SERMON IV.

UNITY OF GOD.

I. CORINTHIANS, viii. 4.-There is none other God but one.

IN the three preceding sermons, I have attempted to prove the Existence of God; to refute the Objections, and expose the systems, of Atheists; and by an examination of the necessary Influence of these systems on the intellect, heart, and life, compared with that of the Christian system, to show the malignant efficacy of the former, and the desirable consequences of the latter.

The text is a direct declaration of the Unity of God; the next subject of discourse in the order which I have proposed.

That there is but one God, is a doctrine acknowledged in this country by every man. No attempt, therefore, to prove the soundness of this doctrine by arguments, can be necessary, in order to produce conviction of its truth. My design, in choosing it for the subject of the present discourse, is, to exhibit the manner, in which we become possessed of it, and the evidence, with which it is attended. In pursuing this design, I shall inquire in the

I. place, What arguments are presented to us by the works of Creation and Providence in support of this doctrine:

II. What views men have entertained concerning it, under the direction of Reason:

III. What has been the influence of Revelation on the reception and continuance of this doctrine.

I. I shall inquire, what arguments are presented to us, by the works of Creation and Providence, in support of this doctrine.

In answer to this inquiry, I observe, that the works of Creation and Providence furnish to Reason, unaided by Revelation, the following considerations.

1st. The human mind, whenever it has admitted the being of One infinite God, has plainly found a difficulty in admitting the existence of more.

This argument I have chosen to express in these general terms, because I am aware, that different men have thought differently concerning this subject. This, indeed, is not at all to be wondered at, when we remember the peculiarly abstruse nature of those doctrines, which respect Infinity. The only conception, which the human mind is capable of forming concerning infinity, is that it exists. This fact we distinctly understand; and from it we can argue with success; but the nature of the thing, which is infinite, or, in more proper language, the nature of infinity itself, we cannot understand, nor can we argue from it at all. As the idea cannot enter

our minds; so it is plain, we can never compare it with any other idea; for it is self-evident, that an idea, which we have not, can never, by us, be compared with another idea. Of course, no proposition can be formed by us, in this case, and no argument founded, or conducted, with any knowledge, or evidence. In every such case, where men think that they conceive, argue, conclude, and demonstrate, they deceive themselves; and will, if they examine, find, that they have formed propositions without ideas, or mere collections of signs without any thing signified; so far at least as they are concerned.

Multitudes of mankind have considered it as obviously impossible, that two infinite beings should exist. As an infinite being and finite beings can, however, coexist in time and place, I see no decisive evidence, that two infinite beings cannot coexist. In truth, there is no perceptible difficulty, arising from the nature of the case, in supposing, that Spirits, or immaterial beings, can occupy the same place, at the same time. The contrary opinion seems, at least, to attribute to Spirits a property, or mode of being, substantially the same with what is called Solidity, or Impenetrability, in Matter.

Others, and, so far as I know, all who have acknowledged one infinite God, have regarded the acknowledgment of more as an absurdity. In this sentiment have concurred the Patriarchs, Jews, Christians, Mohammedans, and all those modern Infidels, who have not denied the existence of such a God. These classes of men have, with one voice, renounced the idea of more than one such God. Such a general accordance in men, differing in other respects so widely, clearly indicates, that the admission of one infinite God brings with it, to the human mind, serious difficulties against the admission of more; and plainly implies, that more cannot be admitted by the mind without violence done to the understanding.

Some degree of force is lent to this argument by Polytheism. Wherever more Gods than one have been acknowledged; it is remarkable, that none of them has been considered as Infinite.

The ideas of Polytheistical nations concerning their Gods have, I confess, been confused and contradictory. But it appears to me evident, that no such nation, and no individual holding a plurality of Gods, has ever introduced an infinitely perfect Being into a religious Creed. From this fact it would seem, that the idea of infinite Perfection was, in the view of the human mind, incompatible with Polytheism.

Several ancient Nations, as well as individuals, particularly the Persians, Egyptians, Chaldeans, and Greeks, according to Plutarch, agreed in the acknowledgment of two Gods. Plutarch himself also, and according to his testimony Plato, in his old age, together with the Pythagoreans, acknowledged two Gods; the one the author of Good, the other the author of Evil. From the account given

of this subject, taken in all its parts, it would seem, however, that the evil God, or Angyos, was inferior to the Ayadagyos, or good God. Two equal original causes seem not to have been received into any scheme of Theology; much less two infinite original Causes. That such was generally the fact, if not universally, will, I presume, be acknowledged without a question.

From all these facts, taken together, it may, I think, be fairly concluded, that the sense of the human mind has every where been against the admission of more than one Infinite God.

2dly. Although the proofs of the existence of God are complete, yet there is no proof of the existence of more than one God.

The argument for the being of God, which I mentioned as exhibited in the happiest manner by Mr. Locke, proves unanswerably the being of one eternal, self-existent Cause, possessed of sufficient Intelligence to contrive, and sufficient Power to create, the Universe of worlds, and all which it contains. The existence of one such Cause completely removes from the mind every difficulty, and satisfactorily accounts for every thing. But this argument proves nothing concerning the existence of a second Cause; nor does it possess the smallest influence to persuade us that a second exists.

The argument, which I mentioned as managed with peculiar felicity by Bishop Berkeley, exhibits in a different manner, but with conclusive evidence, one universally present and universally acting Power; animating, directing, and controlling all things: but it furnishes not a single trace of evidence, that there is a second.

