Rear-adm. Foley has transmitted a letter from Capt. George Downie, of the Royalist sloop, giving an account of his having captured, Jan. 6, the French lugger privateer Le Furet, of 14 guns and 56 men, off Folkestone, after a short chace. She had been two days out from Calais, during which time she had made no capture.

Vice-adm. Otway has transmitted a letter from Capt. Lewis Hole, giving an account of his having captured, Dec. 30, after a short chace, St. Abb's Head bearing West 70 miles, the Danish cutter privateer Alvor, of 70 tons, having 14 guns mounted, with a complement of 38 men; out of North Bergen 15 days, without having made any capture.

LONDON GAZETTE EXTRAORDINARY.

Downing-street, Jan. 20. Capt. Harris, commanding his Majesty's ship Sir Francis Drake, arrived last night at Lord Liverpool's office, with a dispatch, in which the following were inclosures, addressed to his Lordship by Governor Farquhar, dated Port Louis, Isle of France, Oct. 22, 1811. Sir, Batavia, Sept. 29.

I had the honour to acquaint you in my dispatch of the 1st inst. that the conquest of Java was at that time substantially accomplished by the glorious and decisive victory of the 20th of August.—I am happy to announce to your Excellency the realization of those views, by the actual surrender of the island and its dependencies by a capitulation concluded between their Excellencies Lieut.-gen. Sir S. Auchmuty and Gen. Jansens, on the 18th September. I have the honour to inclose a report which the Commander in Chief has addressed to me of the proceedings of the army subsequent to the 26th August, with its inclosures. Your Excellency will observe with satisfaction, from these documents, that the final pacification of the island has been hastened by fresh examples of the same spirit, decision, and judgment, which have marked the measures of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, and of the same gallantry which has characterized the troops since the hour of their disembarkation on this coast. The Commander in Chief will sail in a few days for India; and I flatter myself that I shall be able to embark on board his Majesty's ship Modeste, for Bengal, about the middte of October.

MINTO.

To his Excellency R. T. Farquhar, Esq. &c. &c. &c. Isle of France. Modeste, off Samarang, Sept. 21. My Lord,

I have the honour to submit to your Lordship a continuation of the report, which it is my duty to lay before you, of

Immediately on receiving the intelligence of General Jansens's retreat from Bugtenzorg by an Eastern route, and the occupation of that post by our troops, I placed a force consisting of the 3d battalion of Bengal volunteers, and a detachment of artillery with two guns, under the order of Colonel Wood, and directed his embarkation, in communication with RearAdmiral Stopford, who ordered three frigates on this service, for the purpose of occupying the fort of Cheribon. Transports were at the same time put in a state of preparation for a force, consisting of the detachment of the Royal, and a company of Bengal artillery, a troop of his Majesty's 22d dragoons, his Majesty's 14th and 78th regiments of foot, the 4th battalion of Bengal volunteer Sepoys, the Madras pioneers, and a small ordnance equipment, with which it was my intention to embark, and accompanying Rear-admiral Stopford with the squadron, for the attack of Sourabaya and Fort Louis, towards which place it was supposed the enemy had retired.

A large part of his Majesty's 14th regiment, the royal artillery, and six fieldpieces, were, by the kindness of Rearadmiral Stopford, received on board his Majesty's ships of war, and they, with the transports, sailed as they could be got ready for sea, with orders to rendezvous off the point of Sidayo, near the Western entrance of the harbour of Sourabaya. I embarked on the 4th of September; and early in the morning on the 5th, sailed to join the troops in his Majesty's ship Modeste, which the Admiral, in attention to my convenience, had allotted for my accommodation.

On the 6th of September, when on the point of Indermayo, I learned from an express-boat which had been boarded by Commodore. Broughton, that Cheribon was in possession of the frigates detached on that service, having separated from the transport on board of which all their troops but the Commodore had embarked. Captain Beaver, the senior officer of the squadron, had landed the seamen and marines, and occupied the fort, which surrendered to his summons in time to make a prisoner of Brigadier Jamelle, while passing on his route from Bugtenzorg, with many other officers and troops. Letters intercepted on this occasion from General Jansens announced his intention to collect his remaining force near Samarang, and to retire on Solo. This intelligence determined me to sail for Cheribon, where I arrived on the evening of the 7th of September; and finding that no troops had yet arrived, that a detachment of sea

men and marines had marched inland on the Bugtenzorg road, and been successful in securing great numbers of the fugitives from thence, and gaining possession, on terms of capitulation, of the post of Carong Sambong on that route, I sent immediate orders for the march of reinforcements from the district of Batavia. The cavalry, half of the horse artillery, and the detachment of his Majesty's 89th regiment from Bugtenzorg, were desired to join me at Samarang, by the route of Cheribon, and the light infantry volunteer battalion was ordered to embark at Batavia for the same place.

