rewards and punishments. It condemns men as sinners, and rewards them as righteous. Their moral character is the only ground on which moral justice respects them. But sin and holiness are personal, and cannot be transferred in reality, so as to render the subjects of them any more or less worthy. The death of Christ therefore did not constitute the sinner any more deserving of happiness or any less worthy of punishment. Sin is sin still. It is not justified, nor is the guilt of it lessened. The road to ruin and the gate are as broad as ever. If any man has sinned, it will always remain a truth that he has sinned; and according to distributative justice he deserves punishment. But Christ did satisfy public justice. His death exhibited the law and the transgression of it in such a light that no injury would accrue to the moral system, and no imputation would lie against the moral Governor of the universe, should he pardon the sinner and admit him to heaven, or should he leave him to die in his sins. Perfect justice is therefore done to the universe, though all the transgressors be not punished according to their personal demerit.

Hence from the death of Christ nothing can be inferred as to the number that shall be finally saved. A way is made possible for the salvation of all men, and the penitent may be treated in a way of mercy. But the death of Christ, in itself considered, does not secure the salvation of any. Those who are saved, have their salvation secured on other grounds. The death of Christ avails only on the part of those who repent and believe the gospel. "He that believeth not the son, shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him." The death of Christ, so far from being the ground of salvation to all, will but aggravate the condemnation of many. "He that despised Moses' law, died without mercy,-of how much sorer punishment, suppose ye shall be thought worthy, who hath trodden under foot the Son of God, and hath counted the blood of the covenant wherewith he (Christ) was sanctified an unholy thing, and hath done despite unto the spirit of grace ?"—(Heb. x: 28, 29.) A rejected ransom will secure the salvation of no one who rejects it. “He that believeth not shall be damned.”—(Mark xvi: 16.)

2. Others assert that the doctrine of endless punishment is inconsistent with the goodness of God. Were it assumed that he who gave us existence, and bestowed upon us all things richly to enjoy, is a Being of infinite goodness, it would be taking for granted only what all Christians allow. He is solely good, as all the goodness found in creatures is only an emanation of the divine goodness. He is the chief good, the sum and substance of all excellence. In him there is nothing but goodness, and nothing but goodness proceeds from him. He is infinitely good in himself, and his goodness shines through all his works. But what does this prove? Does it prove that natural and moral evil cannot exist under the government of God, and that the subjects of his government must be holy and consequently happy forever? Are all the subjects of the divine government now perfectly holy and happy? Has not sin existed on earth for nearly six thousand years, and have not sorrow, sickness, pain and death been the unenviable but certain lot of the whole human family? The inheritance of affliction, is as sure as the laws which regulate the motion of the planets; for "man is born to trouble, as the sparks fly upward." And is not all this perfectly consistent with the goodness of God? No one will, I presume, impeach his goodness in permitting the introduction and continu ance of natural and moral evil.

How then do you know that sin and punishment may not exist in a future world, and that their existence may not be perfectly consistent with the goodness of God? This, those who profess to believe in a limited punishment after death, acknowledge. How then do they know that endless punishment may not be equally consistent with the goodness of God? If it is consistent with the Divine benevolence to punish sinners for a year, an age, or for ages of ages, why may it not be consistent also with the same benevolence that they should be punished forever? Wicked men often endure a great amount of suffering in the present life. They not only suffer those evils which are the common lot of man, but as transgressors of the divine law their way is hard. They seek riches and find poverty; honor, and find shame and contempt; happiness,

and find misery. Why then may they not endure sufferings in the life to come? Do you say, temporal sufferings may be so overruled as to promote the general good of the universe? And why may not eternal misery? The scriptures assure us that the punishment of the finally impenitent and incorrigible is appointed expressly for an example to the rest of creation. It is never represented as being inflicted upon them by a being of almighty power merely to show his power over the vanquished, nor with such kind of wrath as bears no relation to the general good. God does not punish because he delights in the misery of his creatures, but because, in many cases, punishment is rendered absolutely necessary in order that the permanency of his government should be maintained. This government as we have seen,* is not a government of arbitrary power, but a government of law. Now if law be the basis of the merciful administration of God, then the character and destiny of moral agents must be determined according to their conformity or non-conformity to this law. Is it inconsistent with a supreme magistrate as benevolent and good, to doom certain persons to death? Is it not rather an act of his benevolence? Should a person guilty of high treason persuade himself and his accomplices in crime that His Excellency could not consent to their execution without ceasing to be that lovely and good character for which he had been famed, would not his reasoning be considered unsound? And as punishment inflicted on the transgressor of any statute law, is in perfect accordance with the strictest goodness in the constituted authorities, so is the endless punishment of the finally impenitent with the goodness of God.

