to him. Joyful meditations elevate the sick and diseased saint. The Roman, if I remember the story, who ran to Rome with the news of victory, was so filled with joyful thoughts, that it excluded all attention and feeling of the thorn in his foot, till his joy was assuaged. The man whom Dionysius set down to a feast, with the point of a sword over his head, found the pain in his thoughts sufficient to spoil all the pleasure of the feast.

SECT. II. Of mental pleasures strictly so called, or the pleasures of thought, knowledge, or contem plation.

Contemplation may reasonably be taken in a larger sense than what it is sometimes confined to, when it is distinguished from the pleasure of affection, action, or society; since it is certain, that our own actions, or the society of others, give us pleasure only by contemplating them, and the pleasure of affection to any object results from a particular view or contemplation of it.

The chief design of this inquiry, being to consider which must be the most pleasant contemplation, or the highest kind of mental enjoyment, it is useful to compare the different kinds of pleasant contemplations, and to consider the causes of that pleasure that is in them.

Every contemplation relates to some object really existing, or supposed to be so; and since there is no object in being, but a Being of infinite perfections, and the various manifestations of them, that is, God and his works, no wonder that every object is capable of giving joy in the contemplation of it, less or more.

Beauty is the name we commonly give to that quality (or whatsoever we call it) in any object, which is the source or cause of joy in the contemplation of it. But since many objects are not the proper causes of the beautiful qualities they are en

dued with, or of our view of them, or joy in that view, therefore it is useful to distinguish between the objective source, and the efficient source, of beauty, contemplation, or joy. Beautiful is the name we are used from our infancy to give to regular material figures, motions, &c.; and is an abstract idea so familiar even to children, and to the most ignorant vulgar, that they apply it to objects otherwise the most unlike in the world; temper, sentiments, inclinations, actions, harmonious sounds, proportions of matter, and, in general, to every thing that has marks of contrivance in it, which is the impression of thought and design, unless the design itself be evil, and appear contrary to a rule which we conceive is the standard of all beauty in action and thought. Beauty is in effect the name the Greeks and Latins gave to the universe, (xopos, mundus), and justly, since the whole and parts are so pleasant to contemplate.

But there is nothing more evident, than that all beautiful objects are not equal; and even in material objects, which are the lowest order, there is a vast diversity, according as there is more or less contrivance, or thought in them: not that there is any thought or design intrinsic in matter itself, but that its form, proportions, and motions, have the manifest marks and signs of thought in them; and what appears void of these, appears deformed and confused.

But living beauties (by which name we may express rational beings) are a quite different and higher kind of pleasant objects of contemplation, having not merely signs of external thought, (which is all the beauty we see in matter), but being, as it were, constantly full of internal thought them

selves.

SECT. III. The pre-eminence of living sources of pleasant contemplation above those that are lifeless. This may appear by considering what condition

a man would be in who had all the lifeless universe to contemplate all alone, without any thought of the living cause of it, or any knowledge of any living being in it, but himself. Supposing there should be never so many living intelligent beings existing in the world; yet if he had no knowledge or contemplation of them, it would be to him absolute solitude; and surely, if we reflect on the frame of our natures, we may justly suppose it would, through time at least, turn to insupportable melancholy.

The chief contemplation of living or intelligent objects of thought, is but another name for society. The enjoyment of lovely society (or of that which is thought to be such) is what gives the greatest cheerfulness; and the loss of it, (as in the death of friends), the most exquisite, and the most becoming sorrow. Society heightens and multiplies the pleasures of other contemplations, or even sensations, to such a degree, that it can raise joy out of objects, whose pleasure in solitude would perhaps scarce be discernible; and can even make trifles, that otherwise would appear insipid, strangely delightful, however unjustly oftentimes, by excluding thoughts of a better sort. Nor can this be imputed merely to the poisonous pleasure of pride and affectation to be source of joy to others; since, besides any pleasure a man has in communicating thoughts to others, he finds pleasure in receiving the like from them; and in receiving delightful contemplations from one person, it heightens our own particular delight, to have many others sharing with us, in an enjoyment which, in this respect, is the reverse of outward possessions; and it is not, like them, lost or lessened, but increased, by being communicated and they that covet it most, are most covelous of being profusely liberal of it to others, and would find themselves poor with it, if they were not bountiful; and therefore endeavour to possess

it, and enrich themselves with it, by giving it to

others.

The best company can make any place or prospect pleasant; but no place can make the worst company pleasant, or even tolerable.

SECT. IV. Of the most delightful living objects of contemplation.

Here it is needful to consider the nature of intellectual beauty, or that in an intelligent being which is the cause of joy in contemplating it: and if these causes admit of degrees, it is plain the greatest cause must have the greatest effect. Excellency, or perfection, is a name we oft-times give to that in a mind, which is the source or cause of joy to itself or others; but that quality which is a hinderance of joy, or which, though it gives some joy, hinders more than what it gives, we call an imperfection. A mind cannot have joy in itself, without knowledge (or contemplation) and power. These are called sometimes physical perfections: but those qualities of a mind, which are not only called causes of joy to itself, but also to others, we use to call moral perfections; such as goodness and justice. The latter consist in affections and inclinations of the mind; and no mind is the proper cause of joy to others, without being inclined; for if the physical perfections of a being give us joy, merely in contemplating them, without his inclination, he is not properly the cause of our joy, but its object, as lifeless matter is.

It is plain, physical and moral perfections admit of degrees; and when they exist united in one subject, the greater they are, the greater is the excellency and beauty of it, and the greater joy there is even in the contemplation of its perfection, besides other effects of it.

To the inward perfections of any rational agent, we may add our relation to him, if he be a

friend or benefactor, or one in whom we are any other way particularly interested, more than in other rational agents; and when we join these together, the perfections of that being, and its relation to us, which are qualities, if I may speak so, that admit of different degrees, we have a view at least of some of the principal qualities in an intelligent being that give the most pleasant contemplation.

The supreme, or highest mental perfection in being, and to which we have the nearest and most joyful relation, is that whose contemplation is necessary to happiness.

If there were no intellectual beauty in being, or none knowable by us, but what is finite, like human minds, there would be none sufficient to happiness, or full and lasting contentment; for finite beauty is that than which we can conceive, and consequently desire, and reasonably wish for a greater; and while we may wish for something better than that we have, while we may feel want in the object or source of our joy, we have not the greatest, that is, full contentment: and to tell us, that we must chiefly desire only what is attainable, and the best object we can desire is not attainable, or is not in being, and that therefore we should be content with the want of it, is to tell us to be content with misery, because it is fatal and unavoidable; which, instead of being a ground of contentment, would be the true ground of despair and anguish for experience shews, that impossibility of supply or relief, is the principal thing to embitter want or trouble.

All pretence to full contentment in our present state, whatever it be, (that is, to wish for nothing but what we have, and are sure of), is a pretence which every man's practice demonstrates to be ridiculous affectation; and the same reason that makes a man discontent, though free of all bodily