3dly. The only conduct, which a Creator can receive with pleasure from his creatures, must plainly be attachment, reverence, and the voluntary obedience which they produce.

Whether the Creator be benevolent, or malevolent; it is impossible, that he should not choose to be loved, reverenced, and obeyed. But the real Creator has so formed his works, and so constituted his Providence, that the minds of men, irresistibly, and of absolute necessity, esteem a benevolent being more than one of the opposite character. I do not mean, here, that this is the dictate of the heart; but I mean, that it is the unavoidable dictate of the intellect; of the conscience and understanding. The intellect is so formed by the Creator, that it is impossible for it to think otherwise. Any person, who will make the attempt, will find it beyond his power to approve of malevolence at all. If, therefore, the Creator be malevolent, he has so formed his Intelligent creatures in this world, that they cannot possibly esteem his character. In other words, he has made them incapable, by a natural necessity, of rendering to him that regard, which in itself, or in its consequences, is the only possible conduct, on the part of his Intelligent creatures, which a Creator can have proposed, when he gave them existence.

Should it be objected, that Benevolence is estimable in the nature of things; that to see its nature is the same thing as to esteem it; and that, therefore, Intelligent creatures cannot avoid experiencing this esteem: I answer, Should it be granted, as I think it must, that all this is true, still an Omnipotent Creator might, for ought that appears, have formed Intelligent creatures with such optics, with powers of understanding so directed, that they might have seen his character in an estimable light. Hypochondriacal and insane minds are direct proofs, that minds can exist, with directly opposite views to those, which Intelligent creatures in this world usually experience. Nor is there any evidence, that an Omnipotent being could not so form Intelligent creatures, as to vary their modes of perception in any manner, and to any extent, which pleased him. At the same time it is perfectly obvious, that, as we are wholly passive in receiving ideas and impressions, he might, with entire ease, have given us just such ideas as he pleased, by presenting to us only those objects, from which they would be derived. In this manner he might have prevented us from forming any conceptions of his moral character; and led us only to admire his Omniscience and Omnipotence, in the stupendous works, which they are capable of producing. This, it is believed, involves no contradiction; and every thing, which does not involve a contradiction, such a Being can confessedly perform.

Should the scheme, which I have here suggested, not be admitted; I answer again: There was no necessity, that he should create Intelligent beings at all; and there is no conceivable motive, which could induce an infinite Being to form Intelligent creatures, VOL. I.

22

who, from their nature and their circumstances, could not possibly esteem, but from absolute necessity must disesteem, him.

But this is not all. Men are so formed, as irresistibly to hate and despise Malevolence. This conduct, on their part, is the unvarying dictate of mere intellect, as well as of the heart. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary: the unavoidable result of that state of things, which he himself has formed; is his own immediate work; and, so far as we know, the only work, of an Intelligent nature, which he has produced: being found in all men, and therefore justly presumable of all other Intelligent creatures. It is, hence, unavoidably concluded to be a direct, and genuine, expression of his choice. If, then, we suppose the Creator to be a malevolent being; he has thus necessitated, beyond a possibility of its being otherwise, his Intelligent creatures to hate and despise that, which he supremely loves and approves; viz. his own moral character; and to esteem and love that, which he supremely hates and despises; viz. the moral character, which is directly opposed to his own. This he has further necessitated them to do, with the entire, and irresistible, approbation of their own understanding and conscience; and, therefore, without any possibility of a future conviction, on their part, that this conduct is wrong in them, or that they are, on this account, guilty, blameworthy, and justly punishable. On the contrary, they are furnished with complete conviction, that this conduct is right, praiseworthy, and rewardable; a conviction, which can never be removed, nor weakened; and which will attend them through every period of their future being. Thus he has, in the most perfect manner, and, at the same time, in the manner most perfectly unaccountable, formed Intelligent beings so, as effectually to prevent the only end, which he could propose in their creation, from ever being accomplished.

