to exercife dominion over his property while he lives, is not well founded.

If men lived only for themfelves, this propofition might indeed be granted. But it may be asked, Why should not the domi nion over his property be as extenfive, as the affections of his mind are enlarged? As his affections and wishes extend to the care of pofterity, why fhould not his power over his property be coextenfive for their benefit? Such principles are furely most

natural.

It is to no purpose to argue, that it is vain to make difpofitions concerning property, which the difpofer cannot protect, and which his furvivors who might, will not: for his inability, and their difinclination to carry the will into execution, only prove, that in a State of Nature there is no method of compelling men to do what in confcience ought to be done. But this does not at all invalidate the opinion of Grotius, that the right of making a will is a Right of Nature.

•

Besides, Puffendorf allows that fuch dif positions are not repugnant to the Law of Nature, but he doubts whether they neceffarily refult from the nature of dominion maatbâì ei porast over property

But Pufendorf admits, however, that there is nothing which prohibits one from transferring his property to another, at the fame time referving a particular right to himself while he lives t. But he proceeds and fays,-The question is not fo much about fuch difpofitions, as concerning wills by which a proprietor difpofes of his pro2 perty, and at the fame time retains the liberty of altering his will to the laft smoment, fo that the right of the heir does not

Nemo facile adferuerit juri naturæ repugnare, ut quis poffit de fuis rebus difponere, eo tempore, quo dominus eft, et effectum conferre in tempus quo futurus dominus non fit; ita ut hoc ex dominii natura a néceffaria aliqua ratione refultet, haud quidquam adparet. Puff. de Jur. Nat. & Gent.

Nihil prohibet quo minus quis dominium rei fu sinualium poffit transferre, recepto tamen fibi certo in eam rem jure quoad in vivis fuerit. / Idem.is: onom

commence

commence till after the death of the tefta

Now, it must be confeffed, that this dif ference is fo extremely nice, that it feems difficult to conceive any reasonable ground for the diftinction. The foundation of it, however, feems to reft on the exception which Puffendorf makes to the definition of a testament given by Grotius, which the latter confiders as a fpecies of alienation. Confidered as fuch, it must be allowed, that a transfer to another, with a refervation of a particular right, is more ftrictly a mode of alienation. But if we confider a teftament as Puffendorf, after the Roman lawyers, chooses to define it, to be nothing more than a declaration of our will with regard to the fucceffion to our eftate, which we may at any time at our pleasure alter

ar

and revoke, fo as to make the right com

Non tam de hujufmodi ultimis difpofitionibus quæftio eft, quam de illis teftamentis, quibus quis ita de fuis rebus difponit, ut libertatem tamen ea mutandi ad ultimum fpiritum retineat, utque hæredi demum a morte teftatoris jus in ipfius bona incipiat nasci.

Puff. de Jur. Nat. & Gent.

mence

mence after our death; confidering a tef tament in this fenfe, I fay, there feems to be no reason why a proprietor may not make a difpofition to take effect after his death, with power of revocation, as well as make a transfer to take effect in his life, time, with power of refervation. The one, though not fo ftrictly a mode of alienation, is as natural and neceffary a confequence of the dominion over property as the other; for, in a State of Nature, all means are ne ceffary which promote the end dictated by reason.

Though the teftamentary right, however, be a Right of Nature, yet it has been a question, whether it may be extended fo far as to juftify the difinheriting of children, Moft writers, however, have agreed that children may be difinherited, and their conclufion feems to be grounded on reason....

* Declarationem voluntatis noftræ circa fucceffores in bona nostra poft mortem noftram; quæ tamen ante mortem pro libitu noftro fit mutabilis & revocabilis, et ex qua aliis demum ab excessu noftro jus nafcatur. Puff. de Jur. Nat. & Gent.

If a child difcards all duty to a parent, and proves enormously and habitually abane: doned, flagitious, and unnatural, he may justly be difinherited. His expectations of fucceeding to his father's property arise al together from the reciprocal obligations and duties between parent and child; and if he breaks afunder the bonds of nature, it is juft reason that he fhould forfeit the benefits refulting from thefe tender ties. Grotius, however, is of opinion, that a difinherited child is entitled to aliment, unless he has deferved death. Upon which Puffendorf obferves, That he can scarce conceive how a fon can deferve disherifon or death, who is in fuch a period of life as to have a claim of aliment from his pa

rents

By this objection, however, Puffendorf feems to confine the word alimenta to fubfiftence due to fuch only as are in an infant ftate, which furely Grotius could never in

Etfi vix videam qua ratione exhæredationem aut -mortem mereri queat filius, in tali ætate conftitutus in qua ipfi a parente naturaliter alimenta debeantur.

tend,