The Moral Philosophy of George BerkeleyUpon the whole, I am inclined to think that the far greater part, if not all, of those difficulties which have hitherto amused philosophers, and blocked up the way to knowledge, are entirely owing to our selves. That we have 1 first raised a dust, and then complain, we cannot see. . . . there are some passages that, taken by themselves, are very liable (nor could it be remedied) to gross misinterpretation, and to be charged with most absurd consequences, which, nevertheless, upon an entire perusal will 2 appear not to follow from them. In an effort to comply with these excellent principles of Berkeley's, I have tried to avoid complex language throughout this book, and to give all of his works the careful scrutiny he urges in order to avoid misplaced emphasis and quoting out of context. George Berkeley waS born in Dysert Castle, Thomastown, Kilkenny, Ireland, in 1685. He is among the best known of Western philosophers, but a brief sketch of the high points of his life might nonetheless be of some interest. His father William Berkeley was related to Lord Berkeley of Stratton, who was the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland from 1670 to 1672. His mother was probably related to General Wolfe, the conqueror of Montcalm in Canada. He was educated at Kilkenny School, and at Trinity College, Dublin, where he received Bachelor's and Master's degrees in 1704 and 1707 respectively. |
Contents
THE LANGUAGE OF THE AUTHOR OF NATURE | 10 |
2 SIGNS AND SYMBOLS SUGGESTION AND JUDGMENT | 20 |
3 FURTHER DEVELOPMENT AND NATURAL LAWS | 30 |
4 A THEORY OF TRUTH AND NATURAL LAWS | 38 |
UTILITARIAN AND RULEUTILITARIAN ELEMENTS IN BERKELEYS NORMATIVE ETHICS | 47 |
2 PASSIVE OBEDIENCE AND MORAL RULES | 56 |
IMPLICATIONS | 67 |
4 SOME RULEUTILITARIAN ELEMENTS | 76 |
2 MORE ABOUT BERKELEYS THEORY OF TRUTH | 139 |
3 AN IMPORTANT PASSAGE AND A WORKING EXAMPLE | 149 |
BERKELEY AND SHAFTESBURY | 154 |
1 SHAFTESBURYS ETHICAL SYSTEM | 155 |
2 MORE ABOUT MORAL SENSE AND ENTHUSIASM | 161 |
3 BERKELEY VERSUS SHAFTESBURY | 165 |
BERKELEY AND MANDEVILLE | 173 |
2 BERKELEY VERSUS MANDEVILLE | 179 |
5 A PRELIMINARY SUMMINGUP | 82 |
ETHICAL ACTS AND FREE WILL | 85 |
1 ACTS AND CONSEQUENCES | 87 |
2 FREE WILL | 91 |
3 OTHER EVIDENCE GUILT AND COMMENTS | 98 |
4 PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS | 102 |
THE ROLE OF GOD AND THE DEFINITION OF GOOD | 104 |
2 THE PROBABLE ARGUMENT | 110 |
3 ANOTHER KIND OF EVIDENCE AND THE MEANING OF GOOD | 117 |
4 CRITICISMS | 122 |
BERKELEY AND THE EMOTIVE USES OF ETHICAL LANGUAGE | 130 |
1 ABSTRACT GENERAL IDEAS AND THE FAMILIAR USES OF WORDS | 131 |
THE DEISTS | 184 |
1 THE PRINCIPLES OF DEISM | 185 |
2 SOME INDIVIDUAL DEISTS | 190 |
PETER BROWNE BERKELEY AND THE DEISTS | 204 |
2 BROWNE AND BERKELEY | 208 |
3 BERKELEY VERSUS THE DEISTS | 215 |
CONCLUSION | 223 |
2 DID BERKELEY HAVE A MORAL PHILOSOPHY? | 227 |
3 SOME GENERAL CRITICISMS | 232 |
238 | |
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abstract general ideas action agent Alciphron analogy Anthony Collins argued arguments attributes believe Berk Berkeley thought Berkeley's moral philosophy Berkeley's theory Berkeley's view Bernard de Mandeville C. D. Broad cause chapter claim Collins consequences consists criticisms Deists demonstration depends determinism discuss distinction divine effects emotive epistemology eternal ethics evidence evil example existence fact follows George Berkeley given God's happiness human inference judgments kinds knowledge laws of nature Lysicles Mandeville material substance mathematics matter means Melampus mental acts meta-ethical metaphor mind moral rules moral sense natural language natural laws natural world necessary notion objects ontology particular Passive Obedience perceived perception Peter Browne pleasures position principle problems properties propositions question rational reason relation religion remarks resemblance seems sensations Shaftesbury sign relations signify signs simply sort speaking substance theory theological theory of truth things tion Toland true understanding universal utilitarian vice well-being words