Wittgenstein: To Follow a RuleS HOLTZMAN, C M LEICH First published in 2005. The essays and replies in this volume represent, with some modifications, the proceedings of a colloquium held in Oxford in Trinity Term, 1979. With occasional exceptions, critical response to the Philosophical Investigations following publication focused on a limited range of topics - an unsystematic book was discussed in an unsystematic fashion. This book employs a different approach, one that interprets disconnected discussions of Wittgenstein's as united by a single underlying set of powerful arguments. |
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action anti-realism anti-realist anti-revisionism ascription assertions attitude Augustinian axiom schema behaviour beliefs calculus capacity to understand claim cognitivism commitments community view concept constraints construal correct criteria criticism David Wiggins desirability characterizations dispositions Dr Baker evaluative realism example explanation expression fact following a rule formulate genuine grasp idea interpretation Investigations involves judgments kind language-game logical logical atomism majoritarian account mathematics ment merely mistakes about existence mistakes in application moral assessments non-cognitivism non-cognitivist notion object-language objective one's ostensive definitions pain particular philosophical philosophy of language philosophy of mind position possibility practice predicate premise prescriptive private language argument projectivist question reason reductivism relevant remarks rule-following scepticism seems semantic sense sentences Simon Blackburn someone sort speakers standard statements suppose tacit knowledge theory of meaning thesis things tion true iff truth truth-conditions utterances verificationist Wittgen Wittgenstein Wittgenstein's thought Wittgenstein's view word wrong