I obtained from Captain Beaver, of his Majesty's ship Nisus, the dispatch of vessels in every direction, to meet the straggling transports on their route to Sourabaya, and direct them all to rendezvous at Samarang; addressing a letter to the Honourable Admiral Stopford, to Commodore Broughton, and all the Captains of his Majesty's ships, requesting them to give similar orders. I sailed the same evening in the Modeste, and, after meeting the Windham transport, and ordering her with the 3d volunteer battalion to Cheriban, directed my course to Samarang. I arrived there on the 9th, and was shortly afterwards joined by Rearadmiral Stopford, the Commodore, and a few transports, having on board a part of his Majesty's 14th regiment, half the 78th, the artillery detachments, six field-pieces, and the detachment of pioneers.

To ascertain the fact of General Jansens's presence, and feel how far the capture of General Jamelle and the troops from Bugtenzorg might have changed his plan, I repeated to him on the 10th, in concert with the Admiral, an invitation to surrender the island on terms of capitulation; and Captain Elliott and Colonel Agnew were charged with the communication. They saw the General,—received his reply,-ascertained that he had still with bim at least a numerous staff,-and that he professed a determination to persevere in the contest. The small force with me did not admit of my attempting to assault the place, while it was supposed to be thus occupied ; but an attack was made that night by the boats of the squadron on several gun-vessels of the enemy moored across the entrance of the rivers leading to the town end: the precipitation with which they were abandoned gave a character of probability to accounts which reached us from fishermen and others, that the General was occupied in withdrawing his troops to the interior, and had fortified a position at a short distance on the road towards Solo or Soercarta, the residence of the Emperor of Java.

On the 12th of September, as no other troeps had arrived, it was determined to

attack the town: a summons was first sent to the Commandant, and it appeared that the Enemy had (as at Batavia) evacuated the place, leaving it to be surren dered by the Commander of the Burgh

ers.

It was that night occupied by a de. tachment under Colonel Gibbs; and all the troops I could collect were landed on the following day.

It was ascertained that the Enemy had retired to a strong position, about six miles distance on the Solo road, carrying with him all the chief civil as well as military officers of the district, and that he was busied in completing batteries and intrenchments in a pass of the hills, where he had collected the residue of his regular troops, some cannon, and a force, including the auxiliary troops of the native princes, exceeding eight hundred men, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, commanded by many European officers of rank.

As any check of the attempts of our troops at this important period might have been productive of the worst effects, I thought it prudent to wait the hourly expected arrival of a larger force; but after two days passed at Samarang without their appearance, I resolved to risk an attack with the slender means at my disposal, rather than to give the Enemy confidence by a longer delay, or afford them time to complete their works, which were said to be still imperfect.

For these reasons, on the evening of the 14th, I had directed preparations to be made for an attack on the following day, when intelligence arrived that the Windham had sailed for Cheribon with some troops, and several vessels were seen in the offing; I therefore countermanded the orders, in the expectation of succours, but the Admiral, anxious, on account of the approaching unfavourable season, to secure a safe anchorage for the ships, sailed in the morning, with two ships of the line aud three frigates, to attack Fort Louis, and, if successful, to occupy the harbour of Sourabaya.

The Windham alone arrived in the course of the night, and even the very slender reinforcement which she brought was, situated as we were, of great importance, and it enabled me to withdraw all the European garrison from the fort of Samarang, and to add a company of Sepoys to the field force, which thus strengthened did not exceed one thousand one hundred infantry, and the necessary artillery to man four six-pounders, with some pioneers.

I did not think it proper to assume the direct command of so small a detachment; I confided it to Colonel Gibbs, of his Majesty's 59th regiment, proceeding, however, with the troops, that I might be at

hand

hand to profit by any fortunate result of the attack.