Further; if the goodness of God proves the future holiness and happiness of all men, does it not equally prove their present holiness and happiness? If sin and misery must come to an end because they are contrary to the divine benevolence, why ought they not to be now at an end? Lapprehend it would be as easy to prove that the present existence of sin and misery is as contrary to the divine benevolence as their future existence. This argument drawn from * Lecture iv.

the goodness of God, proves nothing to the point, unless it can be shown that sin and misery do not now exist. And will any one assert this? We have the awful testimony of scripture, experience and observation, to prove that all mankind are now far from being either holy or happy.

3. But it is said that endless punishment is inconsistent with the justice of our deserts. Who among men, I would ask, are qualified to decide this point? Are we not too much infected with sin, and is not our judgment too much biased by a depraved heart, to be uitable judges of the guilt and demerit of sin? We are too much disposed to make our feelings and our sympathies the standard of truth, to be suitable judges in this case. There are but few children who would not think their parents unmerciful to chastise them. And there is scarcely a thief or murderer who would not think the law severe and the judge cruel, if they should give and execute against them the sentence of death. But would a company of criminals be deemed proper judges of the equity of that law which condemns them? And does any human being know enough of the government of God and of the evil of sin, to determine what laws he should enact and what penalties he should annex to them? This consideration is sufficient to set aside all objections that are urged against the doctrine of endless punishment on the ground of its being unjust. Of this we are incompetent judges. Here our only source of evidence is the word of God. The fact of future punishment and its duration are purely matters of revelation. God has spoken explicitly respecting them, and it is our duty to hear and believe what he has said, and not to attempt to be wise above what is written.

But may not the endless punishment of the wicked be perfectly consistent with the justice of our deserts? May not such a punishment inflicted on the sinner dying in impenitence, be a treatment of him by his Judge correspondent to his moral conduct and personal character? A just punishment is that which is proportioned to the crime punished; and it may be said to be thus proportioned when by the degree and duration of the punishment is exhibited a just

idea of the moral evil or vicious tendency of the crime, and a proper motive to restrain all intelligent beings from the commission of it. Now we have estimated the evil of sin against God. We have seen that it is an infinite evil, because it is committed against a being of infinite excellence; it is the transgression of an infinite law, and has a tendency to produce mischief of infinite extent in the universe of God. What then does the sinner deserve? The fact that God by his overruling and restraining providence has prevented sin from producing its full effect, does not diminish the guilt of the transgres sor. The nature of sin is not changed nor its guilt removed. Sinners are just as criminal as if their sins actually produced all the evils to which they tend. Such being the nature and tendency of sin, it deserves an infinite punishment; for such a punishment is no more than proportionate to its demerit. If the transgression be infinite and the punishment be infinite, it is manifest that endless punishment is no more than what sin deserves. Therefore it is just, which was the thing to be proved.

Remember, dear hearers, by what rule you estimate the evil of a crime against an inferior, an equal, a parent, and a chief magistrate of a nation; then consider the greatness, the majesty, and the glory of the infinite JEHOVAH, until you feel that he is unsearchable in all his perfections and attributes; and after this say, as in his presence, do not your sins justly expose you to endless punishment? With a clear view of the holiness and justice of that Being against whom you have sinned, can you put your hand upon the Bible and say, "O God thou wouldst be unjust to inflict endless punishment upon me." Would not your reason and conscience as well as the sacred scriptures condemn you for such atheistic impiety, and cause you to tremble lest divine vengeance should justly award you with that punishment which you impiously declared to be unjust?

4. The doctrine of endless punishment is said to be derogatory to the character of God, because it proves that God is unable to save all mankind, or he is unwilling. "If you say he is able and not willing, you impeach his goodness;-if you say he is willing but not able, you deny his omnipotence." This argument if it proves any thing,