and studies or occupations are supposed to have rendered them peculiarly skillful concerning questions which arise in trials, and which belong to some particular calling or profession. We take the opinions of physicians in this case for the same reason we resort to them in our own cases out of court, because they are believed to be better able to form a correct opinion, upon a subject within the scope of their studies and practice, than men in general, and therefore better than those who compose your panel; but these opinions, though proper for your respectful consideration, and entitled to have, in your hands, all that weight which reasonably and justly belong to them, are nevertheless not binding on you, against your own judgment, but should be weighed, and, especially where they differ, compared by you, and such effect allowed to them as you think right, not forgetting that on you alone rests the responsibility of a correct verdict. Besides these opinions, upon cases assumed by the counsel, which you may find to correspond more or less nearly with the actual case on trial, the physicians have also described to you the symptoms of the disease of delirium tremens. They all agree that it is a disease of a very distinct and strongly marked character, and as little liable to be mistaken as any known in medicine. All the physicians have described it in substantially the same way. I will read from my notes. that given by Dr. Bell. He says the symptoms are: "(1) Delirium, taking the form of apprehensiveness on the part of the patient. He is fearful of something,—fears pursuit by officers or foes. Sometimes demons and snakes are about him. In the earlier stages, in attempting to escape from his imaginary pursuers, he will attack others, as well as injure himself; but he is much more apprehensive of receiving injury than desirous of inflicting it, except to escape, He is generally timid and irresolute, and easily pacified and controlled. (2) Sleeplessness. I believe delirium tremens cannot exist without this. (3) Tremulousness, especially of the hands, but showing itself in the limbs and the tongue. (4) After a time sleep occurs, and reason thus returns. I do not recall any instance where sleep came on in less than three days, dating from the last sleep. At first it is rather broken, not giving full relief; and this is followed by a very profound sleep, lasting six or eight hours, from which the patient awakes sane." Dr. Stedman, who, from his care of the marine hospital at Chelsea, and of the city hospital at South Boston, has had great experience in the treatment of this disease, after describing its symptoms substantially as Dr. Bell did, says its access may be very sudden, and he has often known it first to manifest itself by the patient's attacking those about him, regarding them as enemies; that it is in accordance with his experience that a case may terminate within two days of the time when the delirium first manifests itself, and that it rarely lasts

more than four days; that he has arrested the disease in forty-eight hours by the use of sulphuric ether.

Taking along with you these accounts of the symptoms and course and termination of this disease, you will inquire whether the evidence proves these symptoms existed in this case; and whether the previous habits and the intemperate use of ardent spirits, from which this disease. springs, are shown; and whether the recovery of the prisoner corresponded with the course and termination of the disease of delirium tremens, as described by the physicians. In respect to the previous intemperance of the prisoner, and the symptoms, course, and termination of the disease, you are to look to the accounts of the conduct and acts of the prisoner, given by his shipmates. Their testimony will be fresh in your recollection, and it is not necessary for me to detail it. How recently before the homicide had he slept? Was his demeanor, for two or three days previous, natural, or was he restless? Was any tremor of the hands or limbs visible, and, if so, was it very marked or not? Did he utter any exclamations manifesting apprehensiveness before or immediately after the act? When, and under what circumstances, did he recover his reason, if he was delirious, and especially did he recover it without sleep? These are all important inquiries to be made by you, and answered as a careful consideration of the evidence may convince you they should be answered.

It is not denied, on the part of the government, that the prisoner had drank intemperately of the ardent spirits of the country during some days before the occurrence. But the district attorney insists that he had continued so to drink down to a short time before the homicide, and that, when he struck the blow, it was in a fit of drunken madness; and this renders it necessary for me to instruct you concerning the law upon the state of facts which the prosecutor asserts existed. Although delirium tremens is the product of intemperance, and therefore, in some sense, is voluntarily brought on, yet it is distinguishable, and by the law is distinguished, from that madness which sometimes accompanies drunkenness. If a person suffering under delirium tremens is so far insane as I have described to be necessary to render him irresponsible, the law does not punish him for any crime he may commit; but if a person commits crime under the immediate influence of liquor, and while intoxicated, the law does punish him, however mad he may have been. It is no excuse, but rather an aggravation, of his offense, that he first deprived himself of his reason before he did the act. You would easily see that there would be no security for life or property if men were allowed to commit crimes with impunity, provided they would first make themselves drunk enough to cease to be reasonable beings. And therefore it is an inquiry of great