4thly. The Creator has placed mankind either in a state of trial, or a state of reward: but our present state is, on neither of these suppositions, compatible with the doctrine, that He is malevolent.

I say, that mankind are placed either in a state of trial, or a state of reward; because rational creatures can exist in no possible situation, except one of these two. If, then, we are placed in a state of reward; we are beyond measure more happy, and less miserable, than is consistent with the character of malevolence in the Creator. No man can say, or believe, that the present state of the human race is so unhappy, as to satisfy the desires or accomplish the purposes, of infinite malevolence.

If we are in a state of trial; our circumstances are equally inconsistent with the designs of a malevolent disposer. All our opposition to his character and designs is necessarily and perfectly approved by our own consciences; and all our approbation and love towards the opposite characteristics is equally approved by the same umpire. In the mean time, our approbation, or adoption, of malevolence, or our disesteem, and rejection, of benevolence, is

in the same necessary and perfect manner condemned by our consciences. But these are the only kinds of conduct, in which we can possibly be guilty of revolt, or disobedience, to a malevolent Creator. For these only can we, then, be tried and condemned by him. Should we, accordingly, be condemned and punished, we shall still necessarily, certainly, and for ever discern, beyond a doubt, that in all that, for which we are punished, we acted with entire rectitude. Of course, whatever punishment we receive, we shall still be supported by the entire approbation of our own minds; and shall, therefore, be far removed from that finished misery, which could not fail to be destined by infinite malevolence for the punishment of its enemies. We should know, that our conduct was right, and excellent; should dwell upon it with entire satisfaction, and should feel no small support, no contemptible alleviation of our sufferings, in the conviction, that our punishment was unmerited, and unjust; and that the evil, for which we suffered, existed, not in ourselves, but in our iniquitous sovereign.

If it can be supposed, that such a Being could confer rewards on any of his creatures; it is evident, that he must confer them on such, as resembled him in their disposition, and approved of his moral character; and for this very resemblance and approbation. But it is perfectly easy to perceive, that the happiness, which would constitute their reward, must be embittered by a complete conviction, that the conduct, for which they are rewarded, was in itself wrong, vile, and despicable; that they themselves were vile and despicable in loving and practising it; that their happiness is wholly unmerited; and that those, who are punished by the same being, are far more excellent than themselves, and in truth are the only excellent beings. Of course, their happiness must be deeply embittered by a miserable sense of unworthiness; by a perpetual self-condemnation. Such must be the manner, in which this supposition exhibits the conduct of the Creator towards his enemies, on the one hand, and towards his friends, on the other.

All these considerations are enhanced, by the great fact, that God has so constituted the world, as to make misery the only legitimate and natural consequence of malevolence, and happiness the only natural consequence of benevolence. In this manner has he irresistibly impressed these truths on the minds of men; exhibited them as practical certainties, visible in all their practical concerns; and thus fixed them beyond removal in the minds of his Rational creatures. When we remember, that these things were contrived, and chosen, by an Omniscient being, who, of course, discerned their real nature and import, before he chose them; we cannot but discern, that they grow necessarily out of the character of a benevolent Creator, but are utterly inconsistent with the opposite charac

ter.

5thly. The goodness of God, displayed in the present world, is a strong argument, that he is a benevolent Being.

St. Paul observes, that God left not himself without witness to the Heathens, in that he did good, and gave them rain from heaven, and fruitful seasons, filling their hearts with food and gladness.* In this passage God himself declares, that his goodness to mankind, in the several particulars here recited, is a witness to them of his true character. What the Scriptures here declare, the Reason of man has in every age approved. All nations have supposed God to be a good Being; and, whenever they have employed themselves in accounting for the origin of evil by attributing it to the agency of superior beings, they have, in no case within my recollection, attributed it to the Original, or Supreme, God. Him they have uniformly believed to be a good, or benevolent, Being.