From the existence of Evil, a considerable number of men have, I acknowledge, imagined, that there was reason to suppose the existence of a second Original Cause. They appear to have argued in this manner: "The good and perfect Cause cannot be the source of Evil. Particularly, he cannot, in any sense, be concerned, or connected, with the existence of Moral Evil. Such Evil, however, exists; and has, therefore, been produced. Of course, there must have been some other Cause, beside the good and perfect one."

This argument is specious, but plainly unsound. For, should it be admitted, as perhaps it safely may be, that Evil cannot proceed immediately from the perfect God; yet no argument can be alleged, to prove, that he cannot with entire propriety create such moral Beings, as, left to themselves, may yield to temptations, necessarily existing in the nature of things, and thus fall into Sin. In any supposable world, Pleasure may of course attend transgression; because Good may and must exist, (if Good exist at all) which cannot be lawfully enjoyed. The Good, which lawfully belongs only to others, may be seen, coveted, and seized; and thus for the time enjoyed. Finite Beings may, therefore, be induced by the present prospect of this Pleasure to transgress; or in other words, to sin. It has not hitherto been shown; I presume it cannot be shown; that God is by his perfections obliged to prevent the existence of

Moral Evil, originated in this manner, nor of Natural Evil, as its proper punishment.

Should it be said, that the perfections of God cannot fail to operate in such a manner, as to produce the greatest good; I acknowledge it. Still it cannot be proved, nor be rendered in any degree probable, that the greatest possible Good will not be found in a System, into which Evil has admission. That, in such a System, great Good may exist, is unquestionable. The Scriptural Scheme of Redemption proves, unanswerably, to all who believe the Bible, that Good will, and, to those who do not believe it, that Good may, spring, in a world where evil is found, greater than any other, which can be imagined by the human Mind. This argument is, therefore, wholly lame with respect to the purpose, for which it is introduced; and furnishes not the least reason for supposing such a second Cause.

3dly. If there were more Gods than one, it is incredible, that no proof should be furnished of their existence.

As no Intelligent being can act at all, without an end in view, for which he acts; so, as has been heretofore observed,* the end, proposed by the Creator of all things, must have been found in himself, and could have been no other, than the manifestation of his own Glory. The end of the Creation of man must of course have been, that he should coincide with this great design in the exercise of all his faculties; that he should discern it with his understanding, relish it in his affections, and promote it with his active powers. But, if more Gods than one were concerned in the Creation of Man, and of the Universe, it is evident, that this, the only supposable end of their acting at all, cannot, so far as respects Man, be possibly accomplished. That Man may either discern, or relish, the excellence, or, in the exercise of his active powers, promote, the designs of his Creator, it is absolutely necessary, that he should be furnished with some knowledge, and therefore with some proof, of his existence.

To his Creator, Man is indebted for existence, and is therefore his property. Of course, Man is absolutely his subject; rightfully governed by his will; rightfully subjected to his Law; rightfully disposed of, at his Pleasure; and therefore wholly bound to coincide, voluntarily, with all his designs. From the Creator, also, Man derives all his blessings; and is, therefore, under the highest obligations to exercise towards Him unceasing gratitude, and to perform all the actions, which gratitude can dictate, or inspire. Finally, the Creator of Man must be, of course, a Being infinitely great and glorious; and in this character claims from him, as an Intelligent creature, his highest adoration, love, complacency, and praise. In these several methods, and in these only, is Man capable of glorifying his Creator. In these, therefore, is found the

* See Sermon 1.

whole, and the only, end, which his Maker could propose in creating Man.

But to Man's performance of all, or any, of these services, it is absolutely necessary, that he should know the Being, who created him, and become acquainted, in some degree at least, with his character: and to this knowledge the previous knowledge of his existence is indispensable. To an unknown Being, Man cannot be conscious of indebtedness or obligation. By an unknown Being, he cannot be voluntarily governed. To the laws of an unknown Being, he cannot be voluntarily subject. To an unknown Being, he cannot be thankful. The character of an unknown Being, he can neither adore, admire, love, nor praise. If, then, his Creator be unknown, and necessarily unknown, Man cannot possibly, however virtuously he may be disposed, fulfil the only purpose, for which he was made. Of course, his Creator has, in the case supposed, made Man for a single end; and has yet so ordered the state of things, as to preclude him from any possibility of answering this end. In other words, he has created Man solely to accomplish a certain purpose; and has, at the same time, on his own part, prevented that purpose from any possibility of accomplish

ment.

What I have here said of one Creator, or one God, is, with exactly the same force, applicable to two, or three, or more Creators. If two or more Gods, sustaining the same character of Infinite Perfection, have been concerned in the Creation, and Providence, of this world; it is unquestionable, that they made the World, and Man upon it, for some end; and that this end must have terminated, as I have already in substance remarked, in themselves; or, in other words, must have been the manifestation of their own glory. In the same degree it is evident, that Man must have been alike indebted to them all for his being and his blessings; must be subject to their laws and government; must be bound voluntarily to coincide with their designs; and must owe them equal adoration, wonder, love, and praise. In order to the possibility of his fulfilling this end, and performing these duties, it is absolutely necessa ry, that he should know his obligations to them; and to this knowledge it is absolutely necessary, that he should know their existence. Whence then, if two or more such Beings exist, to whom Man is equally indebted for his being and his blessings, has it come to pass, that he is precluded, by a natural impossibility, from discovering the existence of any more than one? Whence is it, that all his sense of obligation for these high benefits; whence is it, that his gratitude, his voluntary subjection to divine government, his voluntary coincidence with the divine designs, his love, his reverence, his complacency, and his obedience, due alike to all his glorious Authors and Benefactors; are by absolute necessity, and without a possibility of its being otherwise, confined to one? Whence is it, that Man is so situated as to make the very attempt,