B.

What difference then do you imagine it would have made in Mr. Locke's Effay, if he had fooner been aware of the infeparable connexion between words and knowledge; or, in the language of Sir Hugh, in Shakespeare, that "the "lips is parcel of the mind ?"

Much.

H.

And amongst many other things, I think he would not have talked of the compofition of ideas; but

"ciafcuno intendendo nella fua pura potenza, non poffon per tutte come lo "'ntelletto difcorrere. E ficcome il Principe, fenza lasciarsi vedere o fentire, fa noto altrui la fua volontà per mezzo degli steffi ministri; cofi an "cora l'Intelletto fa intenderfi per via de medefimi Senfi.”

"

*

BUONMATTEI. Tratt. 2. Cap. 2.

"Divers philofophers hold that the lips is parcel of the mind." Merry Wives of Windsor, A&t 1. Scene 4.

Rowland Jones agrees with his countryman, Sir Hugh Evans. In his Origin of Language and Nations," Preface, page 17, he fays (after others)" I think that Language ought not to be confidered as mere arbitrary founds; or any thing lefs than a part, at least, of that living foul "which God is faid to have breathed into man.” This method of referring words immediately to God as their framer, is a fhort cut to escape inquiry and explanation. It faves the philofopher much trouble; but leaves mankind in great ignorance, and leads to great error.-Non dignus vindice nodus.-God having furnished man with fenfes and with organs of articulation; as he has also with water, lime and fand; it should feem no more neceffary to form the words for man, than to temper the mortar.

would

would have feen that it was merely a contrivance of Language: and that the only compofition was in the terms; and consequently that it was as improper to speak of a complex idea, as it would be to call a constellation a complex ftar : And that they are not ideas, but merely terms, which are general and abstract. I think too that he would have seen the advantage of "thoroughly weighing" not only (as he fays)" the imperfections of Language ;" but its perfections alfo: For the perfections of Language, not properly understood, have been one of the chief caufes of the imperfections of our philosophy. And indeed, from numberless passages throughout his Effay, Mr. Locke feems to me to have suspected fomething of this fort: and especially from what he hints in his laft chapter; where, speaking of the doctrine of figns, he says-" The confideration then "of Ideas and Words, as the great instruments of know"ledge, makes no defpicable part of their contemplation "who would take a view of human knowledge in the "whole extent of it. And perhaps, if they were distinctly "weighed and duly confidered, they would afford us another "fort of Logick and Critick than what we have hitherto "been acquainted with."

B.

Do not you think that what you now advance will bear a difpute: and that fome better arguments than

your

your bare affertion are neceffary to make us adopt your opinion?

H.

Yes. To many perfons much more would be neceffary; but not to you. I only defire you to read the Effay over again with attention, and fee whether all that its immortal author has justly concluded will not hold equally true and clear, if you fubftitute the compofition, &c. of terms wherever he has fuppofed a compofition, &c. of ideas. And if that fhall upon ftrict examination appear to you to be the cafe, you will need no other argument against the compofition of Ideas: It being exactly fimilar to that unanswerable one which Mr. Locke himfelf declares to be

sufficient against their being innate. For the fuppofition is unneceffary: Every purpose for which the compofition of Ideas was imagined being more eafily and naturally answered by the compofition of Terms: whilft at the fame time it does likewife clear up many difficulties in which the fuppofed compofition of Ideas neceffarily involves us. And,' though this is the only argument I mean to use at prefent, (because I would not willingly digress too far, and it is not the neceffary foundation for what I have undertaken) yet I will venture to fay, that it is an eafy matter, upon Mr. Locke's own principles and a phyfical confideration of the

Senfes

Senfes and the Mind, to prove the impoffibility of the compofition of Ideas.

B.

Well. Since you do not intend to build any thing upon it, we may fafely for the present suppose what you have advanced; and take it for granted that the greatest part of Mr. Locke's Effay, that is, all which relates to what he calls the compofition, abstraction, complexity, generalization, relation, &c. of Ideas, does indeed merely concern Language. But, pray, let me afk you; If so, what has Mr. Locke done in the Third Book of his Effay? In which he professedly treats of the nature, use, and fignification of Languages ?

H.

He has really done little elfe but enlarge upon what he had faid before, when he thought he was treating only of Ideas: that is, he has continued to treat of the compofition of Terms. For though, in the paffage I have before quoted, he fays, that "unlefs the force and manner of "fignification of words are firft well obferved, there can "be very little faid clearly and pertinently concerning "knowledge;"—and though this is the declared reafon of writing his Third Book concerning Language, as diftin&t

from

from Ideas; yet he continues to treat fingly, as before, concerning the Force of words; and has not advanced one fyllable concerning their Manner of fignification.

The only Division Mr. Locke has made of words, is, into-Names of Ideas and Particles. This divifion is not made regularly and formally; but is reserved to his seventh Chapter. And even there it is done in a very cautious, doubting, loose, uncertain manner, very different from that incomparable author's usual method of proceeding. For, though the general title of the Seventh Chapter is,-Of Particles;—yet he seems to chufe to leave it uncertain whether he does or does not include Verbs in that title, and particularly what he calls "the Marks of the Mind's "affirming or denying." And indeed he himself acknowledges, in a letter to Mr. Molyneux, that—" Some parts "of that Third Book concerning Words, though the "thoughts were easy and clear enough, yet cost him more "pains to exprefs than all the rest of his Effay. And that "therefore he fhould not much wonder if there were in "fome parts of it obfcurity and doubtfulness." Now whenever any man finds this difficulty to express himself,

* The Force of a word depends upon the number of Ideas of which that word is the fign.

6