Experience had warranted my reposing the fullest confidence in the valour and discipline of the troops I had the good fortune to command, and taught me to appreciate those which the Enemy could oppose to them. Many of the fugitives from Cornelius were in their ranks, and the rest of their forces were strongly impressed, by their exaggerated accounts, with the dangers to be dreaded from the impetuosity of our troops. I did not, therefore, feel apprehension of any unfortunate result from attacking the Enemy with numbers so very disproportionate; but from our total want of cavalry, I did not expect to derive from it any very decisive advantage, beyond that of driving them from the position they had chosen.

The small party of cavalry, of which I had been disappointed by the absence of the transports which conveyed them, would have been invaluable; much of the Enemy's force was mounted, and they had some horse artillery, while not even the horses of my staff were arrived, and our artillery and ammunition were to be moved by hand by the lascars and pioneers, who for this purpose were attached to the field-pieces.

Colonel Gibbs marched at two o'clock on the morning of the 16th from Samarang, and after ascending some steep hills, at the distance of near six miles, the fires of the Enemy appeared a little before the dawn of day extending along the summit of a hill, which crossed our front at Jattee Allee, and over part of which the road was cut; the doubtful light, and great height of the hill they occupied, made the position appear at first most formidable. It was resolved to attack it immediately, and as the leading division or advance of the detachments moved forward to torn the Enemy's left, a fire was opened on them from many guns placed on the summit of the hill, and various positions on its face, which completely commanded the road; these were answered by our field-pieces as they came up, with the effect, though fired from a considerable distance, and with great elevation, of confusing the Enemy's artillery in directing their fire, from which a very trifling loss was sustained. Their flank was turned with little difficulty but what arose from the extreme steepness of the ascent, and after a short but ineffectual attempt to stop, by the fire of some guns advantageously posted across a deep ravine, the advance of the body of our detachment, the Enemy abandoned the greatest part of their artillery, and were seen in great numbers, and in great confusion, in full

retreat.

Our want of cavalry to follow the fugi

tives with speed, the steepness of the road, and the necessity for removing chevaux de frise with which the passage was obstructed, gave time for the escape of the Enemy, while our troops, exhausted by their exertions, were recovering their breath.

It was evident that their army was completely disunited; several officers, some of them of rank, were taken; their native allies, panic struck, had abandoned their officers, and only a few pieces of horse artillery remained of their field ordnance. With these they attempted to cover their retreat, pursued by Colonel Gibbs, who, with the detachment, passed several incomplete and abandoned batteries; and at noon, and after twelve miles march over a rugged country, approached the village of Oonarang, in which, and in the small fort beyond it, the Enemy appeared to have halted, and collected in irregular masses. Small cannon from the fort and village opened on the line as it advanced. Our field-pieces were brought up to a commanding station, and by their fire covered the formation of the troops, who, led by Colonel Gibbs, were advancing to assault the fort, when it was evacuated by the Enemy; alarmed by our fire, they were seen to abandon it and its vicinity in the utmost confusion, leaving some light guns with much ammunition and provisions in the village, where they had broken the bridge to impede pursuit; the road beyond it was covered with the caps, clothing, and military equipments of their troops, who seemed to have been completely routed and dispersed.

A number of officers made prisoners confirmed this belief; our troops had however marched so far, that they were unequal to a longer pursuit, and were quartered in the fort and the barracks which the Enemy had quitted.

Early in the night, Brigadier Winkleman, with some other officers, came into my quarters with a flag of truce from General Jansens, who was stated to be fifteen miles in advance of my position, Solatiga, on the road to Solo; the Brigadier was charged to request an armistice, that the Governor-General might communicate with your Lordship on terms of capitulation. He was informed by my direction, that he must treat with me, and that without delay; I, however, consented, in consideration of the distance of his position, to grant, for the express purpose of capitulation, an armistice of twenty-four hours, to commence from six o'clock on the following morning, and limited in its effects to the forces present. With this answer Brigadier Winkleman returned, accepting the armistice próposed.

