said, Reverence the Emperor-fear the Prætor— part 11. respect the Quæstor-and beware of treating with contempt even the despised publican: just as we would say, Reverence the Sovereign-fear the Judges-respect the High Court of Parliamenthonour the municipal or local authorities-and beware of treating with contempt even the bailiff or the constable.

Such appears to me the meaning of these words of the apostle. They are an assertion and enforcement of the duty of payment of tribute on the Christian Romans: they are a reply to the question, Are Christians bound to pay tribute to a government administered by heathens? And that reply is a very strong affirmative.

of tribute any limitation in

the Roman

The questions-Whether this precept to pay Had the law tribute, as addressed to the Roman Christians, the case of had any limits; and if it had, what were they, Christians? come now to be considered. The thought that first suggests itself to the mind reflecting on this subject is, that payment of tribute being just one of the innumerable forms of civil obedience, particularized in the passage before us, for reasons which have been already assigned, must share in the limitations which, as we have shown, in a former part of this discourse, characterize the whole class of duties to which it belongs; and this conclusion is strengthened, by perceiving that the other particular precepts specified along with it, all of them require limitation. It is only within certain limits that we are to fear" or "honour" any human being, however dignified

66

PART II. and powerful.

Not necessarily unlimited.

These considerations will go far, I think, to settle the question with every unprejudiced inquirer, and induce him to proceed immediately to endeavour to ascertain what are the limitations, about the existence of which we can have no doubt.

It seems, however, to be held as something like an ethical axiom with many, that this precept about tribute-paying has no limits; and it has been gravely argued, that the circumstance of its being singled out from among the endlessly diversified forms of civil obedience, and made the subject of an express statute, proves this. The reason why such prominence is given by the apostle to tribute-paying has already been stated. It must strike every person, that if the apostle, in specifying tribute-paying, had intended to teach that the limitations which attach to other forms of civil obedience were inapplicable to it, he would have distinctly said so, and not have left the precept in reference to expression, exactly on a level with a precept, which, as all now admit, requires to be understood with exceptions. Besides, tributepaying does not stand out quite so singly as has been supposed. There are honour and fear specified along with it; and surely these sentiments, without limit, are not due to any created being. Still, however, we do not deny, that the preoncept as to tribute-paying may be without limit. All we say here is, this does not prove it to be so; and if it be unlimited, which certainly is a very improbable hypothesis, this must arise not out of its general nature, as civil obedience, but

Only conceiv

able causes

unlimited.

out of something which is peculiar to it, as tri- PART II. bute-paying. Now there are only two conceivable causes, in the absence of a distinct declararation of the lawgiver, which could give this idiosyncrasy to this particular form of civil obedience : either that the parting with money is not in itself, properly speaking, a moral act-or, that supposing it to be in itself a moral act, if performed voluntarily, the compulsory character of the exaction strips it of its morality. Neither of these views of the case, and I can conceive of no third, is at all tenable.

ney in itself a

Parting with money stands, with regard to mo- Paying morality, on a level, neither higher nor lower, with moral act. all other external acts. Viewed apart from the principles of the intelligent moral agent who performs them, they have no morality. To walk to the heathen temple-to lay incense on the heathen altar, viewed as mere external acts, are just as little moral or immoral as the parting with money. To walk to a heathen temple and burn incense on an idol's altar, is disobedience just from the state of the mind of him who does it-from what must be the state of mind in any sane man who does it; and exactly in the same way, parting with money voluntarily for what I know or believe to be wrong, is just as obviously immoral,-immoral for the same reason, as employing any other set of means, over which I have the control, in the same way.

in its charac

But admitting all this, it has been said that Not changed the compulsory character of tribute strips it of its moral character in one way, and invests it with

ter by civil a

enactment.

PART II. moral character in another. Here is an object to which I could not voluntarily contribute without sin; but God has given another party authority to impose tribute on me, and he has power to compel me to make payment: so that whatever be the object, I have no concern with it, while, from the divine command, it is my duty to make the required payment. Now, in the first place, we have to remark here, that in taking for granted that God gives to the magistrate the right to impose tribute for whatever purpose he pleases, the premise is made identical with the conclusion to be drawn from it—a convenient, but not a very reputable mode of arguing; and, in the second place, that compulsoriness is not a quality peculiar to tribute-paying-it belongs to all acts of civil obedience; the very principle of civil government being force. If a Christian was commanded to pay a tax for the support of idol worship, the very same power that was ready to punish him if he did not do it, was equally ready to be put forth against him for refusing to go to the temple and worship; and if the compulsory nature of the requisition is a good reason for complying with the first, it would be difficult to see why it should not be a good excuse for complying with the second. If actual absolute force were employed in either case, then indeed the moral character of the acts would be lost, obliterated, destroyed; for in that case the man would cease to be an actor and become a sufferer. It appears, then, that there is nothing in the nature of tribute, to take it out of the general category

of forms of civil obedience;-there is nothing to PART II. make the limitation of the precept an impossible thing.

the law of tribute to the Roman Christians

Presuming, then, that there might be limits The sphere of beyond which the law of tribute was not obligatory on the Roman Christians-let us now proceed to inquire if there really were such limits, and if so, attempt to define them. Before entering on this subject, I beg to premise, that the sphere within which the duty of payment of tribute was obligatory, was obviously a wide one. Not merely were all wise and just taxes, all imposts necessary for the right and efficient administration of government, to be paid-but all imposts of the ruling authority, for the purposes of civil rule, though unwise, unequal, and oppressive, were to be paid without murmuring and complaint; though, if the Roman Christians had any constitutional means of representing their grievances to the government and seeking their redress, they certainly were not, by any principle or statute in the law of Christ, prohibited from availing themselves of them.

sive,

I most cordially agree with the remark of a very extenvenerable servant of Jesus Christ-that "the precept to pay taxes should be considered by Christians" (I have no doubt the primitive believers did so consider it) "as a blessing. Had not the precept been given expressly, conscientious men might have thought it necessary to know first how the money was to be applied, and to refuse whenever they disapproved of the expenditure. This would have given occasion to endless trouble