coarsest kind; and of these they have only a weak and confused impression; while in others, taste rises to an acute discernment, and a lively enjoyment of the most refined beauties.

This inequality of taste among men is to be ascribed undoubtedly in part, to the different frame of their natures; to nicer organs, and more delicate internal powers, with which some are endued beyond others; yet it is owing still more to culture and education. Taste is certainly one of the most improvable faculties of our nature. We may easily be convinced of the truth of this assertion, by only reflecting on that immense superiority, which education and improvement give to civilized, above barbarous nations, in refinement of taste; and on the advantage, which they give in the same nation, to those who have studied the liberal arts, above the rude and illiterate vulgar.

Reason and good sense have so extensive an influence on all the operations and decisions of taste, that a completely good taste may well be considered, as a power compounded of natural sensibility to beauty, and of improved understanding: To be satisfied of this, we may observe, that the greater part of the productions of genius are no other than imitations of nature representations of the characters, actions, or manners of men. Now the pleasure we experience from such imitations or representations, is founded on mere taste; but to judge, whether they may be properly executed, belongs to the understanding, which compares the сору with the original.

In reading, for instance, the Eneid of Virgil, a great part of our pleasure arises from the proper conduct of the plan or story; from all the parts being joined to

To what is this inequality of taste to be ascribed? Is taste an improvable faculty?-How may we be convinced of this?

What influence do reason and good sense have upon the operations and decisions of taste? How may we be satisfied of this?-Illustrate.

gether with probability and due connection; from the adoption of the characters from nature, the correspondence of the sentiments to the characters, and of the style to the sentiments. The pleasure, which is derived from a poem so conducted, is felt or enjoyed by taste, as an internal sense; but the discovery of this conduct in the poem is owing to reason; and the more reason enables us to discover such propriety in the conduct, the greater will be our pleasure.

The constituents of taste, when brought to its most perfect state, are two, delicacy and correctness.

Delicacy of taste refers principally to the perfection of that natural sensibility, on which taste is founded. It implies those finer organs or powers, which enable us to discover beauties, that are concealed from a vulgar eye. It is judged of by the same marks, that we employ in judging of the delicacy of an external sense. As the goodness of the palate is not tried by strong flavours, but by a mixture of ingredients, where, notwithstanding the confusion, we remain sensible of each; so delicacy of internal taste appears, by a quick and lively sensibility to its finest, most compounded, or most latent objects.

Correctness of taste respects the improvement this faculty receives through its connection with the understanding. A man of correct taste is one, who is never imposed on by counterfeit beauties; who carries always, in his own mind, that standard of good sense, which he employs in judging of every thing. He estimates with propriety the relative merit of the several beauties which he meets in any work of genius; refers them to their proper classes; assigns the principles, as far as they can be traced, whence their

How many are the constituents of taste?-What are they?

What does delicacy of taste refer to principally?-What does it imply?-How is it judged of?

What is correctness of taste?-What is a man of correct taste?

power of pleasing is derived; and is pleased himself precisely in that degree, in which he ought, and no more.

Taste is certainly not an arbitrary principle, which is subject to the fancy of every individual, and which admits no criterion for determining, whether it be true or false. Its foundation is the same in every human mind. It is built upon sentiments and perceptions, which are inseparable from our nature; and which generally operate with the same uniformity as our other intellectual principles. When these sentiments are perverted by ignorance or prejudice, they may be rectified by reason. Their sound and natural state is finally determined by comparing them with the general taste of mankind. Let men declaim as much as they please, concerning the caprice and uncertainty of taste; it is found by experience, that there are beauties, which, if displayed in a proper light, have power to command lasting and universal admiration. every composition, what interests the imagination, and touches the heart, gives pleasure to all ages and nations. There is a certain string, which being properly struck, the human heart is so made, as to accord to it.

In

Hence the universal testimony, which the most improved nations of the earth, through a long series of ages, have concurred to bestow on some few works of genius; such as the Iliad of Homer, and the Eneid of Virgil. Hence the authority which such works have attained, as standards of poetical composition; since by them we are enabled to collect, what the sense of mankind is, with respect to those beauties, which give them the highest pleasure, and which there

Is taste an arbitrary principle?

Is its foundation the same in every mind?-What is it built upon?-How do they operate?-How may these sentiments be rectified when perverted?-How is their sound and natural state determined?-What may men do? What is found by experience?

What is adduced in proof of this?-What may authority or prejudice do?-How are his faults discovered?-What is seen?-What does time do?

fore, poetry ought to exhibit. Authority or prejudice may, in one age or country, give a short lived reputation to an indifferent poet, or a bad artist; but when foreigners or posterity examine his works, his faults are discovered, and the genuine taste of human nature is seen. Time overthrows the illusions of opinion, but establishes the decisions of nature.

LECTURE III.

CRITICISM.-GENIUS.-PLEASURES OF

TASTE.-SUBLIMITY IN OBJECTS.

TRUE criticism is the application of taste and of good sense to the several fine arts. Its design is to distinguish, what is beautiful, and what is faulty, in every performance. From particular instances it ascends to general principles, and gradually forms rules or conclusions concerning the several kinds of beauty in works of genius.

Criticism is an art founded entirely on experience; on the observation of such beauties as have been found to please mankind most generally. For example, Aristotle's rules concerning the unity of action in dramatic and epic composition, were not first discovered by logical reasoning, and then applied to poetry; but they were deduced from the practice of Homer and Sophocles. They were founded upon observing the superior pleasure which we derive from the relation of an action, which is one and entire, beyond what we receive from the relation of scattered and unconnected facts.

What is the subject of this lecture? What is true criticism? What is its design?-How does it ascend? What does it gradually form?

What is criticism founded on?-Example?

A superior genius, indeed, will of himself, uninstructed, compose in such manner as is agreeable to the most important rules of criticism; for, as these rules are founded in nature, nature will frequently suggest them in practice. Homer was acquainted with no system of the art of poetry. Guided by genius alone, he composed in verse a regular story, which all succeeding ages have admired. This, however, is no argument against the usefulness of criticism. For since no human genius is perfect there is no writer who may not receive assistance from critical observations upon the beauties and faults of those who have gone before him. No rules indeed can supply the defects of genius, or inspire it, where it is wanting; but they may often guide it into its proper channel; they may correct its extravagancies, and teach it the most just and proper imitation of nature. Critical rules are intended chiefly to point out the faults, which ought to be avoided. We must be indebted to nature for the production of eminent beauties.

GENIUS is a word which in common acceptation extends much further than to objects of taste. It signifies that talent or aptitude which we receive from nature, in order to excel in any one thing whatever. A man is said to have a genius for mathematics as well as a genius for poetry; a genius for war, for politics, or for any mechanical employment.

Genius may be greatly improved by art and study; but by them alone it cannot be acquired. As it is a higher faculty than taste, it is ever, according to the common frugality of nature, more limited in the sphere

What is said of a superior genius?-What is said of Homer? Why is this no argument against the usefulness of criticism?-What cannot rules do? What may they do?—What are they intended for chiefly?—For what' must we be indebted to nature?

What is genius?

How may it be improved?-Can it be acquired by these? How does it differ from taste? What persons