clergy have given but too much reason for the most guarded precaution. It is no alleviation of the error to say, that John Knox said, that, "neither promise nor oath can oblige man to give assistance to tyrants against God." However Knox might reason on what he conceived, though presumptuously, the Almighty would dispense with, he could not pretend to dispense with them himself, upon his own principles. Upon his principles the decision was necessarily left to God, and his hearers to their own judgment, whether the words of Knox could be borne out by his authority in the word of God, and to their own risk as to their error. Whereas, the church of Rome declares that she herself has the power of dispensing and absolving, and the laity of that church in general conceive the power to be full. There is therefore the difference between the two cases, of reasoning upon what God may pardon, and assuming the power to pardon.

Another circumstance in the Petition of considerable importance is, that the extent of the spiritual power is left undefined; since, under the term spiritual, so extensive a jurisdiction has been claimed, as to invade the temporal jurisdiction in numberless instances; and to determine its limits, it would be necessary to revise and settle them.

It cannot be overlooked, that the Papal claims and constitutions, which are the most objectionable to Protestants, are neither renounced nor repealed, and that a reservation is established, by the council of Trent, of all extreme cases to the See of Rome. What then if Rome should take upon itself to annul

the declaration, and excommunicate those who had made it, as guilty of a sinful act, till they should repent of it? Most certainly it would be a serious concern to the Protestants, upon the common principles of rational consistency, to know how the Catholics would reconcile their disobedience to a decree of the Pope, who is the medium by which their church, which they believe to be infallible, speaks; though they may not believe him personally to be so. That those of the communion, who are men of high honour and principle, would not obey the decree, it is but just to believe.. But may it not also as justly be feared, that, should circumstances favour the promulgation of such a decree, and especially should the political balance incline towards it, it might produce the most disastrous effects, if salvation and loyalty were thus represented as in opposition, and that many of the clergy might be found, as not being of the Gallican church, active to promote them *? This difficulty arising from hence has been so ably stated in the letter to Dr. Troy, by Melancthon, that it is not necessary to dwell further on it here.

One observation more, however, cannot be omitted, with respect to the singular contrast between the

* Rome will not certainly exert the power she claims lightly. It must be a great and a very favourable occasion that will induce her to hazard it. It is of too much consequence not to be a reserved case; and she knows well enough that it concerns her credit to leave obligations of the kind in their full force, until dispensed with by herself. So long, therefore, they are allowed to be binding by all of her communion.

views as to ecclesiastical matters, exhibited in the Petition, and those by writers in favour of the Question. The Petition seems not to extend them further than such an establishment, as should not interfere with that of the Protestants. But the advocates of the Question speak of them, clearly, as directed to a participation of the property of the established church of Ireland, and similar privileges, or the same.

In order to estimate how far these views are such as a Protestant state should encourage, it will be necessary previously to consider what has been urged by the Hon. Author, in favour of the religion itself.

"The religion which we profess" (says the Hon. Author) "is what we have received from our B ritish, or Saxon, or Norman forefathers. We went out from no church; but other churches, on motives which to them seemed sufficient, went out from us. We impute not this to them as a subject of blame ; then why should we be blamed, if we steadfastly adhere to the ancient faith?"

The moderation of the sentiments expressed in the last sentence of this paragraph is such as it were to be wished were much more general. As to the imputation of blame, it presupposes an error that might have been foreseen, or known and avoided; and though it is too common to blame rashly, yet if all truth is not to be given up, error, when proved to be such, must be blamed as such. But a man, who is in error, may be so without perceiving it; and act very conscientiously on an erroneous principle. Such a man is no further liable to blame, than as he has neglected or resisted the evidence

against his error, and the consequent relinquishment of it. If he has done either, no law human or divine exculpates him from blame. Yet, though it be true, that none but the Deity can judge truly of the conscience, how far it has, or has not, been culpable; if, in argument, rational motives, and, much more, if proofs are resisted without motives, o proofs more rational being adduced to oppose them, such resistance can be resolved only into either prejudice or wilful error; and in either case blame will attach to it.

As to the argument of antiquity, as applied here to the Romish church, I must confess I have frequently been surprised that any of its advocates would enter upon it, in favour of the doctrines to which Protestants object; since it requires little more than to open the New Testament to find they have no real authority there; or than to open the works of the fathers of the three first centuries, to find that they were not the doctrines of the Christian church in their times. With those who do not, or dare not, read these, such an argument may be of force, and their number is unhappily great. What we allege is, that the doctrines, which we object to, were not the most ancient Christian doctrines in Rome itself; that they are contrary to those of Rome for the three first centuries; that they are not the doctrines of the New Testament, nor consistent with it. Thus far has been repeatedly urged. I need go no further; and I hope to prove that the doctrine of Papal infallibility and Papal power, the withholding of the Scriptures from the laity, image-worship, and transubstantiation, were all derived from Paganism, and

were originally the doctrines not of Christian but of Pagan Rome; and these will leave them in possession of an antiquity higher even than that which is contended for.

To consider the question of religion seriously, the object must necessarily be to consider what is true, and what is false; what is indubitably of divine authority, and what is not; without any respect of times or persons that might lead the mind from its direct investigation; but I am content to take the subject up in the manner proposed, and to weigh these accidents of the subject fairly to the best of

my power.

If religion were respectable in proportion to its antiquity, the Jewish system would have an older claim than the Christian, and the Pagan than either; or in this country that of the Druids, or of Odin, the religions of our British and Saxon forefathers, as prior to Christianity. Or if we are to conceive that a religion, because it was that of our forefathers, should be retained and respected, a man of scrupulous conscience may find it hard to decide, upon this principle, whether he should be a Christian or a Pagan. Is it also a merit not to go out of a church? This might also incline him more decisively to adhere to the religion of his elder forefathers, because the latter went out of their church, when they became converts to Christianity, and he might become a Pagan.

If it be a merit not to go out of a church, or to adhere to the old one at all events, then the reverse is of course a demerit. What then are we to think