word create. If this then is the sense relative to the brutal, it is undoubtedly the sense relative to the human creation. Besides, in the second chapter it is expressly said that the woman was made. "And the rib, which the Lord God had taken from the man, made he a woman, and brought her unto the man," verse 22. It is manifest from this passage that Moses has expressed what you call the formation of man by the word make, a word which is certainly synonymous with create. You contend that man was created in the image of God. But when the divine Being addressed Noah after the flood, and fixed the penalty of murder, he assigns this as a reason: "For in the image of God made he man."* Here it is expressly said that man was made in the image of God. And Moses, as we have seen above, declares that the woman was made from the man. Hence it is apparent that the distinction, for which you contend, was unknown to our historian. And if we inquire into the scripture use of the terms create and form, we shall find that the sacred writers use them to signify one and the same thing. When speaking of men, they use these words promiscuously to express their introduction into being. They pursue the same course, when speaking of inanimate nature. The Lord by the prophet says, "I form light, and create darkness; I make peace, and create evil." It is obvious that the words, create and form, are used synonymously in this scripture. It is also worthy of remark, that God is represented in the first chapter of Genesis, to have created that very light, which he is here said to have formed. In a great variety of instances, God is said to have created the heavens and the earth. But the psalmist expresses the same thing by the word form. Addressing his Maker, he says, "Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst formed the earth or the world, even from • Gen. ix. 6. ↑ Isa. xlv. 7.

everlasting to everlasting thou art God."* The earth itself, therefore, is said to have been created in one passage, and formed in another. But shall we maintain that the earth possesses two natures? that it was first created spiritually, and then that the earth was formed of the dust of the earth? This would appear like trifling with the subject, but it appears to me to be just as consistent, as the distinction you make between the creation and formation of man.

I think, Sir, that a person must have a strong inclination for the marvellous, to discover your favorite distinction in the two first chapters of Genesis. Even you yourself, when this part of your system is out of sight, admit the views for which I am contending. You acknowledge that our bodily appetites were created. Your words are: "Our appetites and passions are at all times with us and they are all good in the place for which they were made, and for the use for which they were created." In this very Lecture, you maintain that all appetites and passions are a part of our earthly nature; and you here expressly say that these appetites were créated; consequently the creation and formation of man are one and the same thing. In fact, I know of no distinction which you can make between the words, create and form. You would probably explain the word form to signify to compose, to organize, or put together of materials which are already in existence. And I would ask, what different sense you can put upon the word create? You cannot say it signifies to make out of nothing; for you do not allow such a creation.‡ So upon the whole I very much doubt whether you can put any signification upon the word form, which will not apply equally to the word create.

We have now examined the two first chapters of

* Ps. xc. 2.

+ Lect. p. 79.

Aton. p. 90.

Genesis, on which you found your notion of two natures in man, and find no authority for its support. We have seen that there is no more evidence that man was created in Jesus Christ, than there is that he was created in himself; that the two first chapters of Genesis allude to the same events; that there is no more proof that men were created spiritual beings, than there is that the brutes were created such; that what is ascribed to man in the first chapter, is as indicative of a corporeal body, as what is ascribed to him in the second; that the words create and form have one and the same meaning in Moses' account, and that on your system it is hardly possible to give them different significations; that all your arguments prove too much, and of course prove nothing at all;-In a word, that your whole scheme of two distinct, complex natures in man, is nothing but a phantom too mystical for belief.

Having shown that the idea of two natures in man, the one created and pure, the other formed and sinful, is unfounded, we will now inquire further into the truth of your repeated assertion, that all sin originates in the flesh. Though you lay this down as an axiom, it is a position which is by no means admitted. Before attending to this particular, we will observe, that this is a necessary part of the two natures in man. This grows out of your notion of the formation of man. If what has been offered against that visionary idea be valid, the point we are now upon, is already decided. Every argument which weighs against one, opposes the other. Now we ask proof of the assertion that all sin originates in the flesh. This assertion, though constantly made, is not accompanied with evidence. You will probably say, that sin arises from lust, and lust originates in the flesh. To this let it be replied, that lust, or temptation, selfconsidered, is not vicious. It is no crime in me that an evil suggestion presents itself to my mind. It is the

assent of the mind to the suggestion, or the resolution to commit the act, which constitutes the criminality. The body is a mere instrument in the hands of the mind, if I may so express it. An act of the body, considered by itself, is neither virtuous nor vicious. It is the motive or disposition of the mind, which gives the character to the act. Take away the motive of the mind, and the act has no more character, either good or bad, than the drawing of the breath, or the motion of the eyelids. This is the common sense of mankind; this principle is ever admitted in all courts of justice.

If sin lies in the act of the body, then the surgeon who amputates, is as guilty as the felon who breaks a limb of his victim, and the sheriff is as guilty as the murderer he executes. But there is no end of examples of this nature, all of which show the absurdity of the principle I am opposing. It is so obvious that sin lies in the motive of the mind, and not in the act of the body, that it seems a waste of time to labor this point any further. You yourself, when your system is out of view, contend for the principle I here advocate. When opposing the infinity of sin, you say, "It will be granted on all sides, that no action, unconnected with design, ought to be considered sin; it is then an evil intention that constitutes an evil action. For instance, a man exerting himself to the utmost of his abilities to save the life of his neighbor, accidentally takes his life; the consequence is not the guilt of murder, but a heartaching grief for the loss of his friend. Again, a man exerting himself with all his ingenuity and strength to take the life of his neighbor, misses his intention, and saves his life from immediate danger; the consequence is not the approbation of a good conscience for having saved the life of his neighbor, but condemnation for having designed his death, and perhaps mortification in his disappointment. By these instances the reader may

see that no act can be determined to be morally good or evil by the consequences which follow, but only by the disposition or intention which the actor possesses, when the act is done."* Again you say, "The fact is, the moral distinction between virtue and vice, is the difference between meaning well and meaning evil."+

In these passages you declare in the most unequivocal manner, that every moral act proceeds from the evil intention, disposition, or motive of the mind, and not from the act of the body. According to your confession, an act is criminal, not because it was suggested by any bodily appetite, but because the motive of the mind was evil. You say that an act can be determined to be good or bad, "only by the disposition or intention” of the actor; and this you lay down as an established principle, which "will be admitted on all sides." Thus, Sir, when your mind is free from the bias of system, we find you advocating views which appear rational and self-evident to every reflecting man. You ascribe all moral actions, and consequently all sin, to the evil disposition of the mind. And if all sin proceeds from the evil intentions of the mind, then surely it does not proceed from the appetites of the body. As it is unphilosophical to admit of any effect without an adequate cause, so it is equally unphilosophical to ascribe any effect to more than one adequate cause. So after ascribing every sinful act to the evil disposition of the mind, it would be absurd to ascribe it to any other cause. Once more; you ascribe sin to ignorance. Your words are these "Ignorance was and ever is the cause of sin."‡ I will not in this place attempt to show the impropriety of this statement, but will observe that ignorance, as far as it is any thing, is a state or condition of the mind, and not of the body. Knowledge is a mental acquisi+ U. Mag. vol. IV. p. 153.

* Aton. pp. 21, 22. Lect. P. 10.