importance in this case, and, in the actual state of the evidence, I think one of no small difficulty, whether this homicide was committed while the prisoner was suffering under that marked and settled disease of delirium tremens, or in a fit of drunken madness. My instruction to you is that, if the prisoner, while sane and responsible, made himself intoxicated, and, while intoxicated, committed a murder by reason of insanity, which was one of the consequences of that intoxication, and one of the attendants on that state, then he is responsible in point of law, and must be punished. This is as clearly the law of the land as the other rule, which exempts from punishment acts done under delirium tremens. It may sometimes be difficult to determine under which rule, in point of fact, the accused comes. Perhaps you will think it not easy to determine it in this case. But it is the duty of the jury to ascertain from the evidence on which side of the line this case falls, and to decide accordingly. It may be very material for you to know on which party is the burden of proof in this part of the case. I have already told you that it is incumbent on the prisoner to satisfy you he was insane when he struck the blow, for the reason that, as men in general are sane, the law presumes each man to be so till the contrary is proved; but if the contrary has been. proved, if you are satisfied the prisoner was insane, the law does not presume his insanity arose from any particular cause, and it is incumbent on the party which asserts that it did arise from a particular cause, and that the prisoner is guilty by law because it arose from that cause, to make out this necessary element in the charge to the same extent as every other element in it; for the charge then assumes this form: that the prisoner committed a murder for which, though insane, he is responsible, because his insanity was produced by and accompanied a state of intoxication. In my judgment, the government must satisfy you of these facts, which are necessary to the guilt of the prisoner in point of law, provided you are convinced he was insane. You will look carefully at all the evidence bearing on this question, and, if you are convinced that the prisoner was insane to that extent which I have described as necessary to render him irresponsible, you will acquit him, unless you are also convinced his insanity was produced by intoxication, and accompanied that state, in which case you will find him guilty.

(Delivered in the House of Lords, February 4, 1767)

(This case arose out of a plan to build a new mansion house for the lord mayor of London at the expense of dissenters. It was proposed to levy contributions upon the wealth of the dissenters by means of a municipal by-law imposing a fine of £600 on any person who should be elected sheriff and decline to serve. Some wealthy dissenter was chosen sheriff, and, as the test and corporation acts rendered him incapable of serving, he was compelled to decline. He was then fined £600, under the by-law. After numerous appointments had been made, and £15,000 actually paid in, Allan Evans, who had been selected as a victim, refused to pay the fine. In an action by the city to recover the fine, he pleaded his rights under the toleration act, but judgment was rendered against him. On appeal to the court of common pleas, this judgment was reversed, whereupon the city took the case before the house of lords. The judges of the court of king's bench were consulted, and all but one were of the opinion that Evans' plea was a good defense. In moving judgment in the house of lords, Lord Mansfield made the following speech. Judgment was entered in accordance with Lord Mansfield's motion.-From note in Veeder's "Legal Masterpieces," p. 9.)

MY LORDS: As I made the motion for taking the opinion of the learned judges, and proposed the question your lordships have been pleased to put to them, it may be expected that I should make some further motion, in consequence of the opinions they have delivered.

In moving for the opinion of the judges, I had two views. The first was that the house might have the benefit of their assistance in forming a right judgment in this cause now before us, upon this writ of error. The next was that, the question being fully discussed, the grounds of our judgment, together with their exceptions, limitations, and restrictions, might be clearly and certainly known, as a rule to be followed hereafter in all future cases of the like nature; and this determined me as to the manner of wording the question, "How far the defendant might, in the present case, be allowed to plead his disability in bar of the action brought against him?"

WILLIAM MURRAY (LORD MANSFIELD). Born at Scone, Scotland, March 2, 1705; died in London, March 20, 1793; called to the bar in Lincoln Inn, London, in 1731; 1753 became attorney general; 1756 was made Chief Justice of the King's bench, and raised to the peerage; 1776 was created Earl of Mansfield.

The question thus worded shows the point upon which your lordships thought this case turned; and the answer necessarily fixes a criterion under what circumstances, and by what persons, such a disability may be pleaded as an exemption from the penalty inflicted by this by-law upon those who decline taking upon them the office of sheriff.

In every view in which I have been able to consider this matter, I think this action cannot be supported.

1. If they rely on the corporation act, by the literal and express provision of that act no person can be elected who hath not within a year taken the sacrament in the Church of England. The defendant hath not taken the sacrament within a year; he is not, therefore, elected. Here they fail.

If they ground it on the general design of the legislature in passing the corporation act, the design was to exclude dissenters from office, and disable them from serving; for in those times, when a spirit of intolerance prevailed, and severe measures were pursued, the dissenters were reputed and treated as persons ill affected and dangerous to the government. The defendant, therefore, a dissenter, and in the eye of this law a person dangerous and ill affected, is excluded from office and disabled from serving. Here they fail.

If they ground the action on their own by-law, that by-law was professedly made to procure fit and able persons to serve the office; and the defendant is not fit and able, being expressly disabled by statute law. Here, too, they fail.

If they ground it on his disability's being owing to a neglect of taking the sacrament at church when he ought to have done it, the toleration act having freed the dissenters from all obligation to take the sacrament at church, the defendant is guilty of no neglect, no criminal neglect, Here, therefore, they fail.

These points, my lords, will appear clear and plain.

2. The corporation act, pleaded by the defendant as rendering him ineligible to this office, and incapable of taking it upon him, was most certainly intended by the legislature to prohibit the persons therein described being elected to any corporation offices, and disable them from taking such offices upon them. The act had two parts: First, it appointed a commission for turning out all that were at that time in office who would not comply with what was required as the condition of their continuance therein, and even gave a power to turn them out though they should comply; and then it further enacted that, from the termination of that commission, no person hereafter who had not taken the sacrament according to the rites of the Church of England within one year preceding the time of such election should be placed, chosen, or elected into