Emperor Alexander? It was consequently in this very revolution that Naples should have sought its salvation: it was only by rousing the whole Peninsula, that Southern Italy could ensure the establishment of its own liberties. The remembrance of the unfortunate enterprise of Joachim Murat, should not have prevented another attempt; times were altered. Although Italy did not attend to the call of a foreigner, remarkable for the imbecility of his political character, it might have risen at the summons of the Neapolitan people become free, and inviting their brethren to liberty.

There is still another fault alleged by some against the Neapolitans. I refer to their choice of the Spanish constitution. It is not our business here to discuss its advantages or defects, still less to blame the Spaniards who proclaimed it in 1820: they were bound to rally round it, as a precious model consecrated by the approval of a national assembly, whose noble courage did not suffer them to despair of their country in the hour of calamity. But the Neapolitans possessed also a model, which perhaps they were wrong in neglecting, I mean the Sicilian constitution. This constitution, but little known in Europe, is no other than the written English constitution, but the English constitution without that inequality in the right of election, and without those remains of feudality, which impair its symmetry. It was more popular than the French charter; either because the exclusive proposal or introduction of laws did not form part of the Royal prerogative, or on account of its elective regulations, and the broad basis on which the municipalities were organised. It would have been easy to divest it of certain defects of form and detail, not well adapted to its general tenor. By adopting it, Naples would in the first place have had the advantage of avoiding its sanguinary contests with Sicily, which shocked Europe, and afflicted Italy. Naples might besides have reasonably reckoned on the support of England and France by ranging herself under the same constitutional system. This last advantage appears so important, more especially in the situation of the Neapolitans, that it is surprising they should have renounced it so lightly. This is difficult to account for, unless we ascribe it to a kind of terror in the aristocracy—a terror which spread itself through Italy by means of the writings and discourses of the liberal party of France. But was not this a false alarm? The French had, and they have still to dread, a menacing aristocracy, which was invested with great power under the ancient monarchy, which but ill dissembles its lofty pretensions, which has heavy misfortunes to recount, and odious reprisals (réactions) to charge themselves with; an aristocracy, in short, which in its turn assumes the shape of a party, and is formidable from the

distinguished talents of many of the individuals composing it. Nothing of this kind existed in Italy, where the nobility possesses no influence, but such as arises from the favors it obtains from arbitrary power, or from the attachment of a portion of its body to liberal ideas and to the interests of the people. The nobles of the first-mentioned class would have fallen with the absolute monarchy, which constitutes their only force; and it is not from the latter description that Italians had any thing to fear.

If the Liberals of Piedmont did not all view with pleasure the constitutional system adopted by the Neapolitans, the greater part of them were persuaded that their revolution would become one of those great occasions offered by Providence to oppressed nations, of re-appearing with honor on the arena of politics. Others thought that Italy was not yet prepared for a war of independence. Information, said they, has as yet only reached to certain classes of society; the young, however devoted to their country, can as yet but offer the aid of their physical strength; hereafter, when filling the principal employments in the community, and possessed of property, they will find themselves naturally and effectively at the head of a revolution. That might be all very true; but the first step was taken. The Neapolitans had claimed their rights-they were our brothers; we could not abandon them, without at once failing in our duty and injuring the national honor. There began, however, to detach itself from the great majority of Piedmontese of whom I have spoken above, and who glowed with desire for a war of Italian independence, a set of people who, placing no reliance in the Neapolitans, and judging of the future from the past, were persuaded that their armies would not be able to oppose the slightest resistance. We were more confident; indeed it was not in our nature to foresee the events that have happened.

The differences of opinion among the Piedmontese Liberals on the constitution best suited to their country, did not prevent a sinçere union in the endeavours they used to enlighten the King's Government with respect to its situation. An address of the Piedmontese people to the King, and a short pamphlet intitled Duties of the Piedmontese,' were rapidly circulated at Turin; I regret that I cannot give them publicity. It would be seen with what affection they speak of the King and his family; with what truth the internal disorders of the country are therein pourtrayed, and with what indignation the idea of seeing the house of Savoy promote the designs of Austria on Italy is treated. These pamphlets were printed in Naples and in Spain, and showed at once the moderation and energy that were employed amongst us in the expression of public opinion. It was observable that the wish for a free constitution was strongly marked, but that its principles

were set forth in such a manner as to wound none of those opinions by which we were divided.

A strong sensation had been produced by the Neapolitan revolution. One and the same desire might be read in every eye; the most sensible people conceived and declared openly, that a revolution could only be prevented by the spontaneous promulgation of a constitution. The Liberals neglected no means of apprising the King of his real situation. He might yet take the lead of public opinion in Piedmont; but there was no time to lose. A single word would have won every heart; but it was necessary that he should declare himself. The King's Council assembled, and discussed the grand question. It was publicly asserted that Victor Emmanuel had said: "If my subjects are really desirous of a constitution, I have no wish but to satisfy them." Our hearts leaped for joy; but, alas! a moment put an end to our hopes. I know not whether any one in the Council raised his voice in behalf of his country; I only know too well, that the result of their deliberations proved that the wishes of the Piedmontese had been either mistaken or despised.

The King, about this time, married his daughter to the Prince of Lucca. On occasion of the marriage festivities which took place at Turin, the Court surrounded itself with an imposing military array, and took precautions which indicated alarm, at the same time that they offended the Piedmontese, who had always been remarkable for their attachment to the King's person, even when they blamed his government. Accordingly the people received the Court with a gloomy silence.