I was perfectly aware of the general sehtiments

timents of Rear-admiral Stopford regarding the object on which our joint services were employed, from the unreserved communication I had held with him. He had sailed for Sourabaya with the declared intention of attacking Fort Louis, and of returning to his station when the service was accomplished; and he was most anxious for its speedy termination, as he bad informed me, he did not think ships would be safe on the Northern coasts of Java after the 4th of October, unless Sourabaya was in our possession.

All these considerations were strong in my mind against the delay of a reference to him; and, confident that the important object of attaining for Great Britain an immediate surrender of the island ought not to be impeded or delayed by any point merely of form, I did not hesitate to act individually, and on my sole responsibility, for the interests of the State. I had also cause to fear, if the favourable moment was allowed to pass, that the allies of the Enemy might recover from their panic, that General Jansens might learn the small amount of our force, that he might again collect his troops and retire on Solo, where, profiting by the period of the approaching rains, he might prolong the contest; and, though I could not doubt its ultimate success, a war in the interior would have embarrassed our arrangements, and have involved the affairs of the colony in inextricable confusion.

On the forenoon of the 17th of September, the Commandeur De Kock, Brigadier and Chief of the Staff of the French army in Java, arrived at Oonarang, with powers from Gen. Jansens to treat of a capitulation, which I authorized Col. Agnew, the Adjutant-general of the Forces, to discuss with him on my part: the result was, the signature by them of the articles I have the honour to inclose, No. 1, with which Gen. De Kock returned in the afternoon to obtain Gen. Jansens's approval.

At 3 o'clock in the morning of the 18th, Brig. Winkleman arrived at my quarters from Gen. Jansens, who declined to sign the articles which had been agreed upon, adverting particularly to those which concerned the debts of the Government to individuals. He requested that I would meet the General half way, or stated that he would, if preferred, come to my quarters at Oonarang, for the purpose of discussion or explanation of those articles.

As the situation in which it is evident he stood deprived him of all claim to those terms of capitulation which, had he profited by the former invitations, made while he still possessed the means of defence, he might perhaps have obtained; and as my situation, with a force unequal to prosecute operations farther in the inGent. Mag. January, 1812.

terior, would not admit of delay, I assumed a firm tone; and, desiring Gen. Winkleman to be informed that personal respect for the character of Gen. Jansens had alone induced me to grant any terms to his army, announced to him that the armistice would cease at the appointed hour, and the troops march forward at the same time.

Col. Agnew gave orders for this purpose in his presence; and informed him, that if Gen. Jansens allowed the opportunity of recapitulating now offered to escape, by not accepting the terins already pre pared, no other could be offered. Brig. Winkleman returned with all speed to Gen. Jansens, and Col. Gibbs marched with his detachment at six o'clock on the road to Soligata, where, after advancing about five miles, he was met by Brig. Winkleman, bearing the capitulation, confirmed by the signature of Gen, Jansens, and accompanied by a letter, No. 2, which strongly marked the acuteness of his feelings at being compelled, by the desertion of his allies, and the destruction of his army, to adopt this measure.

The detachment counter-marched immediately, aud, after sending a company (at the request of Brig. Winkleman) to secure the guns on the post of Soligata, moved back to Oonarang, whence on the evening I returned to Samarang, just before Gen. Jansens had announced his intention of joining me at the former place. The General, with great part of his offi cers, also reached Samarang that night. I visited him on the following day, and arranged for the equipment of a transport to convey him to Batavia, with his suite, on which they embarked this morning.

I have dispatched Col. Gibbs to assume the command of the division of Sourabaya, to which I have allotted his Majesty's 78th regiment, the 4th volunteer battalion, the light infantry battalion, and the royal artillery. I have sent a small detachment under Major Yule, of the 20th Bengal regiment, an officer on whose conduct I have much reliance, to accompany the Prince of Samanap and his force to the island of Madnra, where I have directed the Major to assume command, subject to the general controul of Col. Gibbs; he has been instructed to occupy the small forts of Joanna and Rambang on his route; and I have directed that of Japara to be occupied from Samarang. Idiamayo and Pacalonga have been garrisoned by troops from Cheribon. In mentioning the Prince of Samauap, it would be unjust to him not to report, that, prior to my march from Samarang to attack the Enemy, he sent to ask my orders, being, with 2000 of his people, within a short distance at Damak. He visited me on my return to Samarang, and expressed an earnest wish

for

for the protection and friendship of the

British nation.

