of St. Petersburg to be pure metal. The envoy of Khiva, who was at that time at St. Petersburg, confirmed the report about the existence of gold in several rivers of Central Asia; and Peter resolved directly to send two expeditions, one by the Caspian Sea, and another from Siberia, in order to conquer Khiva, to occupy the river Amoo, the town and river Yarkund, and from thence to explore the country towards India, and even to the capital of the Great Mogul.

The expedition, which was to proceed by the Caspian, was entrusted to Prince Becovich, who undertook, in 1715, a voyage on that sea, in order to make some preliminary investigations. The report which he presented on his return was favourably received by Peter, who immediately gave orders to make all the necessary preparations for the expedition, and delivered, on the 14th of February 1716, to Becovich instructions written with his own hand, and which may be considered as a fair specimen of Russian diplomacy in the east.

It was enjoined by the above-mentioned instructions, First, to erect a fortress capable of containing a garrison of 100 men on the ancient mouth of the Amoo in the bay of the Balkkan. Second, to proceed, as an ambassador, to the khan of Khiva, following the ancient bed of the Amoo, and observing it with great care; to ascertain whether it would be possible to destroy the dike by which its waters had been dammed up, and make a calculation how many people would be required to execute that work. Third, to erect a fort secretly on the dike of the Amoo, or somewhere else on that river, and to found a town. Fourth, to persuade the khan of Khiva to become a vassal of Russia, and to promise him in return the settlement of the succession to the throne in his family, a guard composed of Russian troops, and every kind of advantage. Fifth, should the khan receive such proposition, to oblige him to maintain the above-mentioned guard at his own expense. Sixth, should a treaty be concluded with the khan on any conditions whatever, to request the said khan to send a detachment of his own troops, accompanied by some Russians, by the river to Yarkund, to seek for gold. Seventh, to request likewise the said khan to furnish vessels, and to dispatch in those vessels, by the river

Amoo, a person conversant with trade, ordering him to proceed as far as possible by water, and then overland to India; to enjoin that envoy to describe, with the greatest accuracy, the way which he intended to follow, and to take care that he returned by the same route; but should the above-mentioned envoy hear in India of another more convenient route to the Caspian Sea, he was to follow and minutely describe it. Eighth, to collect information in Khiva, whether it might not be possible to induce the khan of Bokhara, who was at variance with his own subjects, to become a vassal of Russia, or at least conclude an alliance with her. Ninth, to furnish the ambassador, Prince Becovich, with 4000 regular troops, as many vessels as might be necessary, and to prepare credentials to the khans of Khiva and Bokhara; to prepare likewise separate credentials for the individual who would be sent to the Great Mogul. The four remaining articles related to measures concerning the irregular troops, engineers and other individuals who were to accompany the expedition.

These instructions were communicated not only to Becovich, but also to the senate, with orders to put them into immediate execution, the affair being pressing. The lieutenant of the navy, Kojeen, who was destined for India, received separate instructions in the handwriting of the emperor.

It must be remarked, that none of these articles were strictly followed, but it is not known whether from a change made by the emperor himself, or, which is more probable, from mere neglect. Becovich, who directed at Astracan the preparations for the expedition, sent some individuals to inform the khan of Khiva of his arrival, but none of his messengers returned, having probably been put to death by the khan. Becovich formed a squadron of dragoons of Swedish prisoners, and entrusted their command to Major Frankenberg, also a prisoner. In September 1716 the expedition, consisting of three regiments of the line, left Astracan, in 100 transports; and Becovich, after having established three forts on different points of the eastern shore of the Caspian, returned in February 1717 to Astracan. In the spring of the same year he again left it, taking with him 3200 cavalry, consisting of the Swedish squadron, Cossacs, and Tatars. When the expedition was on the

point of weighing anchor, an accident happened which strongly affected Becovich, and which is supposed to have produced such an impression on his mind, that his intellect was weakened, and that the preposterous measures by which the expedition was ruined may be ascribed to that cause. His lady, to whom he was fondly attached, and his two daughters, who had accompanied him to the vessel, were upset in a boat on their return to the shore, and drowned.

We shall not enter into minute details respecting this expedition, which, after a difficult march across the steppes, arrived within 100 versts, or 66 English miles, of Khiva, without having experienced any resistance. The khan, however, was not idle; and having assembled 2400 men of different wandering tribes, he fell upon the small Russian army; but he was constantly repelled, and the Russians approached his capital. He therefore sent delegates to Becovich, representing that he had attacked the Russians by mistake, thinking that they were enemies; but having learnt since that they came with amicable intentions, he wished to conclude a treaty. After some negociations, a kind of treaty was agreed to, and confirmed by mutual oaths. The khan invited Becovich to an interview; he accepted the invitation, and repaired to the camp of the khan with an escort of 500 men; but they were attacked, overwhelmed by numbers, and cut to pieces. Becovich was taken prisoner, and compelled to send an order to the remaining troops to separate into small detachments for the alleged purpose of facilitating their supply. The Swedish Major Frankenberg, who commanded the troops in the absence of Becovich, refused three times to comply with these orders; but at the fourth time, when Becovich threatened to punish his disobedience with all the severity of martial law, he had the weakness to obey; and no sooner were the troops separated into small detachments, than they were surrounded by the Khivians, massacred, or led into slavery. Becovich was beheaded; and the troops which had been left in the forts constructed by him, embarked for Astracan on hearing the fate of their companions. We will not omit a circumstance which, although trifling in itself, proves how easily the expedition might have been successful, had

