility of being happy, and therefore to a certainty of being miserable; which, by the former proposition, must be repugnant both to the justice and the goodness of God.

COROLLARY. Hence it is evident that the knowledge of any revelation made to Jew or Christian, cannot be necessary to the happiness of the Heathens in general, and much less the practice of any purely christian duty; because it is morally impossible that many of them should come to the knowledge of these things: and therefore 'faith in Christ Jesus' cannot be necessary to the salvation of as many of them as have never heard of him; 'for how, saith the apostle, 'shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard? And to whom no preacher of Christ Jesus hath been ever sent; for how shall they hear without a preacher?"

VI. Fourthly. This I think certain, that God will only judge men at the last for sinning against the means he hath vouchsafed them to know, and to perform their duty, and only by that law which he hath given them; for sin being only a 'transgression of a law,' where God hath given no law forbidding any action, there can be no imputable transgression of it; and where he hath given no law commanding, there can be no neglect of duty.

COROLLARY. Hence it must follow, that those Heathens to whom the law of nature hath been only given, can be judged only for the violations of that law; that is, for the neglect of that which by that law they might discern to be their duty to perform, or their sin to commit; God's 'wrath being only revealed from heaven against them who held the truth in unrighteousness.' And therefore, as almost all the theses laid down by Vossius, in his disputation De Virtutibus Gentilium, are absurd, so the first thesis which makes this a requisite of a good action, "that it be done according to the law of God," if he understands this of a written law,

f Romans x, 14,

of which the texts alledged by him only speak, is the first-born of absurdities; as requiring the Heathens to know the revealed will of God, (in order to their doing good,) without a revelation, and saying that a righteous judge will judge the Heathens by a law he never had revealed to them, and condemn them for not walking by that rule he never gave them for the direction of their actions. As absurd is his fifth thesis which requires this condition as necessary to render the actions of the Heathens profitable to them, ut promiserit Deus remunerari se ea velle æternâ vitâ, ' that God should have promised to reward them with eternal life;' this being to make it necessary in order to any motive they can have, that is, to any hope they should be better for any good they do, that they should have a promise of eternal life, who are 'st: angers to the covenant of promise, and are incapable of having it, no such promise being ever made to any without a revelation. Sure it is, from the words of the apostle, that if they have any motive to serve God, they must have reason to believe that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him,' and so their service must be done in faith; but then what that reward will be, it being not of debt but grace, it is impossible for them to know without a promise. And this I think so far unnecessary to their good actions, that I rather incline to believe that they among them who endeavoured to live holily and righteously with respect to a recompence without a promise, on the account of divine goodness, and of his love to virtue wherever it was found, will find a suitable reward from God; and that he highly did approve that noble resolution of Socrates, that "being persuaded that good men living and dying should be happy, and bad men punished; I," saith he, "bid adieu to the applauses of the world, καὶ σκοπῶ ὅπως ἀποφανᾶμαι τῷ κριτῇ ὡς ὑγιεςάτην ἔχων τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ πειράσομαι τῷ ὄντι ὡς ἄν δύναμαι βέλτιςος ὤν, καὶ ζῆν, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθνήσκω αποθνήσκειν, * and will make it my care how I may appear before my judge with a most pure soul, and how I may live and die the best of men':" As also that of Scipio," who being told in a dream by Africanus, certum esse in cælo et definitum locum ubi beati ævo sempiterno fruantur, 'that there was a certain place in heaven where the blessed lived for ever,' and that "the way to it was that of pięty

g Plato Georg. p. 358.

h Som. Scip. apud Cicer. n. 8.

!

and righteousness," enters into this serious resolution, " I have always had some regard to these things, nunc autem tanto præmio proposito enitar multo vigilantius, but now in prospect of this high reward, I will pursue them with the greater diligence".""

VII. FIFTHLY. God having laid down this method in the dispensation of his gifts, that he who is, v kanisw misos, FAITHFUL IN THE LEAST talent, shall have a suitable reward, and that to him that hath, so as to improve what he enjoys, shall more be given,' and vice versa,-we may hence rationally conclude that he who diligently endeavours to do good according to that light he hath received, shall find some tokens of the favour of God; and that if any farther aid be requisite to enable the Heathens acceptably to perform their duty, the divine goodness will impart that also to them by those secret dispensations of his providence which we are not acquainted with. For as to idiots and infants, among christians, God's mercies are vouchsafed, and our Saviour's meritorious performances are applied in a manner not understood by us, without any capacity in them to know or believe any thing, so may God's grace be communicated to, and the merits of Christ avail for, ignorant Heathens, in a way unknown to and unsearchable by us. And therefore as the Heathens did acknowledge that the divine assistance was necessary to the performance of their duty, so did they accordingly expect it, and declare that nullus unquam vir magnus fuit sine aliquo afflatu Divino, no man ever was or could be excellent without some divine assistance;' and that by reason of men's proneness to vice, and the difficulty of a virtuous life, "they stood in need, Se συλλήπτορος καὶ συναγωνις," of God to be their helper and their co-adjutor." Whence we may argue, that where this was wanting, it is not for want of knowledge, or of power, but for their slothfulness, and the abusing of their talents, they shall be condemned.

