"protection they afforded us in that glorious conflict. "Let us leave then this fellow with himself, and ascend <6 together to the capitol, to offer to Jupiter the "Deliverer; who, on all occasions as well as this, "hath, from my early youth, vouchsafed to bestow

upon me the growing power and the constant disposition to support the honour of my country. And "let no God, auspicious to Rome, be left uninvoked, "that the State, in its distresses, may never want such servants as I have still endeavoured to approve "myself." When he had said this, he stept from the rostrum, and left the forum empty; all the people following him to the capitol.

That the people followed him is not surely the marvellous part of the story. The thing to be admired is, that a Statesman should lead the people to prayers.

This indeed is the last service a Patriot-minister can render to his country. And I am well persuaded (so exactly does the example fit the occasion) that our illustrious Modern would have deemed it the crown of his labours to have animated his Fellow-citizens with a spirit of true piety towards GOD, as successfully as he inflamed them with a spirit of zeal and fortitude for the King and Constitution.

PREFACE

PREFACE

;

то

THE DOCTRINE OF GRACE.

THE CONTEMPT of Religion soon followed the ABUSE and both of them have existed almost ever since the first institution of the thing itself. For, that corruption of heart, whose disorder Religion was ordained to cure, has been ever struggling against its Remedy.

I. In the days of Solomon, when Wisdom was at its height, Folly, as we learn from many passages in the writings of that sacred sage, kept equal paces with it. Hence it is, that, after he has given many lively paintings of the deformed features of Irreligion and Bigotry, he subjoins directions to the sober advocate of Piety and Virtue, how best to repress their insolence and vanity. ANSWER NOT a fool (says he) according to his folly, lest thou also be like unto him.

ANSWER

a Fool according to his folly, lest he be wise in his own

conceit

Short, isolated sentences were the mode in which ancient wisdom delighted to convey its precepts for the regulation of human conduct. But when this natural method had lost the grace of novelty, and a growing refinement had new-coloured the candid simplicity of ancient manners, these instructive sages found a necessity of giving to their moral maxims the seasoning and poignancy of paradoxes. In these lively and useful sports of fancy, the son of David, we are told, * Prov. xxvi. 4, 5. R

VOL. VIII.

most

most excelled. We find them to abound in the writings which bear his name; and we meet with frequent allusions to them in all the parts of sacred Writ, under the names of Riddles, Parables, and Dark-sayings.

Now of all the examples of this species of instruction, there is none more illustrious, or fuller of moral wisdom, than the parador just now quoted; or which, in the happiness of the expression, has so artfully conveyed the key for opening the treasures of it. But as a dark conceit and a dull one have a great proximity in modern wit; and a nice difference is not distinguished from a contradiction in modern reasoning; this paradox of the Sage has been mistaken by his critics for an absurdity of some of his transcribers, who forgot the negative in the latter member of the sentence: and so, to be set right at an easier expence than unfolding dark sentences of old; that is to say, by exchanging them for clearer, of a modern date: which time can make ANCIENT READINGS; and which a careful collation of its blunders may hereafter make the TRUE.

II. But they who chuse to receive antiquity in its antique garb, will, perhaps, venture with me to try, if the apparent contradiction in the received text cannot be fairly unriddled without any other aid than of the words themselves, in which the dark saying is conveyed.

Had the folly of these fools been only of one condition or denomination, then the advice to answer, and not to answer had been repugnant to itself. But as their folly was of various kinds, in some of which, to answer might offend the dignity, and in others, not to answer might hurt the interests of Truth; To answer, and not to answer, is a consistent, and may, for aught these critics know, be a very wise direction.

Had the advice been given simply and without circumstance, to answer the fool, and not to answer him, a critic, who had a reverence for the text, would satisfy himself in supposing, that the different directions referred to the doing a thing in and out of season. But when, to the general advice about answering, this circumstance is added—according to his folly, that interpretation is excluded; and a difficulty indeed arises; a difficulty, which has made those who have no reverence for the TEXT, to accuse it of absurdity and contradiction.

But now, to each direction, reasons are subjoined, Why a Fool should, and why he should not, be answered: reasons, which, when set together and compared, are, at first sight, sufficient to make the critic suspect, that all the contradiction lies in his own incumbered ideas.

1. The reason given, why a Fool should not be answered according to his folly, is, lest he [the Answerer] be like unto him:

2. The reason given, why he should be answered according to his folly, is, lest he [the Fool] be wise in his own conceit.

The cause assigned, of forbidding to answer, therefore, plainly insinuates, that the Defender of Religion should not imitate the insulter of it in his modes of disputation; which may be comprised in sophistry, buffoonry, and scurrility. For what could so much liken the answerer to his idiot-adversary, as the putting on his fool's-coat in order to captivate and confound the rabble?

The cause assigned, of directing to answer, as plainly intimates, that the Sage should address himself to confute the fool upon the fool's own false principles,

by shewing that they lead to conclusions very wide from the impieties he would deduce from them. And if any thing will prevent the fool from being wise in his own conceit, it must be the dishonour and the ridicule of having his own principles turned against him; while they are shewn to make for the very contrary purpose to that for which he had employed them.

The supreme wisdom, conveyed in the two precepts of this unravelled paradox, will be best understood by explaining the advantages arising from the observance of each of them.

III. We are not to answer a fool according to his folly, lest we also be like unto him-This is the reason given; and a good one it is; sufficient to make any sober man decline a combat, where even victory would bring dishonour with it. Now, if our answer be of such a nature that we also (though with contrary intentions) do injury to truth, we become like unto him in the essential part of his character. And surely Truth is never more grossly abused, nor its advocates more dishonoured, than when they employ the foolish arts of sophistry, buffoonry, and scurrility, in its defence.

1. To use fallacious and inconclusive arguments in support of Truth, is doing it infinite discredit. The practice tends to make men suspect that the questioned Truth is indeed an imposture, when it finds support in the common tricks of impostors: the least unfavourable inference will be, that the Truth is defended not for its own sake, but for the sake of the Defender: this will make the serious inquirer less attentive to the issue, and more jealous of the good faith of the advocate; which cannot but lessen our reverence to the onc, and increase unfavourable prejudices towards the

other.