fuppofe a divine affiftance, by which the spirit of God informs us what is the mind of God contained in his revelation; then this affistance, or work of the spirit in us, is either an affifting of our reafon in its use and exercise, as aforefaid, or elfe it is an immediate informing of our understandings, by infpiration or otherways, of those truths which are contain'd in that revelation. If the former, this is juft the fame with what I faid, viz. it is in the exercise of our reason that we discover the mind of God, as aforefaid; only here it is fuppof'd, that God by his fpirit affifts and helps our reason in its ufe and exercife, and this he may do in all those cafes where truth is discover'd by reafon, for ought that we know. If it be the latter, viz. by immediately informing our underftandings, by infpiration or otherways, without the use of reafon, as aforefaid, then this is not a helping us to understand a former revelation, but it is itself a new revelation to us; for tho' the truths we are inform'd of are fuch as are contain'd in, but not understood by, the written 'word; yet they are as much a new revelation to us, as if they had not been contain'd in it. From hence I conclude, that it is in the ufe and exercife of our reafon that we discover the mind of God contain'd in his revelation, there being no other means, that we know of, but this, for us to difcover it by. And thus we see that reafon has its ufe, even in matters of faith,

TRACT

ΑΝ

ENQUIRY

Concerning PRAYER.

HIS Enquiry is four-fold; first, what prayer is; fecondly, who is the proper object of prayer; thirdly, what are the ends of prayer; and fourthly, what

prayer will be accepted and answered,

First, What prayer is? Prayer, when directed to God, may be confidered in a larger, or in a more reftrained fenfe. When confidered in a larger fenfe, it fignifies the addrefs or application of a dependant being, to his fupreme governour, and original benefactor. And fo it comprehends, or contains all thofe particular acts, which, when diftinguished one from another, we call confeffion, petition, thanksgiving, and the like. But, when it is confidered in a more reftrained fenfe, then we confine it to a petition only. And in this fenfe, it may refpects the petitioner, or others. If it refpects the petitioner, then it is a petitioning to be deliver'd from fome evil that we feel, or to efcape fome evil that we fear; or a petition ing for a fupply of thofe good things we want, or for the continuance of those we already enjoy. If it refpects others, this may be confidered in two refpects, viz. imprecation, and interceffion. By imprecation, we mean petitioning for fome evil to be inflicted upon them, or continued to them: and, by interceffion, we mean a petitioning for fome good to be conferr'd upon them, or continued to them, or for the removing

or

of preventing of fome evil, which they are under, or in danger of falling into. In the prefent enquiry, I shall confider prayer in a restrained sense as it is confined to petition, and likewise as it refpects the petitioner only. And accordingly, I fay, that prayer is the act of the mind, carried out in defire after fome good not enjoy'd. I fay prayer is the act of the mind; in which I exclude the act of the tongue, as effential to prayer. And the reafon of this is evident, because we can put up our defires to God without the use of vocal words to exprefs thofe defires by; and confequently the ufe of the tongue is not effential to prayer. Indeed, when our defires are to be exprefs'd, in order for others to join their defires with them, as in publick prayer, then the use of the tongue is neceffary to that end, but this does not make it neceffary and effential to prayer, confider'd fimply in itself. Again, I fay, prayer is the act of the mind, carried out in defire after fome good. By which I mean, that the thing prayed for is always good in itself, at leaft it is fo in the judgment of the petitioner, or elfe it is good confidered as a means, either to continue fome present or procure fome future good or to remove fome prefent, or avert fome future evil. I fay, the thing prayed for, is always good under one or other of thefe confiderations; because it is impoffible for a man to defire for himfelf evil, as fuch; and therefore when men defire death, which is an evil of all evils that mankind generally flee from, they do not defire it as evil, but as good, that is, as a means either to obtain fome good which they expect beyond it, or elfe to remove them from fome great evil which they esteem worfe than death. Again, I fay, that prayer is the act of the mind, carried out in defire after some good [not enjoyed.] As the

thing prayed for is always good under one or o ther of the foremention'd confiderations, fo it is always future or at a distance. And the reafon of this is manifeft, becaufe defire always fuppofes the abfence of the thing defired; and therefore it must be either future and at a distance, or else it cannot be defired by us. Indeed, we may defire, and confequently pray for the continuance of what we already enjoy, but this is not praying for what we have, but for what we have not, viz. for the continuance of what we have, which continuance as yet we have not. Again, I fay, prayer is the act of the mind [carried out.] By which I mean, that it is carried out in defire or petition to God, that he will vouchfafe to give us the thing which we defire to have. For as prayer is an act of defire, fo we must not only defire to have what we want, but also we must defire or petition God to give us that thing, or elfe it is not prayer. Defire, in this cafe, has a two-fold act; first, we defire the having or enjoying of a thing; and, fecondly, we defire or petition God to give us that enjoyment. Now it is the lattar of thefe only, which is prayer. If a man is fick of fome difeafe, and he defires to have health, in this cafe, the bare defiring to have health is not prayer; but when to our defire of having a thing, we add a defire, and direct that defire, as a petition or addrefs to God, that he will vouchfafe to give us health, or the thing defired, this is prayer. Lastly, I fay, prayer is the act of the mind carried out in [defire.] In which I exclude all other acts of the mind, from being prayer; and therefore I fay, that love, hatred, hope, fear, joy, forrow, anger, and the like, tho' thefe are acts of the mind, yet they are not prayer; and tho' these may be exercifed in, or be the occafion of, or be he attendants of prayer, yet they are not prayer

prayer itself. And as to thofe other acts of the mind, which are fo united to defire, that it cannot be brought forth into act without them, fuch as thought and reflection, yet even these are not prayer; for tho' we cannot defire any thing without thinking upon what we defire, and tho' we think and reflect upon a thing never so much, yet if that thought and reflection does not produce an actual defire, and the putting forth of that defire by petition to God, this is not prayer. So that whatever goes beyond, or falls fhort of the going out of defire to God, is not prayer. Defire may be weaker or ftronger, and the putting forth of that defire, in petition to God, may be more or lefs earneft, or fervent, or whatever term we exprefs it by, and every degree of defire, whether greater or lefs, put forth as aforefaid, is prayer; because it is that wherein the very effence of prayer confifts, viz. the act of the mind going forth in defire to God; but whatever is lefs or more than this, is not prayer. Thus, when a man would pray to God, it is not enough for him to use praying words, that is, words which are expreffive of defire, neither is it: enough for him to employ his mind in thinking, upon, and producing of words which are fuitable and proper for the expreffing of fuch defire; for whether we inftantly think upon words, or whether we use words already prepared to our hands, either by ourselves or others, it makes no alteration in the cafe, any otherways than as either of them is a help or a hindrance to prayer, as perhaps either of them may be a help to fome men in fome cafes, and a hindrance to others; neither, is it enough for him to mind what the fenfe and meaning of those words are, which he uses, becaufe all this may be done, and yet he may not pray. His thinking upon any fubject, and fpeak