VIII. And, LASTLY, We may reasonably conclude God will deal with them in respect both to the acceptation and reward of their good, and his displeasures against, and punishment of, their evil actions according to the measures of their ig norance and knowledge, the abilities, motives, and inducements

i N. 11, N. 18. 7 Cic. de Nat. Deor. l. 2, n. 124, 125. m Max. Tyr. Diss. 22, p. 218.

1

afforded to them to do or to avoid them; and that in these particulars,

First. That their good actions done upon less convictions, aids, and motives, may be more acceptable to God than the like actions done by christians upon much stronger evidence and better aids, and more powerful inducements to the same actions, because this shews a greater readiness to assent to the objects of our faith, and better inclination to the performance of our duty. Hence Christ speaks thus to Thomas, 'hast thou seen, and therefore believed? Blessed are they who have not seen, and yet have believed."" From which words both interpreters and School-men gather that faith upon lesser evidence is of greater merit, because it shews a greater promptitude in the will to embrace, and a stronger affection to the objects of faith. And the Centurion's faith is commended above that of Israel, because he believed in Christ upon lesser evidence than they, who were acquainted with Moses and the Prophets, had; and upon those words of Christ to the Syrophænician woman, 'O woman, great is thy faith,' I have descanted thus, 'great is thy faith, that having no promise to rely upon, and suffering so many repulses, and such seeming contempt, thou still retainest so good hope of my kindness and mercy.' The faith of those who firmly rely upon God's promise, and are not by great temptations and afflictions moved from their confidence, is praise-worthy. But highly excellent is their faith who depending only upon his goodness, do place their humble confidence in God, embracing the faith of Socrates as most certain truth, "that no evil could happen to a good man, living or dead, nec unquam ejus res a diis immortalibus negligentur, ‘because the immortal gods could never neglect his affairs'." Whence we may learn that the faith of the Gentiles is not only pleasing 'to God, but sometimes more excellent than that of those to whom the promises belong, viz. when upon lesser motives it brings forth equal fruits.' Thus v. g. it is praise-worthy in a christian to take no thought for to-morrow, but to depend on the assurance Christ hath given him that he shall want neither food nor raiment; but it is more noble in a heathen, Epictetus,

p Matthew xv, 28.

"Ev Ti šv TÕTo dievoetodai det zandés, Jamb. Protrept. p. 84, Socrat. apud Cicer.

Tusc. 2, q. 1, n. 82, et Apol. p. 31.

to believe that "a servant of God should not be solicitous for the morrow,” and put the question thus, “ φοβεῖται τὶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς, " Can any good man fear' he may want food? Doth God so neglect his servants, and his witnesses of his care and providence?" It is a christian virtue to be contented, and to acquiesce in all God's providences, even under all the comforts, the assistances, the promises, and hopes which christianity affords; but for a poor slave or servant, as Epictetus was, to be able thus to appeal to God, Did I ever, Lord, accuse thee, or complain of thy govern'ment? Was I not always willing to be sick when it was thy 'pleasure that I should be so? Did I ever desire to be what 'thou wouldst not have me to be? Was I ever the less pleased

upon that account? Am I not always ready to do what thou 'commandest? Did I ever transgress thy precepts, or abuse the 'faculties that thou hast given me? Wilt thou have me to quit 'the plays? I go from them full of thanks that thou admittest me to see thy works, and understand the administrations of thy 'providence. Wilt thou have me to continue here? I will freely do 'as thou willest. Wouldst thou have me to depart hence? I will 'freely do it at thy command. I have always had my will subject 'to that of God. Would he have me to be feverish? I would be so. To desire or attempt any thing? I will desire and attempt 'it. Would he not have me to enjoy it? I would not have it. 'Would he have me die? I am willing to die." Deal with me ' according to thy pleasure; I am always of the same mind with 'thee: I refuse nothing which thou art pleased to lay upon me; 'lead me whither thou willest; cloath me as thou pleasest; I will 'be a magistrate, or private person; continue me in my country or in exile, I will not only submit to, but defend thy proceedings in all things.' Let me see in christians a more entire submission to the will of God, that I may prefer their christian virtues before his splendid sins.

Secondly. The Heathens also may expect a reward upon performance of less duty; for as much will be required of them to whom much is given, so to whom less is given, of them less will be required, saith our Lord. We see it is thus in reference to all other

a Apud Arrian. 1. 1, c. 9, p. 108, 1. 3, c. 36, p. 348, 350. CL. 3. c. 24, p. 342.

b Apud Arrian. 1. 3, c. 5, p. 273, 271. d Ibid. c. 26, p. 361, 362, vide p. 388, 401. e L. 2, c. 16, p. 217. f Luke xii, 48.