reflecting mind, be highly important; but, as many vague and incorrect opinions have been formed respecting it, we shall endeavour to ascertain how far the Divine Being extends his notice to human affairs. Does his providence relate only to a general superintendence of the laws of nature; or to the particular concerns of individuals?

With respect to a merely general superintendence, we may observe, that the advocates of this notion do not pretend to have arrived at any certain knowledge of the correctness of their own theory: therefore, although they may presume to determine the exact limits of the Divine superintendence, they cannot be sure that it does not extend to other objects beside the laws of matter and motion; and, unless advised from Heaven to the contrary, they cannot be sure that it does not extend to the concerns of empires, societies, and private persons. When men deny the authority of Scripture, with reference to this or any other theological question, they forsake the only infallible directory, and place their trust in conjectures, which, how ingenious soever, are likely to be as far from the truth as the reveries of the Koran, or the fables of Brahmanism. But, suppose this idea of providence were admitted, in what sense could we regard the Divine Being as the

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Governor of mankind, and what inducements could we have to seek his favour, or to rely on his protection? How could events transpire with regularity; and how, if liable to the fluctuations and heterogeneous combinations of chance, could they tend to any desirable issue? Some issue is certainly designed, unless we imagine the Supreme Intelligence to have constructed the universe in vain. But how could events be conducive to any intended result, if they were merely fortuitous, and, consequently, excluded from the superintendence of the Creator?

Although we would not, on any account, attribute to opinions consequences which the abettors of those opinions disavow, yet it is almost impossible not to observe the tendency of this notion to efface the idea of Divine Providence altogether; and to increase that criminal forgetfulness of God which has so long degraded the majority of our species. Other errors have made only a partial attack on the Creator; but this, with undisguised effrontery, has lifted up its voice against his throne and his sceptre, and has attempted to exclude him from his own dominions.

In endeavouring to establish the doctrine of Providence agreeably to the views we have stated, we shall consider it,

1. In connexion with the grandeur of the Deity.

This topic has been frequently urged by the enemies of the truth against a particular providence. They have imagined, that God, to act consistently with his glorious nature, must leave the universe to the regulation of certain laws, to which they suppose he gave existence at the creation; and that, at most, he attends to the great outlines of nature, without interfering at all with its minuter parts. But why should the sublimity of the Creator be deemed an objection to the universality of his providence? What inconsistency is there between the loftiness of his throne and the exercise of his care over all his works? Why should the most diminutive portions of the great system be regarded as too insignificant for his notice? Why should the affairs of families and of individuals be placed beyond the precincts of his observation? To a finite being, indeed, an accurate survey of a very limited portion of the globe would be impossible, because his natural powers are inadequate to the task. A multiplicity of concerns quickly oppresses and distracts the most powerful of created minds: the application which those concerns demand, so attenuates the human faculties, (if the expression be allowable,) as eventually to enfeeble

and impair them. But no degree of attention, no variety of objects, can bewilder an infinite Being: nor is it imagined, I presume, by those with whom we are at issue, that the Supreme Intelligence is unable to extend his regards to the obscurest person, or the smallest particle of matter in the creation. No; they affirm that their views of the Creator are not less lofty and glorious than those which we derive from the sacred writings. They acknowledge that his power is equal to every possible operation; that his knowledge, whatever its real extent may be, is, at least, capable of comprehending all things that actually exist. If so, no reason can arise from himself, why he should not be acquainted with the circumstances, the conduct, and even with the thoughts of every individual in his dominions; and why he should not arrange and control all things which relate either to the destiny of empires, or the less important affairs of private life. Since, then, it is conceded, that God is able to extend his notice and care to the inferior portions of his dominions; we maintain, that his ability, or, in other language, the grandeur of his perfections, is an argument for the doctrine of a particular providence. To oppose the condescension of God to his majesty, and to allege, that the extension of his parental care to the lowest classes

of being would be inconsistent with his dignity, were worse than trifling; for, it must be obvious, that his greatness is infinitely more apparent, and that it is more impressively exhibited, in his minute and unremitting attention to the concerns of every individual of the human race, and in his immediate superintendence of every event, whether great or small, than it could be in the blind operation of fixed laws. And, indeed, when it is considered, that the Almighty erected the frame of the universe, and formed the several orders of intelligent. creatures for some vast and remote end, by which the wisdom, equity, and benevolence of his government might be displayed in the most advantageous manner, it seems absolutely necessary that he should manage and conduct all events which have the slightest bearing on that end; and, as all events may be connected more or less with such as are selected for that high destination, it seems equally necessary. that they also should be subject to the same Divine control.

What, I would ask, is there in this view of Divine Providence, that is not perfectly compatible with the sublimity of the Creator? If, in order to acquaint himself with human affairs, he were necessitated to leave the abode of his glory; and to pass successively from one scene