not knowing the true Christian principles of conduct from the Scriptures themselves, conceive the opinion of the priest as always right, and a power of absolution as one vested fully in him, so as certain to be ratified by the supreme Being; and thus, thinking themselves secure, have been frequently led astray into errors the most dangerous, and conduct the most disastrous, when sanctioned by priests of an ambitious, turbulent, or otherwise unprincipled character; or such as, being well-intentioned, were in error themselves, or deceived by others.

This is a danger which must ever remain whilst the doctrine of absolution being a judicial act of the person remains unmodified; the abuses of the power claimed have increased the danger; and the power itself, unlimited as it is claimed, and immorally as it has been applied, is a grievous and impious perversion of Scripture and religion.

There is an unhappy promptitude in man to deceive himself, where the object is of importance to his happiness, and to extend his confidence beyond the limit which reason and truth must necessarily determine. But the final issue will, notwithstanding, prove that this limit will not vary with the fluctuations of the human will; and it is rather too much to require, that man should be content to risk the fatal danger of exceeding it, for want of its being clearly ascertained. It is too much, that man should be suffered to endanger his salvation, by presuming on the force of an ambiguous term. The judicial absolution by the priest either is subject to a final ratification or reversal by the Deity, in the day of judgment, or it

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is NOT. If it is, then it is, though judicial, conditionally judicial; and if so allowed and understood, the danger of the doctrine will, I conceive, bẹ obviated, and the doctrine be admissible, though the term 'judicial" is objectionable. If it is not, then I have no hesitation in saying, that the doctrine is contrary both to reason and Scripture, and dangerous to the salvation of every individual, and the safety of every state. It is in the power of the Romish church to satisfy the public in which of these two senses they understand the term judicial; it owes the explanation as much to its own adherents as to others; and with a sincere wish that it may do it satisfactorily, to the consideration of the members of that church I now leave it.

The application of this doctrine to oaths has, above all others, been of the greatest prejudice to civil society; and it is much to be lamented, that the mode of reasoning on the obligation of oaths seems, of late, to have taken a turn no less dangerous, especially as to oaths of compact. It is true, that compact may be conditional; but it is not true, that compact, simply expressed, is to be understood as conditional. The latter would expose society to all the evils of mental reservation, and be even more injurious than the Romish doctrine of absolution; and a casuistry would arise which would destroy all confidence.

In arguments of this kind, it seems, unhappily, to be forgotten, that there is a witness to compacts who cannot be deceived, and who will not let the deceiver go unpunished-even the God that is invoked.

As to expediency, the matter is clear. To break

so,

an oath for a probable good, is to sacrifice a positive duty upon a double presumption; first, that the particular good may arise; and, secondly, that God will pardon it. Is then the hand of God shortened that he cannot make the probable good itself the punishment, or turn the probable evil into a blessing? He is little of a Christian who thinks so, and can have had little experience, who has not, some time or other, found, or known it to be so; or who will, on presumption of its being pardoned, be guilty of the infraction of an engagement of so high a nature.

It may also, with reason perhaps, be absolutely denied, that it is ever truly expedient to break a serious engagement, even by words only, without so solemn a sanction as that of an oath; and much less so with it, inasmuch as it breaks down the strong barrier of principle upon which all reliance of man upon man depends. One instance is readily presumed to infer a succession, and, in proportion to its magnitude, entails (and frequently beyond that proportion) diffidence, distrust, and a plea of justification to those, who may also find it expedient to retaliate in kind. Thus, by natural means, the divine displeasure makes the effects of the error its own punishment; and whosoever has once set an example of it, has seldom failed to find, that it has been sedulously followed, and improved against himself.

If, therefore, motives are offered in favour of infraction of daths, they may justly be liable to heavy sus

*On this subject the Reader will find a curious document in the Antijacobin Magazine, Appendix to vol. xxxi. p. 499.

picion, that interest outweighs principle in the suggestion, which example will neither encourage nor justify; which confidence in society cannot consist with; and which the law of God forbids. To every honest mind the inquiry will be, not what sense or construction may be plausibly, or even possibly, brought within the comprehension of the terms, but what they were directly and plainly intended to mark and signify.

On a subject of such high import as the coronation oath, it is a circumstance which, though it has already been treated of with as little reserve as delicacy, is not, therefore, in itself the less difficult or delicate. When a Roman Catholic treats of it, his object is to find means to prove, if he can, that the terms of it may be so understood, as to allow of an admission of the Catholics to a share of political power, and of an encouragement of their religion. On the other hand, when a Protestant treats of it, he does so under the knowledge, that the intent of it was wholly to exclude both, and to secure the object of the Revolution. What that object was, cannot be more pointedly, or more comprehensively expressed, than in the words which, I humbly hope, I may be permitted to extract from the report of an animated and eloquent speech of his Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland, which reflects hopour on the illustrious House of Brunswick, in the person of the Noble Speaker; and for which his Royal Highness deserves, and, I believe, has, the thanks of every sincere Protestant:— "The great object," said his Grace, was to secure the religion and liberties of these realms. These

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objects were confirmed by the act of settlement, by the declaration of rights, by the oath of supremacy and abjuration, and by the succession to the Crown in the Protestant line. To maintain and uphold all these, our family was called to the throne. And whatever can militate with these principles, in the remotest degree, it is my bounden duty, as a member of that family, and as a member of your Lordships' House, to resist."

For an assurance of the maintenance of these principles, so clearly and energetically expressed, the Protestant considers the coronation oath as his security; and, in its intent, as extending effectually to it. His construction of it, from the fact of the original and received intent, must, therefore, necessarily be directly the reverse of that which the Roman Catholic will, as necessarily, wish to give to it; and neither will consider the comment of the other as an eligible one, on what regards his opposed interest. If then fears have been liberally put in one scale, may it not be permitted to consider, whether there might not some fears be put in the other, should the whole body of the Protestants conceive, that from such concessions to the Catholics, as those so eagerly sought, the security of the Protestant was given up, or, what is still more to be feared, might act as if it was. There is no danger in the warning; the danger would be only when it was done; and, it is not the flimsy veil of a casuistical subtlety that can blind common sense, or overturn well-founded and generally acknowledged principles. We have, blessed be God! a Sovereign, who is too