not then been in prison, whom could the infidel Jews have demanded instead of the Christ? and without this preference of Barabbas to the Christ, what room could there have been for that last and most convincing testimony to the national impenitence and guilt, the deliberate predilection of a robber and an outlaw, a ringleader of sedition, with hands embrued in blood, instead not merely of a person whose innocence was undoubted, and whose purity of character was unimpeachable, but of their own Messias, the Prince of peace, and Saviour of mankind? DISSERTATION XXI. On the question concerning divorce, Matt. xix. 3—12. THE For example, when Jesus had replied to the question of the Pharisees-which was put in public, and answered in public-he retired into some private house. There is no notice, either express or implicit, of this fact in St. Matthew. While he was in this house, the disciples, according to the same authority, renewed the enquiry concerning the question: neither is this fact noticed by St. Matthew. Yet what he attributes to the disciplesd must have made a part of this conversation in private: it has all the appearance of a remark, produced by the repetition to them in particular of what had lately been pronounced to all in common. If so, it becomes implicitly a proof that our Lord, at this riod in St. Matthew's account, was actually in private; and the conclusion is confirmed by the incident next subjoined, the bringing of little children to Christe; for that transaction took place after he came into the house, and before he left it again; that is, while he was still withinf. pe a xvi. 18. 13-15. b xviii. 15. Mark 10. 17. c Mark x. 10. d xix. 10. e xix. We may conclude, therefore, that the final end, which St. Mark has here in view, is to supply certain particulars in a common account, omitted by St. Matthew. Hence he is in some respects fuller, and in some respects more concise, than he: fuller, where St. Matthew had been most defective, and more concise, where he had been most minute. On this principle they may easily be accommodated to each other. For first, the question, according to St. Matthew, stood thus—Εἰ ἔξεστιν ἀνθρώπῳ ἀπολῦσαι τὴν γυναῖκα αὑτοῦ κατὰ πᾶσαν αἰτίαν; according to St. Mark—Εἰ ἔξεστιν ἀνδρὶ γυναῖκα ἀπολῦσas; in which, consequently, there is an omission of xarà πᾶσαν αἰτίαν : and this is an omission which must have been intentional. For the decision of our Lord himself g shews that, on one account, the account of fornication, which in a married woman amounts to adultery, it was lawful to put away a wife. The question, then, Is it lawful for a husband to put away his wife? so expressed, might be answered in the affirmative; the question, Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife, on any account? must be answered in the negative. The true drift of the question, therefore, as stated by St. Mark, supposes its statement by St. Matthew also to be carried along with his. Secondly, in reply to the question, our Lord, according to St. Mark, began with referring to the decision of Moses -according to St. Matthew, he proceeded to decide it himself h. If he did both these things, there is no inconsistency between the statements; and in favour of that supposition we may argue as follows. When, in other instances, a question was put to our Saviour, which either had been actually decided by the Law, or was easily to be collected from it, we observe him refer in the first place to the Lawi; and, as this was a case in point, it might naturally be expected he would do the same now. But, had he never done so, on any other occasion, there were yet special reasons why he should do so on this. Mark x. 3. Matt. xix. 4. 1 Matt. xix. 16. 17. 18. Matt. xix. 9. Luke x. 25. 26. It was notorious that liberty of divorce had been conceded by the Law of Moses k: it was certain also that, at the first institution of marriage, marriage had been pronounced inseparable. It follows, therefore, that the concession of the Law had been contrary to the original statute; and, consequently, a special indulgence, vouchsafed to the Jews. Hence, as there was once a time, when no such indulgence yet existed, so there might be a time, when it should be again repealed. If, then, the original law was to be revived by the Gospel, and made binding on Christians, the temporary indulgence, granted subsequently to the Jews, was necessarily to cease. The design, therefore, of referring in the first place to the decision of the Law was to give greater solemnity to the decision of Christ. It would intimate so much the more clearly both the abrogation of the existing commandment, and the grounds on, which it would be made. What did Moses command you? was, consequently, a natural, and even a necessary, question before any declaration of our Lord himself. The judgment, which he meant to pronounce, would commit his authority apparently with the authority of Moses; and he proposes to shew beforehand that this committal was only apparent, not real. The Mosaic injunction itself was an extraordinary and a temporary concession-not more opposed to his own decision, than to an original and prior law, recorded by Moses himself; which, as it had once prevailed before the dispensation, so, notwithstanding that, might well recover its ascendancy again. The interrogation recorded even by St. Matthew, Tí oùv Μωσῆς ἐνετείλατο, κ.τ.λ. contains an implicit allusion to some such reference concerning the dictum of the Law. The parties, who put that question, are the same as before; and it is manifest, that they put it by way of objection to the decision just pronounced. Our Saviour, it is true, had anticipated the objection in the decision itself; but that the Pharisees should not have been satisfied with his reasons would be nothing extraordinary: and, if they thought proper to start the same difficulty afresh, it would be just as natural that he should reply to it as before. They had not originally put their question, out of a genuine deference to his authority, or with a candid disposition to receive instruction on an important rule of duty-but from some insidious motive; either to elicit a declaration, which they knew would be repugnant to the mandate of the Law, or to render Jesus obnoxious to the people. They could not be ignorant that, twice at least in the course of his ministry, once in the sermon on the mount, and again, still more recently in their own hearing ", he had peremptorily laid down a new principle of conduct upon this very point. Nor was there any thing more palatable to the people at large, nor yet more grossly abused, than this liberty of divorce. The license of polygamy allowed by the doctors of the Law, and practised by the Jews every where, was almost unrestrained. Justin Martyr tells us that the former openly permitted any man to have four or five wives individually; and that the latter freely availed themselves of this permission, marrying as many as they pleased 1. Besides this, however, the right of divorce was carried to an excess, which rendered the marriage union, whatever it might be in profession, little better in practice than the liberty of promiscuous concubinage. There was no conceivable reason, however slight, for which a man might not put away one woman, and marry another. Tuvaixos TS GUVOLNOU σης βουλόμενος διαζευχθῆναι, καθ' ἃς δηποτούν αἰτίας· πολλαὶ δ ̓ ἂν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τοιαῦται γίνοιντο °. Josephus himself is a case in point P, and proves the universality of the practice, as well as the slightness of the reasons for which it might be resorted to, as much as any thing. With respect, however, to the grounds of separation, considered justifiable by the Rabbins, pudet, pigetque! If a wife had spoiled her husband's dinner-nay more, if she was no longer to his liking, Dialog. 423. 436. m Matt. v. 31. 32. Jud. iv. viii. 23. Luke xvi. 14. 18. n • Ant. |