When

it not been for the foolish confidence of Becovich. one of the detachments which had been left in the abovementioned forts, was embarking to return to Astracan, it was attacked by a horde of Toorkmans; but its commander erected a barrier of sacks of flour, and, protected by that singular fortification, repulsed the superior numbers of the barbarians.

Instead of entering into any farther arguments about the expediency or the practicability of the conquest of Khiva by Russia, we shall content ourselves with quoting the opinion of an intelligent Russian, whose personal knowledge of the country, as well as the sound spirit of observation which his work evinces, justify us in considering him as the best evidence on that subject.

"In our days, and with the knowledge we possess of the localities of that country, the success of a similar enterprise may be warranted. A body of three thousand Russians, commanded by a determined and disinterested chief, could conquer and keep that country (Khiva), so advantageous to Russia on account of her commercial relations with Asia. Now it is possible to turn to advantage the notions acquired about that country and the individuals that occupy the principal offices of Khiva, the secret discontent of the Oozbecs against Mahomed Rahim (khan of Khiva in 1820), and the good dispositions of the Toorkmans towards us. The Toorkmans are friendly to Khiva because they draw supplies of food from that country; by furnishing them with corn, which it will be much more profitable for them to receive from us than from Khiva, we may easily induce them to take our part. Even in Khiva itself we may increase our force, by enlisting the three thousand Russian slaves who are in that country, as well as the thirty thousand Persians, who suffer their misery with as much impatience as the Russians. The only difficulty which such an enterprise appears to present, is the passage across the steppes which surround Khiva; but this may be easily overcome. The route from the Caspian Sea to Khiva is now well known; provisions will be found in Khiva, where they are in great abundance. The transport may be effected on camels belonging to the Toorkmans, who will be ready to assist us, and who would likewise furnish us with horses accustomed to the steppes. If Mahomed Rahim penetrated to the shores of the Caspian Sea with an army of 20,000 horsemen, what is to prevent us from arriving at Khiva with a much less numerous body of infantry?"-Voyage en Turcomanie et Khiva, par Mouravieff, page 357.

Besides the fact of the khan of Khiva having penetrated as far as the shores of the Caspian Sea with an army of 20,000 horsemen, which Mouravieff mentions as a proof of the pos

sibility of a Russian army's reaching Khiva, we may add the following circumstance related by Lieutenant Burnes, and which serves to confirm the views of the Russian traveller.

"In the summer of 1832 the khan of Orgunje (another name for Khiva) marched his whole military force from Khiva to Merve, and levied contributions on the Tuka, the greatest of the Toorkman tribes. He fixed a custom-house both there and at the Murukhs, a town held by the Toorkman tribe of the Salore, which is within three marches of Meshid in Persia, and he now levies duties on the caravaus which pass both those places. This advance of the Orgunje army is creditable to the military genius of the khan. The journey from Khiva to Merve amounts to fifteen marches, and is almost destitute of water, which he procured by digging wells at every stage as he advanced."-Travels of Lieutenant Burnes, vol. ii. p. 385.

The conquest of Khiva will naturally lead to that of Bokhara, which may be reached by an army following the course of the Amoo, by which the stores and munitions may be easily conveyed. There would be no difficulty in retaining that valuable conquest, as a great part of the population of Bokhara is composed of Tajecks, who seem to be the original inhabitants of the country, and are the most peaceful and unwarlike nation of the world. The Tajecks are held in a state of complete subjection by the warlike Oozbecs, who treat them with great contempt. "The Tajecks," said an Oozbec to Meyendorf, "inhabit Bokhara since the time of Iskander "without ever having had a chief chosen from themselves; "they only know how to obey." The moral state of Bokhara, whose inhabitants seem to be insensible to any considerations but those of mere lucre, renders that country even more accessible to the diplomacy than to the armies of Russia. As a fair specimen of the notions which the inhabitants of Bokhara entertain of the integrity of public of ficers, we need only mention, that during the first audience given by the vizier of Bokhara to the Russian envoy, Mr. Negri, (1820,) the conversation turned exclusively upon the value of the presents brought by the embassy; and the vizier earnestly requested Mr. Negri not to keep back for himself anything of the presents sent by the Emperor Alexander to the khan of Bokhara.

The last wars with Persia and Turkey proved that Russia understands how to use the natives of Asia in promoting her