As Col. Wood requested permission to * relinquish the command of Samarang, and return to Bengal, I appointed Lieut.-col. Watson, of his Majesty's 14th regiment, to relieve him in the command. The 14th regiment, a small detachment of artillery, and part of the 3d volunteer battalion, have been stationed at Samarang, and will shortly, I trust, be reinforced by the arrival of the detachments of the horse artillery, cavalry, and 89th regiment.

I have detached Capt. Robinson, your Lordship's Aide-de-camp, with a small escort, to the courts of Solo and D'Jogocarta, to deliver a letter from me to the Emperor and Sultan, and announce the change that has taken place. I have also called upon the residents at their courts, Van Braam and Englehard, to continue, agreeably to the capitulation, the exercise of their functions in behalf of the British Government, and to secure carefully the public property of the late Government, placed in the territories of the respective Princes at whose court they reside.

I have also required the other public functionaries of the late Government to continue in the temporary exercise of their functions, which hitherto I have found no instance of their declining to perform.

It will be necessary soon to arrange for the guard of honour attached to the Emperor and Sultan of the troops of the European Government of Java, and for the occupation of the forts at their capital, and on the lines of communication to and between these; but this will be easily arranged when the troops ordered to Sama

rang shall have arrived, and the report of Capt. Robinson shall have warranted a judgment of the strength of these detachments.

I embarked this morning in his Majesty's ship Modeste for Batavia, and shall have the honour of receiving your Lordship's personal commands, and discussing with you the several military arrangements which it may be necessary to make for the security of the island of Java and its dependencies, previous to my return to Madras, which it is my wish to do without delay. S. AUCHMUTY, Lieut.-Gen. To the Right Hon, Lord Minto, Governor General, &c. [Here follow the Articles of Capitulation. They are highly favourable to this country; and at the same time reflect great honour on the British character, The European troops, under Gen. Jansens, surrendered at discretion. The Native Princes, and their troops, who fought under them, are treated with great humanity and respect. There were only 2 killed at Jattee Allee, and 10 wounded. The ordnance found in the batteries between Samarang and Oonarang, and in the latter fort; amounts to 56 pieces of cannon.]

[This Gazette likewise contains copies of letters from Rear-adm. Stopford, Capts. Beaver, Hillyard, and Harris, relative to the co-operation of the naval force in the reduction of Java and its dependencies. The attack upon Sourabaya was suggested by Adm. Stopford, who gives great praise to Capt. Harris, of the Sir Francis Drake, for his successful and able policy in detaching the Sultan of Madura from his alliance with Gen. Jansens.

The following extract of a letter from Capt. Murray, of the Medea, dated South Uist, Dec. 27, states the melancholy particulars of the loss of that vessel :-" The Medea is a total wreck. We sailed from Quebec on the 12th of October; during our voyage we lost several of our masts, sails, &c. owing to the most tempestuous weather. On the morning of the 22d we saw the land of this island. As the vessel was nearly ungovernable, I endeavoured to clear the land to run through some of the many passages here; but, not having sails o masts requisite, the sea drove her to leeward, in spite of all our efforts. When I saw my fate, and the breakers in all directions, I ran to the clearest part I could see, and let go my best bower, and wore away the most of the cable in 10 fathoms water; I found the bottom rocky; and at four a. m. the rocks cut the cable nigh the anchor, and cut what remained en board, to make her wear before the wind for the clearest part of the Sound.

The seamen claimed the boat, and could not be prevailed upon to stop with me till day-light; and their importunity prevailed on me to take my chance with them. I threw my papers into the boat wrapped up, and only waited a chance to get in, when a boisterous sea broke over the vessel, and buried them all in a watery grave, I alone escaping, and an old man that was below sickly."

By the annexed article, brought by the Anholt Mails, the loss of the St. George and Defence ships of the line, with all their crews, except 18, is ascertained. On the morning of the 24th ult. they struck on the coast of Jutland, and soon after went to pieces. Six only of the crew of the Defence reached the shore, and 12 of the St. George. There were between 14 and 1500 men on board when the ships went down; and the sea was so boisterous, that all attempts to save them were fruitless. Copenhagen, Dec. 31. Advice has been received here of the English Ad

miral's