when they, instead of these mortal bodies, shall be clothed with celestial and immortal ones, then shall this creature also have its certain share. in the felicity of that glorious time, and partake in some measure of such a liberty, by being freed in like manner from these their gross terrestrial bodies, and now living only in thin aërial and immortal ones; and so a period put to all their miseries and calamities by him, who made not death, neither hath pleasure in the destruction of the living, but created whatsoever liveth to this end, that it might have its being, and enjoy itself. But however thus much is certain, that brute animals, in this place, cannot be quite excluded; because the Tãoα Krious, the whole creation-will not suffer that: and therefore a Pythagorist would conclude it a warrantable inference from this text of Scripture, that that whole rank in the creation of irrational and brutish animals below men shall not be utterly annihilated in the consummation of things, or future renovation of the world, quite stripped of all this furniture, men being then left alone in it; but that there shall be a continuation of this species or rank of being. And not only so neither; as if there should still be a constant succession of such alternate generations and corruptions, productions or births, and deaths of brute animals, to all eternity; but also, that the individuals themselves shall continue the same, forasmuch as otherwise there would be none at all delivered from the bondage of corruption. And lastly, that these very souls of brutes, which at this time groan and travail in pain, shall themselves be made partakers of that liberty of the children of God; since otherwise they should be

with child, or parturient of nothing; groaning not for themselves, but others. But enough of this Pythagoric hypothesis, which, supposing all manner of souls, sensitive as well as rational, to be substantial things, and therefore to have a permanency after death, in their distinct natures, allows them certain thin aërial ochemata, or vehicles, to subsist in, when these gross terrestrial ones shall fail them.

But let these aërial vehicles of the souls of brutes go for a whimsey, or mere figment; nor let them be allowed to act or enliven any other than terrestrial bodies only, by means whereof they must needs be, immediately after death, quite destitute of all body; they subsisting nevertheless, and not vanishing into nothing, because they are not mere accidents, but substantial things; we say, that in this case, though the substances of them remain, yet must they needs continue in a state of insensibility and inactivity, unless perhaps they be again afterward united to some other terrestrial bodies. Because, though intellection be the energy of the rational soul alone, without the concurrence of body, yet is the energy of the sensitive, always conjoined with it; sense being, as Aristotle hath rightly determined, a complication of soul and body together, as weaving is of the weaver and weaving instruments. Wherefore we say, that if the irrational and sensitive souls in brutes, being substantial things also, be after death quite destitute of all body, then can they neither have sense of any thing, nor act upon any thing, but must continue

a

De Anima, lib. ii. cap. vi. p. 27. tom. ii. oper.

for so long a time, in a state of insensibility and inactivity. Which is a thing therefore to be thought the less impossible, because no man can be certain, that his own soul in sleep, lethargies, and apoplexies, &c. hath always an uninterrupted consciousness of itself; and that it was never without thoughts, even in the mother's womb. However, there is little reason to doubt, but that the sensitive souls of such animals, as lie dead or asleep all the winter, and revive or awake again, at the approaching warmth of summer, do for that time continue in a state of inactivity and insensibility. Upon which account, though these souls of brutes may be said in one sense to be immortal, because the substance of them, and the root of life in them, still remains; yet may they, in another sense, be said also to be mortal, as having the exercise of that life, for a time at least, quité suspended. From whence it appears, that there is no reason at all for that fear and suspicion of some, that if the souls of brutes be substantial, and continue in being after death, they must therefore needs go either to heaven or hell. But as for that supposed possibility of their awakening again afterward, in some other terrestrial bodies, this seemeth to be no more, than what is found by daily experience in the course of nature, when the silk-worm, and other worms, dying, are transformed into butterflies. For there is little reason to doubt, but that the same soul, which before acted the body of the silk-worm, doth afterward act that of the butterfly: upon which account it is, that this hath been made by Christian theologers an emblem of the résurrection.

Hitherto have we declared two several opinions, concerning the substantial souls of brutes supposed therefore to have a permanent subsistence after death; one of Plato's and the Pythagoreans', that when they are divested of these gross terrestrial bodies, they live, and have a sense of themselves, in thin aërial ones; the other of such, as exploding these aërial vehicles of brutes, and allowing them uone but terrestrial bodies, affirm the substances of them, surviving death, to continue in a state of inactivity and insensibility, sleep, silence, or stupor. But now, to say the truth, there is no absolute necessity, that these souls of brutes, because substantial, should therefore have a permanent subsistence after death to all eternity; because, though it be true, that no substance once created by God will of itself ever vanish into nothing, yet it is true also, that whatsoever was created by God out of nothing, may possibly by him be annihilated and reduced to nothing again. Wherefore, when it is said, that the immortality of the human soul is demonstrable by natural reason, the meaning hereof is no more than this, that its substantiality is so demonstrable; from whence it follows, that it will naturally no more perish or vanish into nothing, than the substance of matter itself: and not that it is impossible either for it, or matter, by the Divine power to be annihilated. Wherefore the assurance that we have of our own souls' immortality, must depend upon something else besides their substantiality, namely, a faith also in the Divine Goodness, that he will conserve in being, or not annihilate, all such substances created by him, whose permanent subsistence is neither inconsistent with

his own attributes, nor the good of the universe, as this of rational souls unquestionably is not; they having both morality and liberty of will, and thereby being capable of rewards and punishments, and consequently fit objects for the Divine justice to display itself upon. But, for aught we can be certain, the case may be otherwise as to the souls of brute animals, devoid both of morality and liberty of will, and therefore uncapable of reward and punishment; that though they will not naturally of themselves vanish into nothing, yet, having been created by God in the generations of the respective animals, and had some enjoyment of themselves for a time, they may by him again be as well annihilated in their deaths and corruptions; and if this be absolutely the best, then doubtless is it so. And to this seemeth agreeable the opinion of Porphyrius, amongst the philosophers, when he affirmed every irrational power or soul to be resolved into the life of the whole; that is, retracted and resumed into the Deity, and so annihilated as to its creaturely nature: though possibly there may be another interpretation of that philosopher's meaning here, viz. that all the sensitive souls of brutes are really but one and the same mundane soul, as it were, outflowing and variously displaying itself, and acting upon all the several parts of matter, that are capable to receive it, but at their deaths retiring again back into itself. But we have sufficiently retunded the force of that objection against the ingenerability of all souls, and the substantiality of those of brutes also, from their conse

a

2 Vide Sententias ad Intelligibilia ducentes, par. i. § xxii. p. 227. § xxiv. p. 228. et alias.