party was a good deal encouraged in ecclefiaftical matters; a party which like its authors abroad, were most of them of antimonarchical fpirit, and contributed to diffuse that, or at least a fpirit of very much liberty, as much as they could in the nation. And they fucceeded fo much, that Elizabeth and her council were at length very fenfible of the great increafe of this fpirit among the people; as well as that by the overweight of property acquired by them, the balance was turning, or turned, on their fide against the Lords, and even the crown when joined with them. She knew that this would fome time or other endanger the crown, but it was too late to oppofe it: and therefore that wife queen, though fhe fometimes spoke and governed with the fpirit of her father, was yet at other times obliged to make court to her people.

James I. knew, as well as fhc, where the weakness of the conftitution lay, and how much the power of the crown was declined indeed the house of commons made him feel it? and in order to prop it up, he endeavoured to raise the power of the clergy, as a fupport to the crown; and to infufe principles of reverence to it, from the facredness of hereditary right, the doctrine of paffive obedience, and the like. But he undertook this work too late; befides, he did not manage it with fufficient addrefs, to carry it fo far as it might otherwife have gone. The confequence of which was found very fenfibly, and produced terrible effects, in the reign of Charles I. That unhappy prince, filled with lofty notions about the original and inherent rights of the crown, did not confider, that rights, if they had been fuch, will do nothing without power to fupport them; and that the effective power was vaftly against the crown: for the bulk of the nobility and gentry, as well as the people, were against fuch pretenfiens to arbitrary power.

After the miferable confufions of thofe times had made people weary, and brought about the refloration, Charles II. thought it was a time, when the nation were warmly zealous for monarchy, to try to make himself abfolute, and fome of his minifters were for it but thofe wife and great men, the Earls of Clarendon and Southampton, faw it would not do, and fo diverted him from trying it in the beginning of his reign. James 11. however could not forbear trying the fame thing, and upon the fame principles, that his father had done: but he found too that nature would not rebel against principle, in the most zealous afferters of paffive obedience, and that the bulk of the nation thought their rights were juft, as well as valuable, and would defend them accordingly. The ill-judging zeal and hauteur of this king, in pushing things to extremity, brought on the revoJution which being happily, and foon, and without bloodshed, ffected, put the conftitution upon the foot it is at prefent; and

:

though

though it may not be quite perfect, yet I will venture to say the condition of the nation is, taking all things together, 'as happy as any nation now is, or perhaps ever was.'

In this manner does our Author endeavour to account for the prefervation of the liberties of this country, which have been gradually improved, while other nations, which originally partook of the fame cuftoms and manners, and whofe governments were of a fimilar ftructure at first, have funk into flavery and defpotiím. Upon a review of all the circumft inces here brought together, and various others which might have been added, and which will readily occur to thofe who are well acquainted with this part of our hiftory, we incline to their opinion, who think that the feudal fyftem was, upon the whole, and in its confequences, favourable to the caufe of liberty. The great barons were a conftant check to the power of the crown; and it seems to have been the uniform policy of the kings in that period to reftrain their power and influence, as what was chiefly fo midable to them. The depreffion of the nobility feems to have been the fole object of Henry the Seventh's policy; he found them in a ftate extremely weakened by the civil wars, and he improved his advantage to the utmoft, providing in the most effectual manner, by the diffufion of property and the encouragement of commerce, against their ever rifing again to their former weight. and influence; forgetting that he was at the fame time cherishing a power, then indeed in its infancy, but in its own nature infinitely more formidable to the prerogative of princes. The great reafon why Henry the Eighth did not make ufe of the favourable circumftances, which, as our Author obferves, offered them felves, to render himself and his fucceffors abfolute, was a total inattention to the growth of the power of the commons, and contented himself with purfuing to the utmoft the policy of his father against the nobility. Together with thefe circumftances, other caufes confpired to produce the effect; the reformation from popery; the general progrefs of knowlege and free inquiry; the extenfion of commerce, and increase of wealth, had all their several influence in raifing the fpirits, and enlarging the power of the people, till the balance finally preponderated in their favour.

Our Author, in his fourth tract, examines into the antiquities of the commons in parliament; and is clearly of opinion that before the conqueft, during the Saxon conftitution, the commons had always a fhare in the legislative authority; and that afterwards the parliament confifted, not only of the great barons, but of all who held of the king in capite.

The fubjects of the fifth tract are, the royal prerogative, and the hereditary right to the crown of Britain. This tract is divided into four fections; in the firft of which he confiders the

royal prerogative, with regard to the making and providing for the execution of the laws; the fecond treats of the royal prerogative and dignity in other refpects, fuch as the power of making war and peace; of making treaties with foreign ftates, and appointing ambaffadors; of conferring honours, and that not only in its leffer degrees, but of the peerage itfelf; of appointing to bishoprics; of difpofing of all places of authority and profit, as well ecclefiaftical as civil and military; and not only of rewarding his well-deferving fubjects, but of pardoning criminals, even after conviction, except in the cafe of an impeachment by the houfe of commons for treafon or other crimes, and an appeal for murder, by the next heir, which the king cannot bar the perfon charged with it, even though he has been indicted and acquitted of it at the king's fuit, yet may be tried again upon the appeal; and if in that trial he be found guilty, the king cannot pardon him. In the third fection his Lordship confiders the oppofition made to King James II. at the revolution.

As this is a critical kind of a queftion, wherein the political principles of a writer are immediately difcovered; and as many of our Readers will doubtlefs be curious to know how the fubject is treated, efpecially by a dignified ecclefiaftic, we shall gratify them with the following fhort abftract from the Bishop's arguments, and the rather as it may ferve to juftify the idea we have formerly given of him, as a good state whig.