When we examine the works of Creation and Providence, we are liable, in pursuing this argument, to a considerable degree of perplexity, arising from the vast multitude, and perpetual complication of the things to be examined. To prevent this perplexity, into which men fall very easily, I know of no better method, than to lay hold of certain prominent and distinguishing features of these works, from which we may derive correct general apprehensions of their nature, without confounding ourselves by dwelling on particulars. This, after premising, that in every part of such an examination we must carefully separate what is done by men, from what is done by God, I shall attempt to accomplish under the following heads.

1st. God makes mankind the subjects of extensive enjoyment in the present world.

Our health, food, and raiment, are means of enjoyment to us daily, throughout our lives. Our friends and connexions, also, continually, and extensively, contribute to our happiness. The pleasantness of seasons; the beauty and grandeur of the earth and the heavens; the various kinds of agreeable sounds, ever fluctuating on our ears; the immensely various and delightful uses of language; the interchanges of thought and affection; the peace and safety, afforded by the institution of government; the power and agreeableness of motion and activity; the benefit and comfort, afforded by the arts and sciences, particularly by those of writing, printing, and numbering; and the continual gratification, found in employment; are all, in a sense, daily and hourly sources of good to man; all furnished, either directly or indirectly, by the hand of God. If we consider these things with any attention, we shall perceive, that some of them are unceasing; and that others of them are so frequently repeated, as almost to deserve the same appellation. We shall also perceive, that they are blessings of high importance to our well-being; and that, notwithstanding this character, they are apt to be forgotten in the list, which we form of our blessings, and to be numbered among those, which we call things of course.

*Acts xiv. 17

It ought to be remembered, that in this manner we are prone to diminish both the number and the greatness of our blessings, and the goodness of God in bestowing them; and that we are thus apt to regard them with a very erroneous estimation. But if we consider the number, and the importance, of these and the like blessings; the frequent recurrence of some of them, and the uninterrupted continuance of others; we cannot fail, if influenced by a just and candid spirit, to unite with the Psalmist in his earnest wish, that men would praise the Lord for his goodness, and for his wonderful works to the children of men.

2dly. God has furnished mankind with many alleviations, and many remedies, for the evils, which they suffer in the present world.

Of this nature are the innumerable medicines, which he has provided for the relief, or the cure, of our diseases; fire, for our deliverance from the evils of cold; shade, from those of heat; rest, from those of labour; sleep, from those of watching; together with innumerable others, which cannot here be mentioned. I feel myself obliged, however, to take notice of the attention, which God has given to the preservation of life, of health, and of safety, in the warnings, which our senses give us of the approach, or the exist ence, of injuries, in an innumerable variety of ways; and in the various instinctive efforts, by which we are, in a sense involuntarily, either guarded, or relieved. Thus, on the one hand, pain warns us of almost all injuries, to which our bodies are exposed, or by which they have begun to be affected. On the other, the eye, by its power of contracting the pupil, instinctively exercised, defends itself from the blindness, which would otherwise necessarily ensue from the admission of too great a quantity of light. The hands also, and other members, are instinctively employed to defend us from evils, in many cases, where contrivance would come too late for our safety. To mention one more example; fear, the most active and sudden of all our passions, is a continual preservative against innumerable evils, by which we are threatened. Not ought I here by any means to omit the self-restoring power of our bodies, so remarkable in recovering us from sickness, in the healing of wounds, and in the renewal of our decayed faculties. These, and innumerable other things, of a nature generally similar, are certainly strong proofs of the goodness of God to man

kind.

3dly. The original and main design of each particular thing appears plainly to be benevolent.

This is an argument of Dr. Paley on the subject of the present discourse; and is certainly a sound one. The eye is made to furnish us with the benefit of seeing; the ear, of hearing; and the palate, of tasting. The organs of speech are manifestly intended for the purpose of articulation; the hands and the feet for their well known important uses. The evils, to which these several things are subject, are in the mean time incidental, and not parts