our Saviour, speaking concerning the discriminating grace of God, that appears in election, either in his purpose relating to it, or in the execution thereof, says, Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you, John xv. 16. that is, you have done nothing that has laid any obligation on me to choose you by that act of faith, whereby you are inclined to prefer me to all others; for this is the consequence and result of my discriminating grace. We shall now proceed to consider those arguments, which are generally made use of by those, who are in the other way of thinking, to support the conditionality of God's purpose, as well as of his works of grace, in opposition to what has been said concerning the freeness and sovereignty thereof. They generally allege those scriptures for that purpose, that are laid down in a conditional form; as when the apostle speaks of such a confession of Christ with the mouth, as is attended with believing in the heart, that God raised him from the dead, and calling on the name of the Lord, as connected with salvation, Rom. x. 9, 13. and our Saviour says, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish, but have everlasting life, John iii. 15. and that he that believeth shall be saved, Mark xvi. 16. and elsewhere, Except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish, Luke xiii. 3. and many other scriptures of the like nature; from whence they argue, that since the dispensations of God's providence, the gifts of his grace, and the execution of his purpose are all conditional, the purpose itself must be so. Were it but allowed that election is conditional whether it respects the purpose or providence of God, we should meet with no opposition from those who are on the other side of the question; but as such a purpose to save, as is not absolute, peremptory, or independent on the will of man, has many absurd consequences attending it, which are derogatory to the glory of the divine sovereignty, as has been already considered; so this cannot be the sense of those scriptures, that are laid down in a conditional form, as those and such-like are, that we have but now mentioned; for no sense of scripture can be true or just, that has the least tendency to militate against any of the divine perfections; so that there may without any strain or violence offered to the sense of words, be another sense put upon these, and all other scriptures, in which we have the like mode of speaking, whereby they may be explained, agreeably to the analogy of faith; therefore let us consider,

1. That all such scriptures are to be understood as importing the necessary connexion of things, so that one shall not be brought about without the other; accordingly, repentance, faith, and all other graces, are herein no otherwise considered, than as inseparably connected with salvation; which depends upon one of those propositions, which was before laid down, viz. that

God having chosen to the end has also chosen to the means. We are far from denying that faith and repentance are necessary to salvation, as God never gives one without the other, and consequently they are inseparably connected in his eternal purpose relating thereunto. If nothing else were intended by a conditional purpose than this, we would not offer any thing against it; but certainly this would be to use words without their known or proper ideas; and the word condition, as applicable to other things, is never to be understood in this sense. There is a necessary connection between God's creating the world, and his upholding it, or between his creating an intelligent creature, and his giving laws to him; but none ever supposed one to be properly a condition of the other: so a king's determining to pardon a malefactor, is inseparably connected with his pardoning him, and his pardon given forth, with his having a right to his forfeited life; but it is not proper to say, one is a condition of the other; so a person's seeing is inseparably connected with his opening his eyes; and speaking, with the motion of his lips; but we do not say, when he determines to do both of them, that one is a condition of the other. A condition, properly speaking is that which is not only connected with the privilege that follows upon the performance thereof, but it must be performed by a subject acting independently on him who made the conditional overture, or promise.

If it be said, that a duty, which we are enabled to perform by God, who promised the blessing connected with it, is properly a condition, we will not contend about the propriety, or impropriety, of the word; but inasmuch as it is taken by many, when applied to divine things, in the same sense as in matters of a lower nature, and so used to signify the dependence of the blessings promised, or the efficacy of the divine purpose, relating thereunto, on our performance of the condition, which is supposed to be in our own power, whereby we come to have a right and title to eternal life; it is this that we principally militate against, when we assert the absoluteness of God's purpose. 2. Whatever ideas there may be contained in those scriptures, which are brought to support the doctrine we are opposing, that contain in them the nature of a condition, nothing more is intended thereby, but that what is connected with salvation is a condition of our claim to it, or expectation of it: In this sense, we will not deny faith and repentance to be conditions of salvation, inasmuch as it would be an unwarrantable instance of presumption, for impenitent and unbelieving sinners, to pretend that they have a right to it, or to expect the end without the means, since these are inseparably connected in God's purpose, as well as in all his dispensations of grace. This being laid down, as a general rule for our understanding

all those scriptures, which are usually brought to prove that God's purposes are sometimes conditional, we shall farther illustrate it, by applying it to three or four other scriptures, that are often brought in defence thereof, which we shall endeavour to explain, consistently with the doctrine we are maintaining.

One is taken from Gen. xix. 22. where the angel bade Lot escape to Zoar, telling him, that he could not do any thing till he came thither. If we suppose this to have been a created angel, as most divines do, yet he must be considered as fulfilling the purpose of God, or acting pursuant to his commission; and therefore it is all one, to our present argument, as though God had told Lot, that he could do nothing till he was gone from that place. It is plain, that he had given him to understand, that he should be preserved from the flames of Sodom, and that, in order thereunto, he must flee for his life; and adds, that he could do nothing, that is, he could not destroy Sodom, consistently with the divine purpose to save him, till he was escaped out of the place; for God did not design to preserve him alive (as he did the three Hebrew captives, in Daniel) in the fire, but by his escaping from it; one was as much fore-ordained as the other, or was designed as a means conducive to it; and therefore the meaning of the text is, not that God's purpose, relating to Sodom's destruction, was founded on Lot's escape, as an uncertain and dubious condition, depending on his own will, abstracted from the divine determination relating to it; but he designed that those two things should be connected together, and that one should be antecedent to the other; and both of them, as well as their respective connection, were the object of God's absolute and peremptory determination.