He begins with obferving, that civil government, and thofe who administer it, ought to be confidered as deriving their authority from the Supreme Being. This he explains, from the neceffity of civil government to the fecurity and happiness of mankind in focial life. Therefore that being who certainly intends the happiness of his creatures, muft be fuppofed to intend" that they fhould live under civil government: and hence it follows, that fubjects are bound to yield all fuch fubmiffion to their governors as will be neceffary to that purpofe, But that it is the divine will, that fubjects never fhould, in any cafe, oppofe or refift their governors, even though they make the most unjuft and tyrannical ufe of their authority, cannot be concluded. For in order to this, it muft either appear, that nothing less than an obligation to abfolute fubmiffion and non-refiftance can make civil governments effectually answer the ends for which the Supreme Being defigned them; or it must be fuppofed, that the Supreme Being, out of a mere regard to the fafety and dignity. of the governors only, without any regard to the governed, hath forbidden refiftance. But this latter cannot be true; for the divine power could not make mankind for the benefit or luft of a few only. And if this be certain, then there may be cafes wherein refiftance would be juftifiable, and agreeable to the will of God n the inftitution of civil government.

The

The only argument, fays our Author, of any weight, that I have feen againft this reafoning, is, that if refiftance fhould be allowed in the fuppofed cafe, namely, when it is for the public good; the confequence will be, that the generality of mankind, who are always too partial to themselves, are apt to judge amifs of things, and therefore incline to fedition and rebellion, will often break out into them, when there is no real caufe; by which, diforders frequently happening, civil focieties will in fact fuffer much more harm, upon the whole, in confequence of a liberty of refiftance, than they will have good from it, in fuch cases which I have firft fuppofed, which will happen but rarely and therefore it is juftly to be concluded, that the Supreme Power,. who intends the benefit of mankind in general, and makes fuch regulations as may tend to promote it upon the whole, must difapprove refiftance in all cafes what foever; becaufe this difallowance will tend to do more good, or at least prevent the most mischief, upon the whole*. To this objection, which it may be prefumed is fairly stated, as it is taken from Boffuet, one of the moft artful defenders of the power of princes, our proteftant bifhop answers, 1ft, This objection is founded upon a false representation of the difpofitions and conduct of mankind; for inftances may be given of nations, who, though they have always thought refiftance lawful, and have upon fome great occafions practifed it, and even founded their politics upon it, yet have afterwards, for a long space of time, been very obedient to their governments, and quiet under them.' It is added, 2dly, That thofe men, who are fo ill-difpofed as to be rebellious and feditious without caufe, would be fo, whether it be fuppofed that the Supreme Being difallows refiftance in all cafes, or not for their way of thinking will be, that refiftance is lawful in fome cafes; or whether they think fo or not, they will practife it.-The question then muft be, Whether it be fuppofable that the Divine Power difalJows refiftance, even in thofe cafes where it may do eminent good to the public, only because others, through their own fault, will practice it in cafes where it may do harm? I confefs this conduct appears to me plainly to be what we ought not to impute to the Deity; and what he certainly does not use in feveral cafes, where there is a parity of reafon for it. It is vifible that the Divine Power does permit men, in civil focieties, to go to law for the defence or recovery of their interefts; and it is equally visible that bad men do, in fact, very often make use of this liberty to do a great deal of mifchief: muft it be therefore fuppofed that the Divine Power will allow no man to defend or recover his right? plainly not! In like manner, bad men will make very ill ufe of the liberty of going to war: they make

See Effay fur Govern. Civ. p. 64, 69.

it produce much more mifery than good to mankind upon the whole. But does it therefore follow, that the Supreme Beingwill not have any men war in a good caufe, because bad men will actually war much oftener in ill ones? The patrons of non-refiftance will not fay this, and therefore they ought to fee that their reafoning is not conclufive.'

In this calm and cool manner does our Author reply to the fpecious and artful objection of the popish bishop. We could with he had added fomething like what we meet with in honeft Hoadly's answer to the fame objection, in the paffage we refer to.. "So far is it from being true, fays that excellent prelate, that the univerfal reception of this doctrine [the right of refiftance] would be the ground of public confufion and mifery, that it would entirely prevent the very beginnings of evil, and take away the firft occafions of all difcontent: and in truth it must be acknowledged, that it is because this doctrine hath not been univerfally received, that any governors have been mifled, and encouraged to take fuch meafures, as in the end have proved fatal to themfelves. With reLpect therefore to governors of evil difpofitions, nothing is more neceffary than that they fhould believe refiftance to be lawful and allowable in fome cafes. Such governors indeed cannot perhaps bear this doctrine and why is it, but because it may hinder their pernicious defigns?"

Whatever ill confequences the doctrine of refiftance may be fuppofed to have upon the minds of the people; the want of it would be attended with much worfe upon the minds of princes, unless we suppose them as angels of God, or rather as God himself, incapable of being miltaken or deceived. (See MeaJures of Submiffion.)

The queftion is indeed reduced within a very narrow compafs: if the end of government be the good and happinefs of mankind, and this it muft, be, if it be in any fenfe the inftitution of the moft wife and benevolent of all beings, then the common fenfe of every man, fuperior to the refinements of statesmen, or the cunning of priests, will readily determine which is best for mankind; that the people fhould be always expofed to the boundless will of tyranny, or that the rulers fhould be oppofed when they grow exorbitant in the ufe of their power, or when they employ it in tormenting, harraffing, and deftroying thofe, whom it is the very end of their office to fupport and preferve.Our Author, in the conclufion of this fection, endeavours to fhew, and he does it with great juftice and perfpicuity, that thefe dictates of natural reafon are by no means contradicted, but rather confirmed, by divine velation; and that both unite in making it our duty, 66 to mit, as far as the laws of the fociety of which we are memconfidered together with the public good, do oblige us;

and