ESSAY I.

ON PREJUDICES AGAINST THE GOSPEL.

ONE principal prejudice that the corruption of

the heart raises against the doctrine of the gospel, is, that it represents the evil demerit of sin too great, when so costly a sacrifice was requisite to expiate it. It is one of the hardest tasks in the world, to bring the heart to a sincere persuasion, that sin is indeed as vile as God's word represents it; and that it deserves all that his law threatens against it. Hence, a great many are not properly so sorry for their sins against God's law, as for the severity of God's law against their sins. While many do not regret their sins at all, some regret them rather as misfortunes than faults, and as worthy of pity and compassion, rather than hatred and punishment.

These favourable impressions of sin naturally create prejudices, not only against the awful threatenings of the law, but also even against the glad tidings of the gospel: because the latter as necessarily suppose the former, as a recovery or a remedy supposes a disease, or as deliverance supposes danger. When the apostle Paul represents the scope of the gospel, he says, that "therein is revealed the right

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eousness of God, and the wrath of God against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men," Rom. i. 17, 18. And nothing is more certain than that this is one of the chief prejudices men entertain against it.

If one were to compose a formal confutation of this prejudice, it were needful to meet with some pretended demonstration that sin does not deserve the punishment above mentioned, that so the foundations and grounds of such an argument might be impartially inquired into. But, in effect, this prejudice does not usually form itself into any thing Jike a clear chain of reasoning, but expresses itself in confused and indistinct complaints against the opposite doctrine, as too severe and rigid. And therefore, perhaps, it will not be an improper way of examining of it, to propose some miscellany considerations, that may serve to show whether this prejudice be founded on reason or not.

If any man undertook to prove that sin cannot deserve hell, there are two things absolutely necessary, in order to make that proof good. First, that he know all the ends and designs, all the reasons that God can possibly have for punishing sin; and then, that he demonstrate, that all those ends and designs may be obtained as well, and in a manner as agreeable to the infinite perfections of God, and the most perfect way of governing the world, without inflicting the above mentioned punishment, and without any propitiation to declare his righteousness in the remission of it. Now, it is certain, that no man can pretend, with any tolerable shadow of reason, to so vast an undertaking. All that a man can pretend for lessening the evil demerit of sin, is nothing but appearances, suspicions, and shadows of probability; whereas the evidence for the contrary is i fallible divine revelation.

The threatening of everlasting punishment is as plain in Scripture, as the promise of everlasting

life, Matt. xxv. last verse. And though infinite goodness bestow undeserved favours; yet, it is certain, infinite justice will never inflict the least degrees of undeserved punishment. And therefore, when God threatens so dreadful a punishment against sin, it is to us a sufficient evidence that sin deserves it.

Though some pretended philosophers have denied all difference between moral good and evil, and consequently the evil demerit of sinful actions, (as it has been long since observed, that there is scarce any opinion so absurd, but some philosopher has espoused it); yet when men are left to the dictates of common sense, the evil deserving that is in some actions, is one of the plainest and most evident notions in the world. The rudest of the vulgar know very well what they say, (though they never learned any thing of moral philosophy) when they aver, that such an action deserves to be punished, and such another action deserves greater punishment; which shews that all endowed with the exercise of reason, have a plain notion of the evil demerit in evil actions, and of a proportion that should be observed between various degrees of guilt, and various degrees of punishment.

Even they who argue or write against the morality of actions, and who therefore should think no action deserves hatred or punishment, will notwithstanding be heartily angry at those that contradict them, and hate those that injure them. Hobbes and Spinoza would have inveighed bitterly against those they reckoned to be deceivers and impostors, which supposes a natural sense of the odious nature and evil demerit of imposture.

The passion of anger and revenge, if duly reflected on, might convince men of an evil demerit in actions. Some who can talk and dispute speculatively against moral deservings, will find their own hearts of a different sentiment, when they meet

with extraordinary injustice from others; when they are affronted and injured; when they meet with black ingratitude, treachery, barbarous cruelty, disdainful contempt, pride, or the like.

Example. Let us suppose a courtier, in his principles a first-rate libertine, using his utmost influence to raise one of his meanest servants to the highest preferments, and shewing him as much friendship as ever a great man did to his client, or father to his son; and let us suppose that all the return that servant makes is to supplant his old master, to raise himself upon his ruins, to reduce him to poverty, disgrace, banishment, or even to a cruel death; it is natural for any body to imagine, that in such a case, the disgraced libertine would learn a new way of thinking, and acknowledge there is something worthy of hatred, detestation and punishment in sin, that is, in injustice, treachery and ingratitude, &e. and would even perhaps be strongly inclined to wish for a day of judgment. In effect, all men seem to be in some measure sensible of the odious nature and evil demerit of sin; but the misery is, that it is chiefly of the sins of others, and especially of the sins of others against themselves. If men hated sin as much in them. selves as in others, humility would be a very easy common thing.

If it were duly reflected on, it might bring us to a just sense of the nature and demerit of sin, to observe, that they who hug and caress it most in themselves cannot help abhorring it in others. A man will hate the image of his own sin, when he sees it in his friend, or the child of his bosom. What is most unaccountable in this matter is, that men should be so shamefully partial and unequal in their way of judging about it.

When the question is about a man's own sin, his heart devises a thousand artifices to excuse or extemuate it, which artifices are oft-times such as are

applicable to all sin in general, as well as his sin. But when a man is under the influence of passion against the sins of others, it quite alters the case. He finds no end in exaggerating the guilt of an injury or affront, and his passion will find means to make pretended excuses appear heavy aggravations. The common excuses of human frailty, strength of temptation, and the like, will appear to him too refined and metaphysical, to have any effectual influence for moderating his passion. The vehemence of such passions against sin, would do very little prejudice to charity, if these passions were as equal and impartial, when directed homewards, as they are vehement against others. If men could bate themselves as they do their neighbours, it would be a good help towards loving their neighbours as themselves..

These miscellany considerations are perhaps able to prove the odious nature, and evil demerit of sin in general. But if it be urged, as frequently it is, that though sin should be granted to have some evil demerit in it, yet that it seems strange that it should deserve so very great a punishment, as is usually alleged-in answer to this let it be observed, that, besides the self-evident principle laid down before, viz that no colours or appearances of probability (which oft-times may be on the side of error) should be put in the balance with plain divine revelation; there are several other observations from reason and experience, that may help to make this matter more plain and easy.

One thing that may give no small light to this subject, is, the influence which men's affections have naturally over their judgments. If this were carefully noticed, and if men were earnestly inclined to judge truly, that is impartially, of things, there is nothing in the world they would see more reason to be jealous and suspicious of, than the suggestions of their hearts in favours of sin. They would find