There is another scripture, sometimes brought to the same purpose, in Gen. xxxii. 26. where the angel says to Jacob, Let me go, for the day breaketh; and Jacob replies, I will not let thee go, except thou bless me, which does not infer, that God's determinations were dependent on Jacob's endeavour to detain him, or his willingness to let him depart; but we must consider Jacob as an humble, yet importunate suppliant, as it is said elsewhere, Weeping and making supplication, Hos. xii. 4. Let me go, says God, appearing in the form of an angel, and speaking after the manner of men, that he might give occasion to Jacob to express a more ardent desire of his presence and blessing, as well as to signify how unworthy he was of it; not as though he was undetermined before-hand what to do, but since the grace which Jacob exercised, as well as the blessing which he received, was God's gift, and both were connected in the execution of his purpose, we must conclude that the purpose itself was free, sovereign, and unconditional.

gain, there is another scripture, in which God condescends

to use a mode of speaking, not much unlike to the other, in which he says to Moses, speaking concerning Israel, in Exod. xxxii. 10. This is a stiff-necked people; now therefore let me alone, that my wrath may wax hot against them, and that I may consume them; we are not to suppose that the whole event was to turn upon Moses's prayer, as though God's purposing to save his people were dependent on it; or that that grace, which inclined him to be importunate with God, did not take its rise from him. Moses, indeed, when first he began to plead with God, knew not whether his prayer would be prevalent or no ; however, he addresses himself, with an uncommon degree of importunity, for sparing mercy; and, when God says, Let me alone, it signifies, that his people were unworthy that any one should plead their cause; and, if God should mark iniquity, then Moses's intercession would be altogether in vain, and so he might as well let him alone, in that respect, as ask for his mercy. He does not, indeed, at first, tell him what he designed to do, that he might aggravate their crime, but afterwards he answers his prayer in Israel's favour, and signifies that he would work, not for their sakes, but for his own name's sake; so that he takes occasion, on the one hand, to set forth the people's desert of punishment; and, on the other, the freeness of his own grace.

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There is but one scripture more that I shall mention, among many that might have been brought, and that is what is said concerning our Saviour, in Matt. xiii. 58. that he could not do many mighty works there, at that time, in his own country, cause of their unbelief? where he speaks either of their not having a faith of miracles that was sometimes required, in those for whom they were wrought or else of the unaccountable stupidity of that people, who were not convinced, by many others that he had wrought before them; therefore he resolves to put a stop to his hand, and not, for the present, to work so many miracles amongst them, as otherways might have been expected: If we suppose that their want of faith prevented his working them, this is not to be considered as an unforeseen event. And as he had determined not to confer this privilege upon them, or to continue to work miracles amongst them, if those, which he had already wrought, were disregarded and despised by their unbelief, we must conclude that he had a perfect knowledge of this before-hand, and that his determinations were not dependent on uncertain conditions, though he had resolved to act in such a way, as was most for his own glory; and that there should be an inseparable connexion between that faith, which was their duty, and his continuing to exert divine power, as an ordinance adapted to excite it.

5. God's purpose concerning election is unchangeable; this VOL. I.

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is the result of his being infinitely perfect. Mutability is an imperfection that belongs only to creatures: As it would be an instance of imperfection, if there were the least change in God's understanding, so as to know more or less than he did from all eternity; the same must be said with respect to his will, which cannot admit of any new determinations. There are, indeed, many changes in the external dispensations of his providence, which are the result of his will, as well as the effects of his power; yet there is not the least appearance of mutability in his purpose. We have before considered, in speaking concerning the immutability of the divine nature *, that whatever may be a reason obliging men to alter their purposes, it cannot, in the least, take place, so that God hereby should be obliged to alter his No unforseen occurrence can render it expedient for him to change his mind, nor can any superior power oblige him to do it; nor can any defect of power, to bring about what he had designed, induce him to alter his purpose.

If it be objected to this, that the obstinacy of man's will may do it; that is to suppose his will exempted from the governing influence of divine providence, and the contrary force, that of fers resistance, superior to it, which cannot be supposed, without detracting from the glory of the divine perfections. It would be a very unworthy thought for any one to conclude that God is one day of one mind, and another day forced to be of the contrary; how far this is a necessary consequence from that scheme of doctrine that we are opposing, let any one judge. It will be very hard to clear it of this entanglement, which they are obliged to do, or else all the absurdities that they fasten on the doctrine of election, which are far from being unanswerable, will not be sufficient to justify their prejudices against it.

They who are on the other side of the question, are sensible that they have one difficulty to conflict with, namely, the inconsistency of God's infallible knowledge of future events, with a mutability of will relating thereunto; or how the independency of the divine fore-knowledge is consistent with the dependence and mutability of his will. To fence against this, some have ventured to deny the divine prescience; but that is to split against one rock, whilst endeavouring to avoid another. Therefore others distinguish concerning the objects of the divine prescience, and consider them, either as they are necessary or contingent, and accordingly suppose that God has a certain foreknowledge of the former; but his knowledge of the latter, (from the nature of the things known) is uncertain, and consequently the determination of his will is not unalterable. But this is to set bounds to the fore-knowledge of God, with respect to its object, and, indeed, to exclude the free actions of the creature See page 137.