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absolute according Anaxagoras Anaximander animal Aristotle becomes Berlin body cause century Christian Church conceived conception consequently constitutes creatures Democritus Descartes Diog disciple divine doctrine dogma dualism Duns Scotus earth Eleatic elements Empedocles Engl essence eternal ethics everything evil existence Geschichte Greek Hegel Hence Heraclitus human ideal ideas immortality individual infinite intellectual intelligence Kant knowledge Leibniz Leipsic logic London material matter means metaphysics mind modern monads monism moral motion movement Mullach nature Neo-Platonic non-being object organs pantheism Paris Parmenides perceive perfect Peripateticism philo philosophy Phys physics Plato Plotinus principle priori produces Protagoras pure Pythagoras Pythagorean reality reason religion Ritter and Preller scepticism Scholasticism Scotus sensation sense sensible Socrates soul space speculation sphere Spinoza spirit Stoicism Stoics substance supreme teachings teleology theology theory things thought tion transl true truth unity universe vols καὶ τὸ
Popular passages
Page 423 - That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours to establish...
Page 419 - universally acknowledged that there is a great uniformity among the actions of men in all nations and ages, and that human nature remains still the same in its principles and operations. The same motives always produce the same actions : the same events follow from the same causes.
Page 385 - We have the ideas of matter and thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know whether any mere material being thinks or no;* it being impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own ideas, without revelation, to discover whether Omnipotency has not given to some systems of matter fitly disposed, a power to perceive and think...
Page 192 - For who maketh thee to differ from another ? and what hast thou that thou didst not receive? now if thou didst receive it, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received it?
Page 416 - ... the cause, and the first invention or conception of it, a priori, must be entirely arbitrary. And even after it is suggested, the conjunction of it with the cause must appear equally arbitrary, since there are always many other effects which, to reason, must seem fully as consistent and natural. In vain, therefore, should we pretend to determine any single event or infer any cause or effect without the assistance of observation and experience.
Page 391 - I ask whether those supposed originals or external things, of which our ideas are the pictures or representations, be themselves perceivable or no? If they are, then they are ideas and we have gained our point; but if you say they are not, I appeal to any one whether it be sense to assert a color is like something which is invisible; hard or soft, like something which is intangible; and so of the rest.
Page 412 - The only method of freeing learning at once from these abstruse questions is to inquire seriously into the nature of human understanding and show, from an exact analysis of its powers and capacity, that it is by no means fitted for such remote and abstruse subjects. We must submit to this fatigue in order to live at ease ever after and must cultivate true metaphysics with some care in order to destroy the false and adulterate.
Page 377 - ... and therefore they may be called real qualities, because they really exist in those bodies : but light, heat, whiteness, or coldness, are no more really in them than sickness or pain is in manna. Take away the sensation of them; let not the eyes see light or colours, nor the ears hear sounds ; let the palate not taste, nor the nose smell ; and all colours, tastes, odours, and sounds, as they are such particular ideas, vanish and cease, and are reduced to their causes, ie bulk, figure, and motion...
Page 417 - One event follows another; but we never can observe any tie between them. They seem conjoined, but never connected. And as we can have no idea of any thing which never appeared to our outward sense or inward / sentiment, the necessary conclusion seems to be that we ./ have no idea of connexion or power at all, and that these words are absolutely without any meaning, when employed either in philosophical reasonings or common life.
Page 392 - When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my view; and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses; the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There is therefore some other Will or Spirit that produces them.