Victor Emmanuel was unaccustomed to such mournful countenances, and must have felt himself chagrined. And possibly this feeling might have given rise to resolutions that would have saved the country. But a bold step was indispensable on our part; it was necessary to destroy the illusions with which the whole Court and many of the ministers had encompassed the King; it was necessary that petitions should pour in from every quarter, conveying to the foot of the throne the real grievances of the nation. Doubtless those who were the first to sign, might have expected to be shut up in a state prison: but the multiplication of such proceedings would have opened the eyes of the prince, and prevented a revolution. The people of property in Piedmont have shown themselves deficient in political courage, and every day furnishes them fresh cause for repentance.

There was no time for delay. The warlike preparations of Austria, the energy of the Neapolitan Parliament, in short every thing concurred in giving an impulse to public opinion. The moment had arrived for pointing out to the Piedmontese army the

line of their duty. A printed proclamation was circulated through all the Piedmontese garrisons, with a rapidity which should have taught the Government that the friends of liberty were numerous and active.

The Neapolitan Parliament having preserved the Spanish Constitution with scarce any alteration, and having indignantly rejected the overtures of the King, which were founded on the principles of the French Charter, the Piedmontese Liberals rallied in great numbers around a constitution which five millions of Italians had sworn to support, and which the Emperor of Austria had sworn to detroy. They would have considered themselves as wanting in their first duty to their country if, from an obstinate attachment to political theories, they had presented to that country the spectacle of Italian Liberals divided among themselves, at a time when unity was the only means of salvation.

There were, however, among the Liberal party those who did not renounce the hope of establishing a more monarchical constitution in Piedmont, up to the moment that the news reached Turin of the Austrians having crossed the Po. It then became the duty of all to unite under one banner. All those in whose bosoms the love of country reigned paramount, all those who could not endure to remain inactive at a moment which was to decide the great question of national independence, met together, and became friends. Never were oaths less necessary to insure fidelity amongst persons acting in confederacy.

Two parties of Liberals, indeed, refused to enter the same ranks. The first of these parties considered that the oath of the soldier was an obstacle to the indestructible duty of the citizen: they shut their eyes, lest they should see that the honor of the Sovereign in this instance required a great resolution on the part of the army. There are extraordinary circumstances of which we cannot form a judgment but at a certain distance of time, and a man must place himself at that point either by the force of his genius, or of an imagination inflamed with the love of his country. The House of Savoy was about to run the risk, either of obtaining immortal glory together with a great accession of power, or of falling under

Those who have written on our revolution, have affected to repeat that the Piedmontese Noblesse were drawn into it from the alluremeut of an hereditary peerage. This vulgar accusation bears falsity on the face of it, since all those members of the Noblesse who took an active part in the revolution had joined the party that espoused the Spanish constitution. Some persons, as I have observed, only gave up the English parliamentary system owing to the force of circumstances; but it was precisely those whose position in society must have prevented their aspiring to the peerage-the Count Santa Rosa for instance, who was neither of high birth nor possessed the fortune requisite for that dignity.

more did the Prince appear to attach himself to the Italian cause. How many times have we asked each other, whether this young man could be relied on! Undoubtedly there were many things against him; and the bias of the heart, which rarely deceives, did not speak in his favor. But, men who had resolved not to lose the present occasion of trying to rouse Italy, were little disposed to listen to an unfavorable presentiment. We did not expect to find in Charles Albert a Count Verd or a Prince Eugene; but if any one had foretold to us that which has happened, we should have treated his predictions as a senseless dream.

Prince Carignan was rather popular; he sent assistance to the young people wounded on the 12th January, and showed great indignation against an officer reported to have sabred a student who had offended him. In his post of Master of Artillery, which he had filled for some time, Charles Albert appeared to pay assiduous attention to the training of this description of force, as well as to the administration of the arsenal; which the public, and more especially the military, observed with great satisfaction.

But the moment had arrived for the Prince to take a decided part; and this was announced to him by the Chevalier de Collegno. The Marquis Charles de Saint Marsan, a Colonel in the army, and eldest son of the minister for Foreign Affairs, had already spoken to him with warmth on the situation of Italy, and had not concealed from him the necessity of the Piedmontese Revolution.'

Charles de Saint-Marsan was well calculated to promote the progress of a great enterprise. This young man, too little appreciated in his country, calumniated by many precisely because he despised calumny, united with a sentiment of personal affection for Victor Emmanuel, to whom he was Aide-de-camp, a devotedness to his country, and a lofty desire for true glory, which was the idol of his soul. Accustomed to view things from an elevated point, he formed a just judgment of the situation of the country, and saw clearly that there are circumstances in which it becomes a duty to serve one's Sovereign in spite of himself. This principle once settled in his mind, his moral courage and ardor of character did the rest.

Never did this noble ardor appear so conspicuously as on the 6th March. Our measures were taken. We knew the men whom the dangers of commencing a revolution would not affright; we knew who would never have turned their arms against us, and

It was Prince Carignan who made the first overtures to Marquis Charles de St. Marsan; it was he who, on the 1st January, at court, called the Colonel aside to discourse on the affairs of Italy, assuming an air of anxiety, and appearing like a man impatient to act some conspicuous part.